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ABSTRACT
Interference constitutes a major challenge for communication networks op-
erating over a shared medium where availability is imperative. This dissertation
studies the problem of designing and analyzing efficient medium access proto-
cols which are robust against strong adversarial jamming. More specifically, four
medium access (MAC) protocols (i.e., JADE, ANTIJAM, COMAC, and SINRMAC)
which aim to achieve high throughput despite jamming activities under a variety
of network and adversary models are presented. We also propose a self-stabilizing
leader election protocol, SELECT, that can effectively elect a leader in the network
with the existence of a strong adversary.
Our protocols can not only deal with internal interference without the exact
knowledge on the number of participants in the network, but they are also robust to
unintentional or intentional external interference, e.g., due to co-existing networks
or jammers. We model the external interference by a powerful adaptive and/or re-
active adversary which can jam a (1−ε)-portion of the time steps, where 0< ε ≤ 1
is an arbitrary constant. We allow the adversary to be adaptive and to have com-
plete knowledge of the entire protocol history. Moreover, in case the adversary is
also reactive, it uses carrier sensing to make informed decisions to disrupt commu-
nications.
Among the proposed protocols, JADE, ANTIJAM and COMAC are able to
achieve Θ(1)-competitive throughput with the presence of the strong adversary;
while SINRMAC is the first attempt to apply SINR model (i.e., Signal to Inter-
ference plus Noise Ratio), in robust medium access protocols design; the derived
principles are also useful to build applications on top of the MAC layer, and we
present SELECT, which is an exemplary study for leader election, which is one of
the most fundamental tasks in distributed computing.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
Designing efficient medium access protocols in a wireless network envi-
ronment that are robust against different kinds of interference is one of the most
relevant but also most complex problems in distributed computing. First, a wire-
less network requires distributed access coordination mechanisms which minimize
the internal interference due to simultaneous transmissions from wireless devices
in the same network. In addition, the availability of the wireless medium can vary
significantly over time due to the external interference, e.g., due to disturbances
from other sources such as microwaves, due to transmissions of coexisting (poten-
tially mobile) networks, or due to intentional or even adversarial interruptions. For
example, it is well-known that already simple jamming attacks—without using any
special hardware—constitute a threat for the widely used IEEE 802.11 MAC pro-
tocol [7]. Due to the problem’s relevance, there has been a significant effort to cope
with such disruption problems both from the industry and the academia side and
much progress has been made over the past few years.
This dissertation aims to design and analyze robust medium access proto-
cols, so that even with the existence of a strong adversary the protocols can still
manage to achieve provably high throughput. Note that we consider adversarial
physical layer jamming only. Although we do not study malicious fake message
jamming and other form of jamming activities which are above the physical layer,
our physical adversarial jamming model works in conjunction with other adversary
models at higher layers. The protocols studied here operate on the Medium Ac-
cess Control (MAC) sub-layer of the data link layer (defined in the seven-layer OSI
model), so we call them MAC protocols. The MAC protocols address the problem
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of how to decide who gets to use the shared medium when there is a contention for
it. Many MAC protocols have been proposed, however, the presence of a strong ad-
versary in the network makes the existing protocols vulnerable and inefficient to the
jamming attack. Classic defense mechanisms operate at the physical layer [38, 42]
and there exist approaches both to avoid as well as to detect jamming. Spread
spectrum and frequency hopping technologies have been shown to be very effective
to avoid jamming with widely spread signals. These physical layer solutions are
orthogonal to our work, and can improve the robustness of the protocols further.
However, the ISM frequency band used by IEEE 802.11 variants is too narrow to
effectively apply spread spectrum techniques [10]. Also, as jamming strategies can
come in many different flavors, detecting jamming activities by simple methods
based on signal strength, carrier sensing, or packet delivery ratios has turned out
to be quite difficult [37]. A more comprehensive overview of the related work is
provided in Section 1.3.
We consider two types of adversaries in this dissertation: (i) adaptive but
non-reactive, where the adversary has the complete knowledge of the protocol his-
tory and can use this knowledge to make jamming decisions. However, the adver-
sary has to take actions before honest nodes decide whether to transmit a message
or not; Clearly, the adaptive adversary is much stronger compared to oblivious or
random adversaries; (ii) adaptive and reactive, where the adversary is adaptive,
and moreover, it is reactive in the sense that the adversary can use carrier sensing
to sense the channel and make jamming decisions after honest nodes made their
transmission decisions, which makes the adversary even more powerful and effec-
tive. Let us consider the following scenario as an example: suppose that at the
current time step no node in the network decides to transmit, then the adversary can
2
quickly sense the channel and decide not to jam the channel, so that the energy can
be saved to jam the channel when certain transmission activity is taking place.
Our work is motivated by the results in [7] and [6]. In [7] it is shown that
an adaptive jammer can dramatically reduce the throughput of the standard MAC
protocol used in IEEE 802.11 with only limited energy cost on the adversary side.
Awerbuch et al. [6] initiated the study of throughput-competitive MAC protocols in
single-hop wireless networks under continuously running, adaptive jammers, and
presented a protocol that achieves a high performance under adaptive but non-
reactive jamming. In a single-hop network, all the nodes are within transmission
and interference range of each other, i.e., the communication network is a complete
graph. In contrast, in a multi-hop network, not all nodes are within each other’s
transmission and interference range. In order to get a message broadcasted in a
multi-hop network, more than one hop of transmission is needed. We extend the
results in [6] in the following ways:
1. JADE: The JADE protocol is designed for multi-hop wireless networks. Cru-
cial modifications are made based on the protocol in [6], so that JADE achieves
constant throughput in multi-hop wireless networks that can be modeled as
unit disk graph (see Section 1.2.1), and is robust against an adaptive but non-
reactive adversary. We discuss JADE in more detail in Chapter 2 (this work
also appeared in [49]).
2. ANTIJAM: Although an adaptive but non-reactive adversary is much stronger
than an oblivious or random adversary, not being able to make a jamming de-
cision based on honest nodes’ decisions in the current time step makes the
adversary model less practical. Hence, we consider adaptive and reactive ad-
versary, and propose ANTIJAM, where constant throughput can be achieved
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with the presence of a strong adaptive and reactive adversary in the single-
hop wireless networks We discuss ANTIJAM in detail in Chapter 3 (this work
also appeared in [50]).
3. SELECT: Leader election is a classical problem in the field of distributed
computing. Once a leader is elected, many coordination tasks are greatly
simplified. We consider the problem of electing a leader in a harsh wireless
network in order to coordinate access to a shared communication medium.
We propose SELECT, a self-stabilizing leader election protocol that can al-
ways elect one and only one leader from a single-hop wireless network, no
matter what the initial state is, and despite the existence of a strong adaptive
and reactive adversary. We discuss SELECT in detail in Chapter 4 (this work
also appeared in [51]).
4. COMAC: The problem of accessing the shared medium by different co-
existing networks fairly and efficiently, especially in environments with un-
controllable external interference, such as jamming, is important and chal-
lenging. Nowadays, more and more devices belonging to co-existing net-
works share a chunk of the limited wireless spectrum resource simultane-
ously. We propose COMAC, which is able to achieve constant throughput
and fairness, since it evenly distributes the number of successful transmis-
sions for each individual network, up to a small multiplicative factor. The
protocol is also robust against an adaptive but non-reactive adversary. We
discuss COMAC in detail in Chapter 5 (this work also appeared in [53])).
5. SINRMAC: Designing a jamming-resistant MAC protocol under the widely
used and more realistic Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise-Ratio (SINR) would
be the next big step forward. Hence, we explore the possibility to come
up with such a MAC protocol, called SINRMAC, which can achieve high
4
throughput despite jamming. An initial study on this problem is presented in
Chapter 6 (this work also appeared in [52]).
1.2 General Model
We specify the general network (interference), communication and adver-
sary models here. Note that models for specific protocols may vary. Please refer
to the corresponding chapters for the detailed models used by each protocol. We
summarize the models used by different protocols in Table 1.1.
Protocol Network Model Communication Model Adversary Model
JADE UDG (Multi-hop) Single Channel, Half-duplex Adaptive but Non-Reactive
ANTIJAM Single-hop Single Channel, Half-duplex Adaptive and Reactive
SELECT Single-hop Single Channel, Half-duplex Adaptive and Reactive
COMAC Single-hop Single Channel, Half-duplex Adaptive but Non-Reactive
SINRMAC SINR (Multi-hop) Single Channel, Half-duplex Adaptive but Non-Reactive
Table 1.1: Different models for different protocols.
1.2.1 Network (Interference) Model:
1. Single-hop: The network consists of n honest and reliable nodes that are
within the transmission and interference range of each other, which is equiv-
alent to assuming that the network topology is a complete graph.
2. UDG (Multi-hop): As an initial study of multi-hop wireless networks, we use
the Unit Disk Graph (UDG) to model the network topology. More specifi-
cally, let the network be represented by a graph G = (V,E) where V repre-
sents a set of n = |V | honest and reliable nodes and two nodes u,v ∈ V are
within each other’s transmission and interference range, i.e., {u,v} ∈ E, if
and only if their (normalized) distance is at most 1. Note that the transmis-
sion and interference range of the nodes are the same under the UDG model.
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3. SINR (Multi-hop): We assume n wireless nodes are distributed arbitrarily in
the 2-dimensional Euclidean plane. The SINR model defines a parameter
called minimum signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at which a
data frame can still be received with a reasonably low frame error rate. A
message sent from u to v is received correctly if and only if
Pv(u)
N +∑w∈S Pv(w)
≥ β1
where Pv(u) is the received power at node v of the signal transmitted by node
u, N captures the background noise (e.g., thermal), S is the subset of nodes
in V \{u,v} that are concurrently transmitting, and β1 is the SINR threshold
that depends on the desired rate, the modulation scheme, etc.
1.2.2 Communication Model:
We assume a back-logged scenario where the nodes continuously contend for send-
ing a packet on the wireless channel. A node may either transmit a message or sense
the channel at a time step, but it cannot do both, and there is no immediate feedback
mechanism telling a node whether its transmission was successful. When consid-
ering single-hop or UDG (multi-hop) network model, a node sensing the channel
may come across one of the following three scenarios: (i) sense an idle channel (in
case no other node in the transmitting range of the node transmits at that time); (ii)
sense a busy channel (in case two or more nodes within the transmission range of
the node transmit at the time step, or the adversary or the adversary disrupts the
signal at the node); or (iii) receive a packet (in case exactly one node within the
transmitting range of the node transmits at the time step). While considering SINR
as the network model, a node does not have clear distinctions regarding idle and
busy channels. A noise level threshold is introduced to resolve this issue. More de-
tails can be found in Chapter 6. The wireless channel considered in this dissertation
has single frequency and is half-duplex.
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1.2.3 Adversary Model:
We consider two types of adversaries:
1. adaptive but non-reactive adversary: adaptive in the sense that the adversary
knows the protocol history, and can make jamming decisions based on it.
The adversary has to make a jamming decision before honest nodes decide
whether to transmit or not.
2. adaptive and reactive adversary: in addition to being adaptive, the adversary
is reactive in the sense that it can perform physical carrier sensing to learn
whether the channel is currently idle or not, and jam the medium depending
on these measurements. Note that the adversary can sense the channel condi-
tion in the current time step and make a jamming decision instantly (i.e., the
jamming decision is made after honest nodes decide whether to transmit or
not).
Note that although being reactive gives the adversary more power by revealing some
information about the nodes’ random decisions at the current time step, an adaptive
adversary is already much stronger than its oblivious and random adversaries coun-
terparts.
1.3 Related Work
Due to the topic’s importance, wireless network jamming has been exten-
sively studied in the applied research fields [1, 10, 12, 31, 35, 37, 38, 42, 43, 58,
61, 62, 63], both from the attacker’s perspective [12, 35, 37, 63] as well as from
the defender’s perspective [1, 10, 12, 37, 38, 42, 61, 63]—also in multi-hop settings
(e.g. [29, 45, 65, 66, 67]).
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Recent work has also studied MAC layer strategies against jamming, includ-
ing coding strategies (e.g., [12]), channel surfing and spatial retreat (e.g., [1, 64]),
or mechanisms to hide messages from a jammer, evade its search, and reduce the
impact of corrupted messages (e.g., [61]). However, these methods do not help
against an adaptive jammer with full information about the history of the protocol,
like the one considered in our work.
In the theory community, work on MAC protocols has mostly focused on
efficiency. Many of these protocols are random backoff protocols (e.g., [8, 13, 14,
25, 48]) that do not take jamming activity into account and, in fact, are not robust
against it (see [6] for more details). But also some theoretical work on jamming is
known (e.g., [16] for a short overview). There are two basic approaches in the lit-
erature. The first assumes randomly corrupted messages (e.g. [47]), which is much
easier to handle than adaptive adversarial jamming [7]. The second line of work
either bounds the number of messages that the adversary can transmit or disrupt
with a limited energy budget (e.g. [23, 32]), or bounds the number of channels the
adversary can jam (e.g. [22, 39]). The protocols in, e.g., [32] can tackle adversarial
jamming at both the MAC and network layers, where the adversary may not only
jam the channel but also introduce malicious (fake) messages (possibly with ad-
dress spoofing). However, these solutions depend on the fact that the adversarial
jamming budget is finite, so it is not clear whether the protocols would work under
heavy continuous jamming. (The result in Theorem 1 of [23] upper bounds the ad-
versary’s capability of disrupting communications with a budget of β messages, and
then shows that the proposed protocol needs at least 2β rounds to terminate, which
implies a jamming rate below 0.5. The handshaking mechanism in [32] requires an
even lower jamming rate.
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In the multi-channel version of the problem introduced in the theory com-
munity by Dolev [17] and also studied in [19, 17, 18, 22, 39], a node can only access
one channel at a time, which results in protocols with a fairly large runtime (which
can be exponential for deterministic protocols [17, 22] and at least quadratic in the
number of jammed channels for randomized protocols [18, 39] if the adversary can
jam almost all channels at a time). Recent work [19] also focuses on the wireless
synchronization problem which requires devices to be activated at different times on
a congested single-hop radio network to synchronize their round numbering while
an adversary can disrupt a certain number of frequencies per round. Gilbert et
al. [22] study robust information exchange in single-hop networks.
There is also a chapter on the leader election application considered in this
dissertation. Leader election is an evergreen in distributed algorithms research and
there exist many theoretical and practical results [5, 20, 33, 36, 41, 44, 57, 60].
The following two book chapters provide a good introduction: Chapter 3 in [4] and
Chapter 8 in [27]. A leader election algorithm should be as flexible as possible in
the sense that a correct solution is computed independently of the initial network
state. For instance, the algorithm should be able to react to a leader departure, or
be able to cope with situations where for some reasons, multiple nodes consider
themselves leaders. Self-stabilization [15] is an attractive concept to describe such
self-repairing properties of an algorithm, and it has been intensively studied already,
not only in terms of eventual stabilization but also in terms of guaranteed conver-
gence times (see e.g., the works on time-adaptive self-stabilization such as [34]).
Several self-stabilizing leader election protocols have been devised, e.g., [2, 11, 28]
(see also the fault-contained solutions such as [21]). However, none of these ap-
proaches allows us to elect a leader in a wireless network that is exposed to harsh
interference or even adaptive jamming. But such interruptions of communication
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are often unavoidable in wireless systems, and we believe that electing a leader can
be particularly useful in such harsh environments.
When it comes to design robust and efficient MAC protocols for coexisting
networks, the performance achieved by the MAC protocols described in [6, 49, 50],
which are jamming-resistant in single network settings, drops sharply if multiple
networks are collocated: This is due to the fact that in these protocols, each indi-
vidual co-existing network will strive to achieve a constant competitive throughput
in the non-jammed time periods, which requires a constant cumulative access prob-
ability per co-existing network. It is easy to see that this necessarily leads to a
throughput which is exponentially small in the number of co-existing networks.
More importantly, the algorithmic approach used [6, 49, 50] is doomed to fail in
the context of co-existing networks, as nodes in different networks do not have a
consistent view of the successful transmissions: in a remote network, a successful
transmission cannot be distinguished from a collision or jammed time step.
It turns out that in a co-existing scenario, the nodes must strike a good bal-
ance between a less aggressive (more cooperative) medium access strategy while re-
maining robust against external interference. We will show that this can be achieved
by monitoring the availability of the wireless medium over time and adjusting the
sending probabilities or backoffs according to the fraction of observed idle time pe-
riods. (A similar approach is used in the IdleSense [26] Distributed Coordination
Function to synchronize the nodes’ contention windows.) Implicitly synchronizing
access via idle time periods is also the key to enable fairness between co-existing
networks. The performance analysis of such an algorithm however is involved,
as the distributed and randomized decisions exhibit many non-trivial dependencies.
Nevertheless, we are able to rigorously prove good competitive throughput and fair-
ness properties, which is also confirmed by our simulation study.
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Interestingly, although co-existing networks are ubiquitous and many dif-
ferent aspects are discussed intensively (e.g., the packet inter-arrival time and fair-
ness in co-existing 802.11a/g and 802.11n networks [3], interference cancelation
phenomena [54], transmission capacities in multi-antenna ad-hoc networks [30],
or even explicit inter-network communication for frequency cooperation [68]) in
different contexts (e.g., in the current debate on white space liberalization [46]
where primary TV and microphone users announcing their reservations in a cen-
tral database are given strict priority), we are not aware of any work on the design
of MAC protocols for independent co-existing networks with rigorous formal com-
petitive throughput and fairness guarantees.
1.4 Preliminaries
In this section, we present some important definitions and basic results,
which will be used in the following chapters.
1.4.1 Intuition
We first explain the intuition used by our protocols in this dissertation.
Although serving for different purposes under different models, the intu-
ition behind JADE, ANIJAM, SELECT, COMAC, and SINRMAC is similar to the
one presented in [6]. For JADE, ANTIJAM, COMAC and SINRMAC, the goal is to
achieve provably high throughput against adversarial jamming by adapting nodes’
access probabilities based on the events of idle channel and successful transmis-
sion. For SELECT, the main goal is to have a leader election protocol that is self-
stabilizing despite adversarial jamming. To accomplish this, nodes also need to
adjust their probabilities based on idle channel or successful transmissions so that
FOLLOWER and LEADER messages can go through despite jamming. Hence,
how to adjust nodes’ access probabilities appropriately is crucial to the design of
robust and efficient medium access despite jamming. Next, we explain the intuition
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in more detail. We assume the network model is single-hop and single network for
now, in case of multi-hop networks as well as coexisting networks, the same intu-
ition still applies, as explained in Chapters 2 and 5.
Let G = (V,E) be a single-hop network where n = |V |. Each node v main-
tains a medium access probability pv which determines the probability that v trans-
mits a message in a communication round. Let the cumulative probability p =
∑v pv, q0 be the probability that the channel is idle, and q1 be the probability that
exactly one node is sending a message. We have the following lemma which was
first proved in [6]:
Lemma 1.1 q0 · p≤ q1 ≤ q01−pˆ · p.
Proof. It holds that q0 =∏v(1− pv) and q1 = ∑v pv∏w6=v(1−pw). Hence,
q1 ≤∑
v
pv
1
1− pˆ∏w
(1− pw) = q0 · p1− pˆ
q1 ≥∑
v
pv∏
w
(1− pw) = q0 · p
which implies the lemma.
According to Lemma 1.1, if q0 =Θ(q1), then the cumulative sending proba-
bility p is constant, which in turn implies that at any non-jammed time step we have
constant probability of having a successful transmission. Hence our protocol aims
at adjusting the sending probabilities pv of the nodes such that q0 =Θ(q1), in spite
of adversarial jamming activities. This could be achieved by adjusting nodes’ ac-
cess probabilities based on the events of idle channel and successful transmissions,
more details of which are provided in the following chapters.
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1.4.2 Mathematical Tools
In order to perform theoretical analysis on our protocols, we will frequently use the
following two lemmas: Lemma 1.2 is the variant of the Chernoff bounds [6, 56];
Lemma 1.3 follows immediately from the Taylor series of the exponential function.
Lemma 1.2 Consider any set of binary random variables X1, . . . ,Xn. Suppose
that there are values p1, . . . , pn ∈ [0,1] with E[∏i∈S Xi] ≤ ∏i∈S pi for every set
S⊆ {1, . . . ,n}. Then it holds for X = ∑ni=1 Xi and µ = ∑ni=1 pi and any δ > 0 that
P[X ≥ (1+δ )µ]≤
(
eδ
(1+δ )1+δ
)µ
≤ e−
δ2µ
2(1+δ/3) .
If, on the other hand, it holds that E[∏i∈S Xi]≥∏i∈S pi for every set S⊆ {1, . . . ,n},
then it holds for any 0< δ < 1 that
P[X ≤ (1−δ )µ]≤
(
e−δ
(1−δ )1−δ
)µ
≤ e−δ 2µ/2.
Lemma 1.3 For all 0< x< 1 it holds that
e−x/(1−x) ≤ 1− x≤ e−x
13
Chapter 2
THE JADE PROTOCOL
In this chapter, we consider the problem of designing a robust MAC protocol for
multi-hop wireless networks, with the existence of a strong adaptive but non-reactive
adversary. We prove that the proposed protocol, JADE, can achieve constant com-
petitive throughput, and the limitations of JADE is also discussed.
The wireless network is modeled as a unit disk graph (UDG) G = (V,E)
where V represents a set of n= |V | honest and reliable nodes and two nodes u,v∈V
are within each other’s transmission range, i.e., {u,v} ∈ E, if and only if their (nor-
malized) distance is at most 1. We assume that time proceeds in synchronous time
steps called rounds. In each round, a node may either transmit a message or sense
the channel, but it cannot do both. Moreover, we assume that a (receiving) node
can detect collisions. Concretely, a node which is sensing the channel may either
(i) sense an idle channel (if no other node in its transmission range is transmitting at
that round and its channel is not jammed), (ii) sense a busy channel (if two or more
nodes in its transmission range transmit at that round or its channel is jammed), or
(iii) receive a packet (if exactly one node in its transmission range transmits at that
round and its channel is not jammed).
In addition to these nodes there is an adversary (controlling any number of
jamming devices). We allow the adversary to know the protocol and its entire his-
tory and to use this knowledge in order to jam the wireless channel at will at any
round (i.e, the adversary is adaptive). However, like in [6], the adversary has to
make a jamming decision before it knows the actions of the nodes at the current
round. The adversary can jam the nodes individually at will, as long as for every
node v, at most a (1− ε)-fraction of its rounds is jammed (ε > 0 can be an arbi-
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trarily small constant independent of n), among which at least an arbitrary constant
fraction are open. We say a round t is open for a node v if v and at least one other
node in its neighborhood are non-jammed (which implies that v’s neighborhood is
non-empty). More formally, an adversary is (T,1−ε)-bounded for some T ∈N and
0 < ε < 1, if for any time window of size w ≥ T and at any node v, the adversary
can jam at most (1− ε)w of the w rounds at v, and at least an arbitrary constant
fraction of the non-jammed rounds at v are open in every time interval of size w. In
this chapter, if not stated otherwise and by default, we always refer to the adversary
defined here. We also consider a stronger adversary that does not have the limita-
tion of providing open rounds. Note that we sometime explicitly use the adjective
weak to distinguish the adversary defined previously from the stronger variant.
Next, we need to rigorously define c-competitiveness in a multi-hop wireless
network setting. Given a node v and a time interval I, we define fv(I) as the number
of time steps in I that are non-jammed at v and sv(I) as the number of time steps in I
in which v successfully receives a message. Then, we have the following definition:
Definition 2.1 A MAC protocol is called c-competitive against some (T,1− ε)-
bounded adversary if, for any time interval I with |I| ≥ K for a sufficiently large K
(that may depend on T and n), ∑v∈V sv(I)≥ c ·∑v∈V fv(I).
In other words, a c-competitive MAC protocol can achieve at least a c-fraction of
the best possible throughput.
Our goal is to design a symmetric local-control MAC protocol (i.e., there is
no central authority controlling the nodes, and all the nodes are executing the same
protocol) that has a constant-competitive throughput (i.e., a c-competitive through-
put where c does not depend on n) against any (T,1− ε)-bounded adversary in
any multi-hop network that can be modeled as a UDG. Not only the nodes are dis-
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tributed in space in our model, but also the adversary. Concretely, we introduce
the concept of a k-uniform adversary, an adversary that can jam different nodes at
different times. An adversary is k-uniform if the node set V can be partitioned into
k subsets so that the jamming sequence is the same within each subset. In other
words, we require that at all times, the nodes in a subset are either all jammed or
all non-jammed. Thus, a 1-uniform jammer jams either everybody or nobody in a
round whereas an n-uniform jammer can jam the nodes individually at will. Note
that the adversary must hence not necessarily be geometrically constrained.
As already mentioned, we also consider a stronger adversary: we say that a
strong adversary is (T,1− ε)-bounded, if for any time window of size w ≥ T and
at any node v, the adversary can jam at most (1− ε)w of the w rounds at v, where
T ∈N and 0< ε < 1. Note that this adversary is stronger as we only guarantee that
an ε-fraction of the rounds at v are non-jammed, but not that during these rounds
there exists at least one neighbor free to receive a message from v. While the nodes
do not know ε , we do allow them to have a very rough upper bound of the values n
and T .
Finally, let us emphasize that our notion of throughput is constrained to
Layer 2 (the MAC layer), and measures the number of successful transmissions over
“links”, i.e., pairs of nodes. That is, assuming a backlogged situation where packets
are constantly submitted to the medium access layer from higher layers, we can
schedule transmissions over Layer 2 links efficiently. In contrast to other through-
put models in literature (e.g., [59]), we explicitly consider the receiver-side which
we believe is much more meaningful: in a broadcast medium and in a distributed
setting, the throughput computed by focusing on the sender only can be misleading
as simply sending a packet out does not imply that it is also received (and by how
many nodes). However, also note that a (MAC layer) link-based throughput does
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not imply any minimal end-to-end throughput between remote nodes on higher lay-
ers, e.g., on the transport layer (especially when using TCP with its flow and con-
gestion control mechanisms), or throughput of flows. Moreover, note that we do
not model any retransmissions that would happen on higher layers. Indeed, our
MAC protocol has the nice property that it does not rely on any acknowledgements
on the MAC layer to guarantee the throughput, and assumes that retransmission
mechanisms are in place on higher layers.
In this dissertation, we say that a claim holds with high probability (w.h.p.)
iff it holds with probability at least 1− 1/nc for any constant c ≥ 1; it holds with
moderate probability (w.m.p.) iff it holds with probability at least 1−1/(logn)c for
any constant c≥ 1.
2.1 Contribution
We present a robust MAC protocol called JADE. JADE is a fairly simple pro-
tocol: it is based on a small set of rules and assumptions (e.g., collision detection at
receivers), and has a minimal storage overhead. We can prove the following main
theorem:
Theorem 2.2 When running JADE for Ω([T +(log3 n)/(γ2ε)] · (logn)/ε) rounds it
holds w.h.p. that JADE achieves a constant competitive throughput (i.e., indepen-
dent of n) for any (T,1−ε)-bounded (weak) adversary, where n is the total number
of nodes and γ ∈ O(1/(logT + log logn) is a parameter.
Since logT and loglogn are small the assumption on γ is not too restrictive:
A conservative estimate on logT and loglogn would leave room for a superpoly-
nomial change in n and a polynomial change in T over time. Also note that the
(unrealistic and non-scalable) assumption that the nodes know constant factor ap-
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proximations of n or T directly would render the problem trivial. (Whether a com-
petitive MAC protocol exists without any assumptions on the magnitude of these
parameters is an open question. We conjecture no such algorithm exists.)
Regarding the strong adversary, we can show constant throughput only if
one of the conditions in Theorem 2.3 is satisfied.
Theorem 2.3 When running JADE forΩ((T logn)/ε+(logn)4/(γε)2) rounds, JADE
has a constant competitive throughput against any strong adversary that is (T,1−
ε)-bounded and in any UDG w.h.p., as long as (a) the adversary is 1-uniform and
the UDG is connected, or (b) there are at least 2/ε nodes within the transmission
range of every node.
In Section 2.3.4, we show that Theorem 2.3 captures all the scenarios for which
JADE can have a constant competitive throughput under a strong adversary.
Concretely, we will show the following limitations under a strong adversary.
Let D(u) denote the set of nodes around node u, consisting of u’s neighboring nodes
as well as u.
Theorem 2.4 In general, JADE is not strongly c-competitive for a constant c > 0
(independent of n) if the strong adversary is allowed to be 2-uniform and ε ≤ 1/3.
Moreover, JADE is also not c-competitive for a constant c if there are nodes u with
|D(u)|= o(1/ε) and the strong adversary is allowed to be 2-uniform.
Here, strongly c-competitive refers to a stronger throughput model where we require
that for any sufficiently large time interval and any node v, the number of rounds in
which v successfully receives a message is at least a c-fraction of the total number
of non-jammed rounds at v.
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2.2 Description of JADE
This section first gives a short motivation for our algorithmic approach and
then presents the JADE protocol in detail.
2.2.1 Intuition
Each node u maintains a parameter pu which describes u’s probability of accessing
the channel at a given moment of time. That is, in each round, each node u decides
to broadcast a packet with probability pu. (This is similar to classic random backoff
mechanisms where the next transmission time t is chosen uniformly at random from
an interval of size 1/pv.) The nodes adapt and synchronize their pu values over time
in a multiplicative increase multiplicative decrease manner, i.e., the value is lowered
in times of high interference or increased during times where the channel is idling.
However, pu will never exceed pˆ, for some constant 0< pˆ< 1.
The intuition behind JADE follows the guideline illustrated in Section 1.4.1,
although Lemma 1.1 needs to be verified in multi-hop scenario. We show this as
follows.
Consider the unit disk D(u) around node u consisting of u’s neighboring
nodes as well as u.1 Moreover, let N(u) = D(u) \ {u} and p = p(u) = ∑v∈N(u) pv;
henceforth, when u is clear from the context, we will often simply write p instead
of p(u). Suppose that u is sensing the channel. Let q0 be the probability that the
channel is idle at u and let q1 be the probability that exactly one node in N(u) is
sending a message.
It holds that q0 =∏v∈N(u)(1− pv) and q1 =∑v∈N(u) pv∏w∈N(u)\{v}(1− pw).
1In this dissertation, disks (and later sectors) will refer both to 2-dimensional areas in the plane
as well as to the set of nodes in the respective areas. The exact meaning will become clear in the
specific context.
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Hence,
q1 ≤ ∑
v∈N(u)
pv
1
1− pˆ ∏w∈N(u)
(1− pw) = q0 · p1− pˆ
q1 ≥ ∑
v∈N(u)
pv ∏
w∈N(u)
(1− pw) = q0 · p.
Thus we prove Lemma 1.1 for the multi-hop case.
By Lemma 1.1, if a node v observes that the number of rounds in which
the channel is idle is equal to the number of rounds in which exactly one message
is sent, then p = ∑v∈N(v) pv is likely to be around 1 (if pˆ is a sufficiently small
constant), which would be ideal.
Otherwise, the nodes know that they need to adapt their probabilities. Thus,
if we had sufficiently many cases in which an idle channel or exactly one message
transmission is observed (which is the case if the adversary does not heavily jam the
channel and p is not too large), then one can adapt the probabilities pv just based on
these two events and ignore all cases in which the wireless channel is blocked, either
because the adversary is jamming it or because at least two messages interfere with
each other (see also [26] for a similar conclusion). Unfortunately, p can be very
high for some reason (e.g., due to high initial sending probabilities), which requires
a more sophisticated strategy for adjusting the access probabilities.
2.2.2 Protocol Description
In JADE, each node v maintains, in addition to the probability value pv, a threshold
Tv and a counter cv for Tv. Tv is used to estimate the adversary’s time window
T : a good estimation of T can help the nodes recover from a situation where they
experience high interference in the network. In times of high interference, Tv will
be increased and the sending probability pv will be decreased.
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Initially, every node v sets cv := 1 and pv := pˆ. Note however that while
we provide some initial values for the variables in our description, our protocol is
self-stabilizing and works for any initial variable values, as we will show in our
proofs.
Algorithm 1 JADE: for each node v
1: roundcounter = 0
2: pv := pˆ
3: cv := 1
4: Tv := 1 {JADE works in synchronized rounds}
5: while True do
6: v decides with probability pv to send a message
7: if v decides to send a message then
8: v sends a message
9: else
10: v senses the channel
11: if v senses an idle channel then
12: pv := min{(1+ γ)pv, pˆ}
13: else if v successfully receives a message then
14: pv := (1+ γ)−1 pv
15: Tv := max{Tv−1,1}
16: end if
17: end if
18: cv := cv+1
19: if cv > Tv then
20: cv := 1
21: if there was no successful transmission or an idle channel among the past
Tv time steps then
22: pv := (1+ γ)−1 pv
23: Tv := min{Tv+1,21/(4γ)}
24: end if
25: end if
26: roundcounter := roundcounter+1
27: end while
As we will see in the upcoming section, the concept of using a multiplicative-
increase-multiplicative-decrease mechanism for pv and an additive-increase-additive-
decrease mechanism for Tv, as well as the slight modifications of the protocol in [6],
marked in italic above, are crucial for JADE to work. If in the Afterwards part of the
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algorithm we did not include the “idle” condition, in a distributed setting, it could
happen that a center node u which is surrounded by many nodes with low pv values
which are in turn surrounded by nodes with high pw values (and hence the middle
nodes’s pv values stay low), will never see any successful transmissions (apart from
u’s own transmissions), and hence Tu may increase arbitrarily. Such high Tu values
however are harmful to the fast recovery properties of the protocol.
2.3 Analysis
In contrast the description of JADE, its stochastic analysis is rather involved
as it requires to shed light onto the complex interplay of the nodes all following
their randomized protocol in a dependent manner. We first prove Theorem 2.2
in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, and then derive Theorem 2.3 in Section 2.3.3. The
limitations of JADE under the strong adversary are discussed in Section 2.3.4.
The analysis makes repeated use of Lemma 1.3 and the Chernoff bounds in
Lemma 1.2.
2.3.1 Proof of Theorem 2.2
First, we focus on a time frame F consisting of (α logn)/ε subframes of size f =
α[T +(log3 n)/(γ2ε)] each, where f is a multiple of T and α is a sufficiently large
constant. The proof needs the following three lemmas. The first one is identical to
Claim 2.5 in [6]. It is true because only successful message transmissions reduce
Tu.
Lemma 2.5 If in a time interval I the number of rounds in which a node u suc-
cessfully receives a message is at most r, then u increases Tu in at most r+
√
2|I|
rounds in I.
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The following lemma even holds for a strong adversary and will be shown
in Section 2.3.2.
Lemma 2.6 For every node u, ∑v∈D(u) pv =O(1) for at least a (1−εβ )-fraction of
the rounds in time frame F, w.h.p., where the constant β > 0 can be made arbitrarily
small.
The following lemma follows from simple geometric arguments.
Lemma 2.7 A disk of radius 2 can be cut into at most 20 regions so that the distance
between any two points in a region is at most 1.
Consider some fixed node u. Let J ⊆ F be the set of all non-jammed open
rounds at u in time frame F (which are a constant fraction of the non-jammed rounds
at u). Let p be a constant satisfying Lemma 2.6 (i.e., ∑w∈D(v) pw ≤ p). Define
DD(u) to be the disk of radius 2 around u (i.e., it has twice the radius of D(u)). Cut
DD(u) into 20 regions R1, . . . ,R20 satisfying Lemma 2.7, and let vi be any node in
region Ri (if such a node exists), where vi = u if u ∈ Ri. According to Lemma 2.6
it holds for each i that at least a (1− εβ ′/20)-fraction of the rounds in F satisfy
∑w∈D(vi) pw ≤ p for any constant β ′ > 0, w.h.p. Thus, at least a (1− εβ ′′)-fraction
of the rounds in F satisfy∑w∈D(vi) pw≤ p for every i for any constant β ′′> 0, w.h.p.
As D(v) ⊆ DD(u) for all v ∈ D(u) and u has at least ε|F | non-jammed rounds in
F , we get the following lemma, which also holds for arbitrary (T,1− ε)-bounded
adversaries.
Lemma 2.8 At least a (1− β )-fraction of the rounds in J satisfy ∑v∈D(u) pv ≤ p
and ∑w∈D(v) pw = O(p) for all nodes v ∈ D(u) for any constant β > 0, w.h.p.
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Let us call these rounds good. Since the probability that u senses the channel
is at least 1− pˆ and the probability that the channel at u is idle for ∑w∈D(u) pw ≤ p
is equal to ∏v∈N(u)(1− pv) ≥ ∏v∈N(u) e−2pv ≥ e−2p, u senses an idle channel for
at least (1− pˆ)(1− β )|J|e−2p ≥ 2β |J| many rounds in J on expectation if β is
sufficiently small. This also holds w.h.p. when using the Chernoff bounds under
the condition that at least (1−β )|J| rounds in F are good (which also holds w.h.p.).
Let k be the number of times u receives a message in F . We distinguish between
two cases.
Case 1: k ≥ β |J|/6. Then JADE is constant competitive for u and we are done.
Case 2: k < β |J|/6. Then we know from Lemma 2.5 that pu is decreased at most
β |J|/6+√2|F | times in F due to cu > Tu. In addition to this, pu is decreased
at most β |J|/6 times in F due to a received message. On the other hand, pu is
increased at least 2β |J| times in J (if possible) due to an idle channel w.h.p. Also,
we know from the JADE protocol that at the beginning of F , pu = pˆ. Hence, there
must be at least β (2− 1/6− 1/6)|J| −√2|F | ≥ (3/2)β |J| rounds in J w.h.p. at
which pu = pˆ. As there are at least (1−β )|J| good rounds in J (w.h.p.), there are
at least β |J|/2 good rounds in J w.h.p. in which pu = pˆ. For these good rounds,
u has a constant probability to transmit a message and every node v ∈ D(u) has a
constant probability of receiving it, so u successfully transmits Θ(|J|) messages to
at least one of its non-jammed neighbors in F (on expectation and also w.h.p.).
If we charge 1/2 of each successfully transmitted message to the sender and
1/2 to the receiver, then a constant competitive throughput can be identified for
every node in both cases above, so JADE is constant competitive in F .
It remains to show that Theorem 2.2 also holds for larger time intervals than
|F |. First, note that all the proofs are valid as long as γ ≤ 1/[c(logT + log logn)] for
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a constant c≥ 2, so we can increase T and thereby also |F | as long as this inequality
holds. So w.l.o.g. we may assume that γ = 1/[2(logT + log logn)]. In this case,
21/(4γ) ≤√|F |, so our rule of increasing Tv in JADE implies that Tv ≤√|F | at any
time. This allows us to extend the competitive throughput result to any sequence
of time frames. Let J ⊂ l ·F be the set of all non-jammed open rounds at u overall
time frames, where l is the number of frames considered here. Hence, Case 1 holds
directly; as for Case 2, we have β (2−1/6−1/6)|J|−√2l|F | ≥ (3/2)β |J| rounds
in J w.h.p. at which pu = pˆ. Hence, the rest of the proof follows directly, which
completes the proof of Theorem 2.2.
2.3.2 Proof of Lemma 2.6
This section is dedicated to the proof of Lemma 2.6 which is rather involved. Con-
sider any fixed node u. We partition u’s unit disk D(u) into six sectors of equal
angles from u, S1, ...,S6. Note that all nodes within a sector Si have distances of
at most 1 from each other, so they can directly communicate with one another (in
D(u), distances can be up to 2). We will first explore properties of an arbitrary node
in one sector, then consider the implications for a whole sector, and finally bound
the cumulative sending probability in the entire unit disk.
Recall the definition of a time frame, a subframe and f in the proof of The-
orem 2.2. Fix a sector S in D(u) and consider some fixed time frame F . Let us refer
to the sum of the probabilities of the neighboring nodes of a given node v ∈ S by
p¯v := ∑w∈S\{v} pw. The following lemma shows that pv will decrease dramatically
if p¯v is high throughout a certain time interval.
Lemma 2.9 Consider a node v in a unit disk D(u). If p¯v > 5− pˆ during all rounds
of a subframe I of F, then pv will be at most 1/n2 at the end of I, w.h.p.
Proof. We say that a round is useful for node v if from v’s perspective there is
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an idle channel or a successful transmission at that round (when ignoring the action
of v); otherwise the round is called non-useful. Note that in a non-useful round,
according to our protocol, pv will either decrease (if the threshold Tv is exceeded)
or remain the same. On the other hand, in a useful round, pv will increase (if v senses
an idle channel), decrease (if v senses a successful transmission) or remain the same
(if v sends a message). Hence, pv can only increase during useful rounds of I. Let
U be the set of useful rounds in I for our node v. We distinguish between two cases,
depending on the cardinality |U |. In the following, let pv(0) denote the probability
of v at the beginning of I (which is at most pˆ). Suppose that f ≥ 2[(3c lnn)/γ]2 for
a sufficiently large constant c. (This lower bound coincides with our definition of f
in the proof of Theorem 2.2.)
Case 1: Suppose that |U |< (c lnn)/γ , that is, many rounds are blocked and
pv can increase only rarely. As there are at least (3c lnn)/γ occasions in I in which
cv > Tv and |U | < (c lnn)/γ , in at least (2c lnn)/γ of these occasions v only saw
blocked channels for Tv consecutive rounds and therefore decides to increase Tv and
decrease pv. Hence, at the end of I,
pv ≤ (1+ γ)|U |−2c lnn/γ pv(0)
≤ (1+ γ)−c lnn/γ pv(0)
≤ e−c lnn = 1/nc.
Case 2: Next, suppose that |U | ≥ (c lnn)/γ . We will show that many of
these useful rounds will be successful such that pv decreases. Since pv ≤ pˆ ≤
1/24 throughout I, it follows from the Chernoff bounds that w.h.p. v will sense the
channel for at least a fraction of 2/3 of the useful rounds w.h.p. Let this set of
useful rounds be called U ′. Consider any round t ∈U ′. Let q0 be the probability
that there is an idle channel at round t and q1 be the probability that there is a
26
successful transmission at t. It holds that q0 + q1 = 1. From Lemma 1.1 we also
know that q1 ≥ q0 · p¯v. Since p¯v > 5− pˆ for all rounds in I, it follows that q1 ≥ 4/5
for every round in U ′. Thus, it follows from the Chernoff bounds that for at least
2/3 of the rounds inU ′, v will sense a successful transmission w.h.p. Hence, at the
end of I it holds w.h.p. that
pv ≤ (1+ γ)−(1/3)·|U ′|pv(0)
≤ (1+ γ)−(1/3)·(2c/3) lnn/γ pv(0)
≤ e−(2c/9) lnn = 1/n2c/9.
Combining the two cases with c≥ 9 results in the lemma.
Given this property of the individual probabilities, we can derive a bound for
the cumulative probability of an entire sector S. In order to compute pS = ∑v∈S pv,
we introduce three thresholds, a low one, ρgreen = 5, one in the middle, ρyellow = 5e,
and a high one, ρred = 5e2. The following three lemmas provide some important
insights about these probabilities.
Lemma 2.10 For any subframe I in F and any initial value of pS in I there is at
least one round in I with pS ≤ ρgreen w.h.p.
Proof. We prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose that throughout the entire
interval I, pS > ρgreen. Then it holds for every node v ∈ S that p¯v > ρgreen− pˆ
throughout I. In this case, however, we know from Lemma 2.9, that pv will decrease
to at most 1/n2 at the end of I w.h.p. Hence, all nodes v ∈ S would decrease pv to
at most 1/n2 at the end of I w.h.p., which results in pS ≤ 1/n. This contradicts our
assumption, so w.h.p. there must be a round t in I at which pS ≤ ρgreen.
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Lemma 2.11 For any time interval I in F of size f and any sector S it holds that if
pS ≤ ρgreen at the beginning of I, then pS ≤ ρyellow throughout I, w.m.p. Similarly,
if pS ≤ ρyellow at the beginning of I, then pS ≤ ρred throughout I, w.m.p.
Proof. It suffices to prove the lemma for the case that initially pS ≤ ρgreen as the
other case is analogous. Consider some fixed round t in I. Let pS be the cumulative
probability at the beginning of t and p′S be the cumulative probability at the end of
t. Moreover, let p(0)S denote the cumulative probability of the nodes w ∈ S with no
transmitting node in D(w) \ S in round t. Similarly, let p(1)S denote the cumulative
probability of the nodes w ∈ S with a single transmitting node in D(w) \ S, and let
p(2)S be the cumulative probability of the nodes w ∈ S that experience a blocked
round either because they are jammed or at least two nodes in D(w) \ S are trans-
mitting at t. Certainly, pS = p
(0)
S + p
(1)
S + p
(2)
S . Our goal is to determine p
′
S in this
case. Let q0(S) be the probability that all nodes in S stay silent, q1(S) be the prob-
ability that exactly one node in S is transmitting, and q2(S) = 1−q0(S)−q1(S) be
the probability that at least two nodes in S are transmitting.
When ignoring the case that cv > Tv for a node v ∈ S at round t, it holds:
E[p′S] = q0(S) · [(1+ γ)p(0)S +(1+ γ)−1 p(1)S + p(2)S ]
+q1(S) · [(1+ γ)−1 p(0)S + p(1)S + p(2)S ]
+q2(S) · [p(0)S + p(1)S + p(2)S ]
This is certainly also an upper bound for E[p′S] if cv > Tv for a node v ∈ S because
pv will never be increased (but possibly decreased) in this case. Now, consider
the event E2 that at least two nodes in S transmit a message. If E2 holds, then
E[p′S] = p′S = pS, so there is no change in the system. On the other hand, assume that
E2 does not hold. Let q′0(S) = q0(S)/(1−q2(S)) and q′1(S) = q1(S)/(1−q2(S)) be
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the probabilities q0(S) and q1(S) under the condition of ¬E2. Then we distinguish
between three cases.
Case 1: p(0)S = pS. Then
E[p′S] ≤ q′0(S) · (1+ γ)pS+q′1(S) · (1+ γ)−1 pS
= ((1+ γ)q′0(S)+(1+ γ)
−1q′1(S))pS.
From Lemma 1.1 we know that q0(S) ≤ q1(S)/pS, so q′0(S) ≤ q′1(S)/pS. If pS ≥
ρgreen, then q′0(S)≤ q′1(S)/5. Hence,
E[p′S] ≤ ((1+ γ)/6+(1+ γ)−15/6)pS ≤ (1+ γ)−1/2 pS
since γ = o(1). On the other hand, p′S ≤ (1+ γ)pS in any case.
Case 2: p(1)S = pS. Then
E[p′S] ≤ q′0(S) · (1+ γ)−1 pS+q′1(S)pS
= (q′0(S)/(1+ γ)+(1−q′0(S)))pS
= (1−q′0(S)γ/(1+ γ))pS.
Now, it holds that 1− xγ/(1+ γ) ≤ (1+ γ)−x/2 for all x ∈ [0,1] because from the
Taylor series of ex and ln(1+ x) it follows that
(1+ γ)−x/2 ≥ 1− (x ln(1+ γ))/2≥ 1− (x(1− γ/2)γ)/2
and
1− xγ/(1+ γ)≤ 1− (x(1− γ/2)γ)/2
for all x,γ ∈ [0,1] as is easy to check. Therefore, when defining ϕ = q′0(S), we get
E[p′S]≤ (1+ γ)−ϕ/2 pS. On the other hand, p′S ≤ pS ≤ (1+ γ)ϕ pS.
Case 3: p(2)S = pS. Then for ϕ = 0, E[p
′
S] ≤ pS = (1+ γ)−ϕ/2 pS and p′S ≤ pS =
(1+ γ)ϕ pS.
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Combining the three cases and taking into account that p(0)S + p
(1)
S + p
(2)
S =
pS, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 2.12 There is a φ ∈ [0,1] (depending on p(0)S , p(1)S and p(2)S ) so that
E[p′S]≤ (1+ γ)−φ pS and p′S ≤ (1+ γ)2φ pS. (2.1)
Proof. Let a = (1+ γ)1/2, b = (1+ γ)ϕ/2 for the ϕ defined in Case 2, and c =
1. Furthermore, let x0 = p
(0)
S /pS, x1 = p
(1)
S /pS and x2 = p
(2)
S /pS. Define φ =
− log1+γ((1/a)x0+(1/b)x1+(1/c)x2). Then we have
E[p′S] ≤ (1+ γ)−1/2 p(0)S +(1+ γ)−ϕ/2 p(1)S + p(2)S
= (1+ γ)−φ pS.
We need to show that for this φ , also p′S ≤ (1+ γ)2φ pS. As p′S ≤ (1+ γ)p(0)S +(1+
γ)ϕ p(1)S + p
(2)
S , this is true if
a2x0+b2x1+ c2x2 ≤ 1
((1/a)x0+(1/b)x1+(1/c)x2)2
or
((1/a)x0+(1/b)x1+(1/c)x2)2(a2x0+b2x1+ c2x2)≤ 1 (2.2)
To prove this, we need two claims whose proofs are tedious but follow from stan-
dard math.
Claim 2.13 For any a,b,c> 0 and any x0,x1,x2 > 0 with x0+ x1+ x2 = 1,
(ax0+bx1+ cx2)2 ≤ (a2x0+b2x1+ c2x2)
Claim 2.14 For any a,b,c> 0 and any x0,x1,x2 > 0 with x0+ x1+ x2 = 1,
((1/a)x0+(1/b)x1+(1/c)x2)(ax0+bx1+ cx2)≤ 1
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Combining the claims, Equation (2.2) follows, which completes the proof.
Hence, for any outcome of E2, E[p′S] ≤ (1+ γ)−ϕ pS and p′S ≤ (1+ γ)2ϕ pS
for some ϕ ∈ [0,1]. If we define qS = log1+γ pS, then it holds that E[q′S] ≤ qS−ϕ .
For any time t in I, let qt be equal to qS at time t and ϕt be defined as ϕ at time t.
Our calculations above imply that as long as pS ∈ [ρgreen,ρyellow], E[qt+1]≤ qt−ϕt
and qt+1 ≤ qt +2ϕt .
Now, suppose that within subframe I we reach a point t when pS > ρyellow.
Since we start with pS ≤ ρgreen, there must be a time interval I′ ⊆ I so that right
before I′, pS ≤ ρgreen, during I′ we always have ρgreen < pS ≤ ρyellow, and at the
end of I′, pS > ρyellow. We want to bound the probability for this to happen.
Consider some fixed interval I′ with the properties above, i.e., with pS ≤
ρgreen right before I′ and pS ≥ ρgreen at the first round of I′, so initially, pS ∈
[ρgreen,(1+ γ)ρgreen]. We use martingale theory to bound the probability that in
this case, the properties defined above for I′ hold. Consider the rounds in I′ to be
numbered from 1 to |I′|, let qt and ϕt be defined as above, and let q′t = qt +∑t−1i=1 ϕi.
It holds that
E[q′t+1] = E[qt+1+
t
∑
i=1
ϕi]
= E[qt+1]+
t
∑
i=1
ϕi ≤ qt−ϕt +
t
∑
i=1
ϕi
= qt +
t−1
∑
i=1
ϕi
= q′t .
Moreover, it follows from Inequality (2.1) that for any round t, p′S ≤ (1+ γ)2ϕt pS.
Therefore, qt+1 ≤ qt + 2ϕt , which implies that q′t+1 ≤ q′t +ϕt . Hence, we can de-
fine a martingale (Xt)t∈I′ with E[Xt+1] = Xt and Xt+1 ≤ Xt +ϕt that stochastically
31
dominates q′t . Recall that a random variable Yt stochastically dominates a random
variable Zt if for any z, P[Yt ≥ z] ≥ P[Zt ≥ z]. In that case, it is also straightfor-
ward to show that ∑iYi stochastically dominates ∑i Zi, which we will need in the
following. Let T = |I′|. We will make use of Azuma’s inequality to bound XT .
Fact 2.15 (Azuma Inequality) Let X0,X1, . . . be a martingale satisfying the prop-
erty that Xi ≤ Xi−1+ ci for all i≥ 1. Then for any δ ≥ 0,
P[XT > X0+δ ]≤ e−δ 2/(2∑Ti=1 c2i ).
Thus, for δ = 1/γ+∑Ti=1ϕi it holds in our case that
P[XT > X0+δ ]≤ e−δ 2/(2∑Ti=1ϕ2i ).
This implies that
P[q′T > q′0+δ ]≤ e−δ
2/(2∑Ti=1ϕ
2
i ),
for several reasons. First of all, stochastic dominance holds as long as pS ∈ [ρgreen,ρyellow],
and whenever this is violated, we can stop the process as the requirements on I′
would be violated, so we would not have to count that probability towards I′. There-
fore,
P[qT > q0+1/γ]≤ e−δ 2/(2∑Ti=1ϕ2i ).
Notice that qT > q0 + 1/γ is required so that pS > ρyellow at the end of I′, so the
probability bound above is exactly what we need. Let ϕ = ∑Ti=1ϕi. Since ϕi ≤ 1
for all i, ϕ ≥ ∑Ti=1ϕ2i . Hence,
δ 2
2∑Ti=1ϕ2i
≥ (1/γ+ϕ)
2
2ϕ
≥
(
1
2ϕγ2
+
ϕ
2
)
.
This is minimized for 1/(2ϕγ2) = ϕ/2 or equivalently, ϕ = 1/γ . Thus,
P[qT > q0+1/γ]≤ e−1/γ
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Since there are at most
( f
2
)
ways of selecting I′ ⊆ I, the probability that there exists
an interval I′ with the properties above is at most(
f
2
)
e−1/γ ≤ f 2e−1/γ ≤ 1
logc n
for any constant c if γ = O(1/(logT + log logn)) is small enough.
Lemma 2.16 For any subframe I in F it holds that if there has been at least one
round during the past subframe where pS ≤ ρgreen, then throughout I, pS ≤ ρred
w.m.p.
Proof. Suppose that there has been at least one round during the past subframe
where pS ≤ ρgreen. Then we know from Lemma 2.11 that w.m.p. pS ≤ ρyellow at
the beginning of I. But if pS ≤ ρyellow at the beginning of I, we also know from
Lemma 2.11 that w.m.p. pS ≤ ρred throughout I, which proves the lemma.
Now, define a subframe I to be good if pS≤ ρred throughout I, and otherwise
I is called bad. With the help of Lemma 2.10 and Lemma 2.16 we can prove the
following lemma.
Lemma 2.17 For any sector S, at most εβ/6 of the subframes I in F are bad w.h.p.,
where the constant β > 0 can be made arbitrarily small depending on the constant
α in f .
Proof. From Lemma 2.10 it follows that for every subframe I in F there is a time
point t ∈ I at which pS ≤ ρgreen w.h.p. Consider now some fixed subframe I in F
that is not the first one and suppose that the previous subframe in F had at least
one round with pS ≤ ρgreen. Then it follows from Lemma 2.16 that for all rounds
in I, pS ≤ ρred w.m.p. (where the probability only depends on I and its preceding
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subframe), i.e., I is good. Hence, it follows from the Chernoff bounds that at most
εβ/7 of the odd-numbered as well as the even-numbered subframes after the first
subframe in F are bad w.h.p. (if the constant α is sufficiently large). This implies
that overall at most εβ/6 of the subframes in F are bad w.h.p.
From Lemma 2.17 it follows that apart from an εβ -fraction of the sub-
frames, all subframes I in F satisfy ∑v∈D(u) pv ∈ O(1) throughout I, which com-
pletes the proof of Lemma 2.6.
2.3.3 Proof of Theorem 2.3
Now, let us consider the two cases of Theorem 2.3 under the strong adversary.
Case 1: the adversary is 1-uniform and the UDG is connected.
In this case, every node has a non-empty neighborhood and therefore all non-
jammed rounds of the nodes are open. Hence, the conditions on a (T,1− ε)-
bounded adversary are satisfied. So Theorem 2.2 applies, which completes the
proof of Theorem 2.3 a).
Case 2: |D(v)| ≥ 2/ε for all v ∈V .
Consider some fixed time interval I with |I| being a multiple of T . For every node
v ∈D(u) let fv be the number of non-jammed rounds at v in I and ov be the number
of open rounds at v in I. Let J be the set of rounds in I with at most one non-jammed
node. Suppose that |J| > (1− ε/2)|I|. Then every node in D(u) must have more
than (ε/2)|I| of its non-jammed rounds in J. As these non-jammed rounds must be
serialized in J to satisfy our requirement on J, it holds that |J|> ∑v∈D(u)(ε/2)|I| ≥
(2/ε) · (ε/2)|I|= |I|. Since this is impossible, it must hold that |J| ≤ (1− ε/2)|I|.
Thus,∑v∈D(u) ov≥ (∑v∈D(u) fv)−|J| ≥ (1/2)∑v∈D(u) fv because∑v∈D(u) fv≥
(2/ε) · ε|I| = 2|I|. Let D′(u) be the set of nodes v ∈ D(u) with ov ≥ fv/4. That
is, for each of these nodes, a constant fraction of the non-jammed time steps is
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open. Then ∑v∈D(u)\D′(u) ov < (1/4)∑v∈D(u) fv, so ∑v∈D′(u) ov ≥ (1/2)∑v∈D(u) ov ≥
(1/4)∑v∈D(u) fv.
Consider now a set U ⊆ V of nodes so that ⋃u∈U D(u) = V and for every
v ∈ V there are at most 6 nodes u ∈U with v ∈ D(u) (U is easy to construct in a
greedy fashion for arbitrary UDGs and also known as a dominating set of constant
density). Let V ′ =
⋃
u∈U D′(u). Since ∑v∈D′(u) ov ≥ (1/4)∑v∈D(u) fv for every node
u∈U , it follows that∑v∈V ′ ov≥ (1/6)∑u∈U ∑v∈D′(u) ov≥ (1/24)∑u∈U ∑v∈D(u) fv≥
(1/24)∑v∈V fv. Using that together with Theorem 2.2, which implies that JADE is
constant competitive w.r.t. the nodes in V ′, completes the proof of Theorem 2.3 b).
2.3.4 Limitations under the Strong Adversary
One may ask whether a stronger throughput result than Theorem 2.3 can be shown
for the strong adversary. Ideally, we would like to use the following model. A MAC
protocol is called strongly c-competitive against some (T,1−ε)-bounded adversary
if, for any sufficiently large time interval and any node v, the number of rounds in
which v successfully receives a message is at least a c-fraction of the total number
of non-jammed rounds at v. In other words, a strongly c-competitive MAC protocol
can achieve at least a c-fraction of the best possible throughput for every individual
node. Unfortunately, such a protocol seems to be difficult to design. In fact, JADE
is not strongly c-competitive for any constant c > 0, even if the node density is
sufficiently high. We can prove the following lemmas which imply Theorem 2.4.
Lemma 2.18 In general, JADE is not strongly c-competitive for a constant c> 0 if
the strong adversary is allowed to be 2-uniform and ε ≤ 1/3.
Proof. Suppose that (at some corner of the UDG) we have a set U of at least
1/pˆ nodes located closely to each other that are all within the transmission range
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of a node v. Initially, we assume that ∑u∈U pu ≥ 1, pv = pˆ and Tx = 1 for all nodes
x ∈U ∪{v}. The time is partitioned into time intervals of size T . In each such time
interval, called T -interval, the (T,1−ε)-bounded adversary jams all but the first εT
rounds at U and all but the last εT rounds at v. It follows directly from Section 2.3
of [6] that if T =Ω((log3 n)/(γ2ε)), then for every node u ∈U , Tu ≤ α
√
T logn/ε
w.h.p. for some sufficiently large constant α . Thus, Tu ≤ γT/(β logn) w.h.p. for
any constant β > 0 if T is sufficiently large. Hence, between the last non-jammed
round at U and the first non-jammed round at v in a T -interval, the values Tu are
increased (and the values pu are decreased) at least β (logn)/(6γ) times. Thus, at
the first non-jammed round at v, it holds for every u ∈U that
pu ≤ pˆ · (1+ γ)−β (logn)/(6γ) ≤ pˆ · e−(β/6) logn ≤ 1/nβ/6
and, therefore, ∑u∈U pu =O(1/n2) if β ≥ 18. This cumulative probability will stay
that low during all of v’s non-jammed rounds as during these rounds the nodes in
U are jammed. Hence, the probability that v receives any message during its non-
jammed rounds of a T -interval is O(1/n2), so JADE is not c-competitive for v for
any constant c> 0.
Also, in our original model, JADE is not constant competitive if the node
density is too low.
Lemma 2.19 In general, JADE is not c-competitive for a constant c independent of
ε if there are nodes u with |D(u)|= o(1/ε) and the strong adversary is allowed to
be 2-uniform.
Proof. Suppose that we have a set U of k = o(1/ε) nodes located closely to each
other that are all within the transmission range of a node v. Let T =Ω((log3 n)/(γ2ε)).
In each T -interval, the adversary never jams v but jams all but the first εT rounds
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at U . Then Section 2.3 of [6] implies that for every node u ∈U , Tu ≤ γT/(β logn)
w.h.p. for any constant β > 0 if T is sufficiently large. The nodes in U con-
tinuously increase their Tu-values and thereby reduce their pu values during their
jammed time steps. Hence, the nodes in U ∪{v} will receive at most εT · |U |+
(εT +O(T/ logn)) = εT · o(1/ε)+ (ε + o(1))T = (ε + o(1))T messages in each
T -interval on expectation whereas the sum of non-jammed rounds over all nodes is
more than T .
Hence, Theorem 2.3 is the best one can show for JADE (within our notation).
More generally, of course, no MAC protocol can guarantee a constant competi-
tive throughput if the UDG is not connected. However, it is still an open question
whether there are simple MAC protocols that are constant competitive under non-
uniform jamming strategies even if there are o(1/ε) nodes within the transmission
range of a node.
2.4 Simulations
In order to complement our theoretical insights, we report on our simulation
results. First, we present our throughput results for a sufficiently large time interval,
and then we discuss the convergence behavior. For our simulations, as in our formal
analysis, we assume that initially all nodes v ∈ V have a high sending probability
of pv = pˆ = 1/24. The nodes are distributed at random over a square plane of 4×4
units, and are connected in a unit disk graph manner (multi-hop). We simulate the
jamming activity in the following way: for each round, a node is jammed indepen-
dently with probability (1− ε). Note that in the terminology we introduced, this
adversary is strong (as rounds do not need to be open) and n-uniform (as nodes
are jammed independently). The reason for studying this rather simplistic random-
ized “adversary” is twofold. First, although our formal results hold for arbitrary
adversaries, it is not clear how to constructively compute such a worst adversarial
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strategy; second, a random adversary also complements our formal results better as
it may capture the “average case” behavior.
We run the simulation for a sufficiently large number of time steps indicated
by the Theorem 2.2, i.e., for ([T +(log3 n)/(γ2ε)] ·(logn)/ε rounds, where ε = 0.1,
T = 200, and γ = 1/(logT + log logN). Simulations with different combinations
of ε ∈ {0.5,0.3,0.1} and T = {50,100,150,200} showed that ε = 0.1 and T = 200
yields the lowest throughput (and the strongest adversary), and hence, in the fol-
lowing, we will focus on this most challenging case. (The parameter γ is set to a
value satisfy its definition, i.e., γ = O(1/(logT + log logN)).)
Figure 2.1 (top) shows the throughput competitiveness of JADE for a sce-
nario where different numbers of nodes (i.e., n ∈ [100,2000]) are distributed uni-
formly at random over the plane and a scenario where the nodes are distributed
according to a normal/Gaussian distributionN (0,1). In both cases, the throughput
is larger when the density is higher. This corresponds to our formal insight that a
constant competitive throughput is possible only if the node density exceeds a cer-
tain threshold. For example, in a scenario with 100 nodes in the 4×4 plane (density
of 6.25), there are at least 6.25pi ≈ 20 ≥ 2/ε = 20 uniformly distributed nodes in
one unit disk. As can be seen in the figure, when the number of nodes is larger than
600, the throughput falls between 20% and 40% for both uniform distribution and
Gaussian distribution.
Convergence time is the second most important evaluation criterion. We
found that already after a short time, a constant throughput is achieved; in particu-
lar, the total sending probability per unit disk approaches a constant value quickly.
This is due to the nodes’ ability to adapt their sending probabilities fast, see Fig-
ure 2.1 (bottom left). The figure also illustrates the high correlation between success
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Figure 2.1: Top: Throughput as a function of network size, where n ∈ [100,2000],
ε = 0.1, T = 200, and γ = 1/(logT + log logn). The result is averaged over
10 runs. Bottom left: Convergence behavior for multi-hop networks (uniform
distribution). As a demonstration, we used n = 500, ε = 0.1, T = 200, and
γ = 1/(logT + log logN). Note that the start-up phase where the sending prob-
abilities are high is short (no more than 50 rounds). Bottom right: Convergence
of Tv for multi-hop networks (uniform distribution). For demonstration, we used
n = 500, ε = 0.1, T = 200, and γ = 1/(logT + log logN).
ratio and aggregated sending probability.
Finally, we have also studied the average of the Tv values over time. The
average quickly stabilizes to a value around 10, as shown in Figure 2.1 (bottom
right).
2.5 Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge, JADE is the first jamming-resistant MAC pro-
tocol with provably good performance in multi-hop networks exposed to an adap-
tive but non-reactive adversary . While we have focused on unit disk graphs, we
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believe that our stochastic analysis is also useful for more realistic wireless net-
work models. Moreover, although our analysis is involved, our protocol is rather
simple. Also, there are several questions remain open. For instance, we assumed a
common parameter γ which is known by all nodes and which depends on n and T .
Although the estimations on these parameters we need are very rough and scalable,
it remains an open question whether this limitation can be relaxed,and e.g., a local
value γv = 1/ logTv would also work.
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Chapter 3
THE ANTIJAM PROTOCOL
In this chapter, we study the problem of designing a robust MAC protocol that can
achieve provably high competitive throughput despite a strong adaptive and reactive
adversary.
The wireless network considered consists of n honest and reliable simple
wireless devices (e.g., sensor nodes) that are within the transmission range of each
other and which communicate over a single frequency (or a limited, narrow fre-
quency band). We assume a back-logged scenario where the nodes continuously
contend for sending a packet on the wireless channel. A node may either transmit
a message or sense the channel at a time step, but it cannot do both, and there is no
immediate feedback mechanism telling a node whether its transmission was suc-
cessful. A node sensing the channel may either (i) sense an idle channel (in case
no other node is transmitting at that time), (ii) sense a busy channel (in case two or
more nodes transmit at the time step), or (iii) receive a packet (in case exactly one
node transmits at the time step).
In addition to these nodes there is arbitrary external interference which we
model as an adversary. Note that our notion of adversary is a model to describe
external interference only; it does not, e.g., read and modify packet contents. We
allow the adversary to know the protocol and its entire history (in terms of idle,
busy, and successful transmission events) and to use this knowledge in order to jam
the wireless channel at will at any time (i.e, the adversary is adaptive). Whenever it
jams the channel, all nodes will notice a busy channel. However, the nodes cannot
distinguish between the adversarial jamming or a collision of two or more messages
that are sent at the same time.
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Moreover, we allow the jammer to be reactive: it is allowed to make a
jamming decision based on the actions of the nodes at the current step. In other
words, reactive jammers can determine (through physical carrier sensing) whether
the channel is currently idle or non-idle (the channel is non-idle either because of
a successful transmission, or the channel is busy) and can instantly make a jam-
ming decision based on that information. Those jammers arise in scenarios where,
for example, encryption is used for communication and where the jammer cannot
distinguish between an encrypted package and noise in the channel. Note that ro-
bustness in the reactive model is relevant beyond jamming, e.g., in situations with
co-existent networks, as many MAC protocols based on carrier sensing activate
nodes during idle time periods.
We assume that the adversary is only allowed to jam a (1−ε)-fraction of the
time steps, for an arbitrary constant 0< ε ≤ 1. In addition, we allow the adversary
to perform bursty jamming. Formally, an adversary is called (T,1−ε)-bounded for
some T ∈ N and 0< ε ≤ 1 if for any time window of size w≥ T the adversary can
jam at most (1− ε)w of the time steps in that window.
The network scenario described above arises, for example, in sensor net-
works, which consist of simple wireless nodes usually running on a single fre-
quency and which cannot benefit from more advanced anti-jamming techniques
such as frequency hopping or spread spectrum. In such scenarios, a jammer will
also most probably run on power-constrained devices (e.g., solar-powered batter-
ies), and hence will not have enough power to continuously jam over time. (The
time window threshold T can be chosen large enough to accommodate the respec-
tive jamming pattern.)
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Indeed, due to the large number of possible strategies a jammer can pursue,
the problem becomes significantly more challenging than the non-reactive version.
First, the analysis is more involved as the nodes’ cumulative sending probability
varies in a larger range depending on the adversarial strategy. Technically, the reac-
tive jamming renders it impossible to apply Chernoff bounds over the non-jammed
time periods as their patterns are no longer random; rather, we have to argue over all
time periods. Second, modifications to the protocol in [6] are needed. For instance,
the ANTIJAM protocol seeks to synchronize the nodes’ sending probabilities; this
has the desirable side effect of achieving fairness: all nodes are basically granted
the same channel access probabilities, which greatly improves the unfair protocol of
[6]. While our formal analysis confirms our expectations that the overall throughput
under reactive jammers is lower than the throughput obtainable against non-reactive
jammers, we are still able to prove a constant-competitive performance (for constant
ε), which is also confirmed by our simulation study.
We study competitive MAC protocols.
Definition 3.1 (c-Competitive) A MAC protocol is called c-competitive against
some (T,1− ε)-bounded adversary (with high probability or on expectation) if, for
any sufficiently large number of time steps, the nodes manage to perform successful
message transmissions in at least a c-fraction of the time steps not jammed by the
adversary (with high probability or on expectation).
In other words, in a c-competitive protocol, on average every c-th round there is a
successful transmission in the network.
Our goal is to design a symmetric local-control MAC protocol (i.e., there is
no central authority controlling the nodes, and the nodes have symmetric roles at
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any point in time) that is fair and O(1)-competitive against any (T,1− ε)-bounded
adversary. The nodes do not know ε , but we do allow them to have a very rough up-
per bound of the number n and T . More specifically, we will assume that the nodes
have a common parameter γ = O(1/(logT + log logn)). As logT and loglogn
are small for all reasonable values of T and n, this is scalable and not a critical
constraint, as it leaves room for a super-polynomial change in n and a polynomial
change in T over time.1 Thus, all we need for our formal performance result to
hold is a is very a rough upper bound on γ , and as we will see in our theorems
there is a tradeoff between too low γ values (which causes the protocol to react too
slowly to changes) and a too high γ values (with which the cumulative probability
may overshoot). In practice we expect that choosing a constant, sufficiently small
γ yields a good performance for any practical network; indeed, in our simulations
γ = 0.1 results in a good throughput for a wide range of networks.
3.1 Contribution
This chapter presents a very simple medium access protocol called AN-
TIJAM. ANTIJAM is provably robust to a strong adaptive and reactive adversary
that can block the medium a constant fraction of the time and thus models a large
range of (intentional and unintentional) interference scenarios. Nevertheless, we
can show that the ANTIJAM MAC protocol achieves a high throughput performance
by exploiting any non-blocked time intervals effectively. The main theoretical con-
tribution is a formal and rigorous derivation of the good throughput and fairness
guarantees of our protocol. We show that ANTIJAM is competitive in the sense
that a constant fraction of the non-jammed execution time is used for successful
1On the other hand, note that the assumption that the nodes know constant factor approximations
of n or T directly would render the problem simple: if the set of n nodes is static, nodes can simply
access the medium with probability 1/n which yields a high and fair throughput; if T is known, a
time period of length T without idle and successful periods implies that the cumulative probability
is too high—an information which can be exploited by the algorithm. However, such assumptions
are unrealistic and do not scale.
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transmissions, i.e., ANTIJAM is able to benefit from the rare and hard-to-predict
time intervals where the shared medium is available. Our theoretical results are
complemented by extensive simulations.
Theorem 3.2 Let N = max{T,n}. The ANTIJAM protocol is constant-competitive,
namely e−Θ(1/ε2)-competitive w.h.p., under any (T,1− ε)-bounded reactive adver-
sary if the protocol is executed for at least Θ(1ε logN max{T,(eδ/ε
2
/εγ2) log3 N})
many time steps, where ε ∈ (0,1] is a constant, γ = O(1/(logT + log logn)), and
where δ is a sufficiently large constant. Moreover, ANTIJAM achieves a high fair-
ness: the channel access probabilities among nodes do not differ by more than a
factor of (1+ γ) after the first message was sent successfully.
3.2 Description of ANTIJAM
3.2.1 Intuition:
In the ANTIJAM protocol, each node v maintains a medium access probability pv
which determines the probability that v transmits a message in a communication
round. The nodes adapt and synchronize their pv values over time (which as a side-
effect also improves fairness) in a multiplicative-increase multiplicative-decrease
manner in order to ensure a throughput that is as good as possible. The pv values
tend to be lowered in times of high interference, and increased during times where
the channel is idling. (This is similar to classic random backoff mechanisms where
the next transmission time t is chosen uniformly at random from an interval of size
1/pv.) More precisely, the sending probabilities are changed by a factor of (1+ γ).
However, we impose an upper bound of pˆ on pv, for some constant 0 < pˆ < 1/24.
As we will see, unlike in most classic backoff protocols, our adaption rules for pv
ensure that the adversary cannot influence the pv values much by jamming.
In addition, each node maintains two variables, a threshold variable Tv and
a counter variable cv. Tv is used to estimate the adversary’s time window T : a good
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estimation of T can help the nodes recover from a situation where they experience
high interference in the network. In times of high interference, Tv will be increased
and the sending probability pv will be decreased.
Initially, every node v sets Tv := 1, cv := 1 and pv := pˆ; however, as we will
see, ANTIJAM works for arbitrary variable values. Afterwards, the protocol works
in synchronized time steps. We assume synchronized time steps for the analysis,
but a nonsynchronized execution of the protocol would also work as long as all
nodes operate at roughly the same speed.
ANTIJAM is based on the intuition presented in Section 1.4.1. However,
since ANTIJAM aims to be jamming-resistant against an adaptive and reactive ad-
versary, in order to still achieve constant cumulative probability, not only does the
protocol need to use a multiplicative increase/decrease game for the probabilities
pv, but also it synchronizes all the nodes, both in terms of sending probabilities and
their own estimates on the time window threshold estimate Tv’s, at every successful
transmission.
3.2.2 Protocol Description:
With these definitions and insights, we can now formally present the ANTIJAM
protocol, see Algorithm 2.
A summary of all our variables (including the ones from the analysis) is
provided in Table 3.1.
The most significant change in ANTIJAM compared to the protocol in [6]
is that the nodes synchronize everything: (i) their pv, cv, and Tv values whenever
a message is successfully received, and (ii) Tv is decreased only when the channel
is idle, since idle channel is experienced by all the nodes. The reason that we seek
synchronization is that the adversary we consider here is much stronger, i.e., adap-
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Algorithm 2 ANTIJAM: for each node v
1: roundcounter = 0
2: pv := pˆ
3: cv := 1
4: Tv := 1 {ANTIJAM works in synchronized rounds}
5: while True do
6: v decides with probability pv to send a message
7: if v decides to send a message then
8: v sends a message along with a triple: (pv,cv,Tv).
9: else
10: v senses the channel
11: if v senses an idle channel then
12: pv := min{(1+ γ)pv, pˆ}
13: Tv := Tv−1
14: else if v successfully receives a message along with the triple of
(pnew,cnew,Tnew) then
15: pv := (1+ γ)−1 pnew
16: cv := cnew
17: Tv := Tnew
18: end if
19: end if
20: cv := cv+1
21: if cv > Tv then
22: cv := 1
23: if there was no idle step among the past Tv time steps then
24: pv := (1+ γ)−1 pv
25: Tv := Tv+2
26: end if
27: end if
28: roundcounter := roundcounter+1
29: end while
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n number of nodes
T time window of adversary
N N = max{T,n}
ε adversary leaves εT time steps non-jammed
γ common parameter to adapt nodes’ access probabilities
pv node v’s access probability
cv counter variable used to keep track of time steps
Tv node v’s estimation of T
pˆ maximum individual node access probability
p cumulative probabilities of the network
pt(v) node v’s probability at time step t
pt cumulative probabilities at time step t
I′ subframe used to analyze the protocol
f size of I′
I a time frame consisting of a polylogarithmic number of I′
F size of I
k number of useful time steps in I′
k0 number of idle time steps in I′
k1 number of time steps in I′ with a successful transmission
k′1 successful transmission with different sender
k2 number of times cumulative probability decreased
k3 number of times pass started at initial step
g number of non-jammed time steps
Table 3.1: Important Variables
tive and reactive, and hence could dramatically affect the cumulative probability
of the network. By synchronizing the nodes, we could greatly simplify the proofs,
and manage to show constant competitive throughput can still be achieved. As a
by-product, ANTIJAM achieves fairness, as any two nodes’ access probabilities do
not differ by more than (1+ γ) factor.
3.3 Analysis
Our analysis of Theorem 3.2 unfolds in a number of lemmas. We first show
that given a certain initial cumulative sending probability p, p stays high in the
future, i.e., it cannot drop below this initial probability over time (Lemma 3.6).
Lemma 3.10 then shows that a sufficiently large initial cumulative sending proba-
bility p implies a good throughput in time intervals where p often remains below a
certain threshold. Finally, Lemma 3.13 proves that with high probability, p indeed
does not increase beyond a certain threshold.
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The analysis makes repeated use of Lemma 1.3 and the Chernoff bounds in
Lemma 1.2.
Let V be the set of all nodes. Let pt(v) be node v’s access probability pv
at the beginning of the t-th time step. Furthermore, let pt = ∑v∈V pt(v). Let I be a
time frame consisting of αε logN subframes I
′ of size f =max{T, αβ 2εγ2 eδ/ε
2
log3 N},
where α , β and δ are sufficiently large constants. Let F = αε logN · f denote the
size of I.
We start with some simple facts which also provide some intuition for AN-
TIJAM. Fact 3.3 states that the protocol synchronizes the sending probabilities of
the nodes (up to a factor of (1+ γ)) as well as the values cv and Tv.
Fact 3.3 Right after a successful transmission of the triple (p′,c′,T ′), (pv,cv,Tv) =
((1+ γ)−1 p′,c′,T ′) for all receiving nodes v and (pu,cu,Tu) = (p′,c′,T ′) for the
sending node u. In particular, for any time step t after a successful transmission by
node u, (cv,Tv) = (cw,Tw) for all nodes v,w ∈V .
Fact 3.3 also implies the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4 After a successful transmission, the access probabilities pv of the
nodes v ∈V will never differ by more than a factor (1+ γ) in the future.
The following facts study how the cumulative sending probability varies
over time depending on the different events.
Fact 3.5 For any time step t after a successful transmission or a well-initialized
state of the protocol (in which (pv,cv,Tv) = (pˆ,1,1) for all nodes v) it holds:
1. If the channel is idle at time t then (i) if pv = pˆ for all v, then pt+1 = pt; (ii) if
pu = pˆ and pv = (1+ γ)−1 pˆ for all nodes v 6= u, then pt+1 = (1+ γ −O(1/n))pt
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(because all nodes except for u increase their sending probability by a factor (1+γ)
from pˆ/(1+ γ)); or (iii) if pv < pˆ for all nodes v, then pt+1 = (1+ γ)pt .
2. If there is a successful transmission at time t, and if cv ≤ Tv or there was an idle
time step in the previous Tv rounds, then (i) if the sender is the same as the last
successful sender, then pt+1 = pt (because for the sender u, pu(t +1) = pu(t), and
the other nodes remain at pu(t+1)/(1+ γ) = pu(t)/(1+ γ)); if (ii) the sender w is
different from the last successful sender u and pv = pˆ for all nodes v (including u
and w), then pt+1 = (1+ γ−O(1/n))−1 pt (all nodes except w reduce their sending
probability); or (iii) if the sender w is different from the last successful sender u and
pv < pˆ for at least one node v (including u and w), then pt+1 = (1+γ)−1 pt (because
at time t, for all nodes v 6= u: pv(t)= pu(t)/(1+γ); subsequently, pw(t+1)= pw(t)
and for all nodes v 6= w: pv(t+1) = pw(t+1)/(1+ γ)).
3. If the channel is busy at time t, then pt+1 = pt when ignoring the case that
cv > Tv.
Whenever cv > Tv and there has not been an idle time step during the past
Tv steps, then pt+1 is, in addition to the actions specified in the two cases above,
reduced by a factor of (1+ γ).
We can now prove the following crucial lemma lower bounding the cumu-
lative sending probability.
Lemma 3.6 For any subframe I′ in which initially pt0 ≥ 1/( f 2(1+ γ)
√
2 f ), the last
time step t of I′ again satisfies pt ≥ 1/( f 2(1+ γ)
√
2 f ), w.h.p.
Proof. We start with the following claim about the maximum number of times
the nodes decrease their probabilities in I′ due to cv > Tv.
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Claim 3.7 If in subframe I′ the number of idle time steps is at most k, then every
node v increases Tv by 2 at most k/2+
√
f many times.
Proof. Only idle time steps reduce Tv. If there is no idle time step during the
last Tv many steps, Tv is increased by 2. Suppose that k = 0. Then the number
of times a node v increases Tv by 2 is upper bounded by the largest possible ` so
that ∑`i=0 T 0v + 2i ≤ f , where T 0v is the initial size of Tv. For any T 0v ≥ 1, ` ≤
√
f ,
so the claim is true for k = 0. At best, each additional idle time step allows us to
reduce all thresholds for v by 1, so we are searching for the maximum ` so that
∑`i=0 max{T 0v +2i−k,1} ≤ f . This ` is upper bounded by k/2+
√
f , which proves
our claim.
This allows us to prove that p exceeds a certain minimal threshold in a
subframe.
Claim 3.8 Suppose that for the first time step t0 in I′, pt0 ∈ [1/( f 2(1+γ)
√
2 f ),1/ f 2].
Then there is a time step t in I′ with pt ≥ 1/ f 2, w.h.p.
Proof. Suppose that there are g non-jammed time steps in I′. Let k0 be the number
of these steps with an idle channel and k1 be the number of these steps with a
successful message transmission. Furthermore, let k2 be the maximum number of
times a node v increases Tv by 2 in I′. If all time steps t in I′ satisfy pt < 1/ f 2, then
it must hold that k0− log1+γ(1/pt0) ≤ k1 + k2. This is because no v has reached a
point with pt(v) = pˆ in this case, so Fact 3.5 implies that for each time step t with
an idle channel, pt+1 = (1+ γ)pt . Thus, at most log1+γ(1/pt0) time steps with an
idle channel would be needed to get pt to 1/ f 2, and then there would have to be
a balance between further increases (that are guaranteed to be caused by an idle
channel) and decreases (that might be caused by a successful transmission or the
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case cv > Tv) of pt in order to avoid the case pt ≥ 1/ f 2. The number of times we
can allow an idle channel is maximized if all successful transmissions and cases
where cv > Tv cause a reduction of pt . So we need k0− log1+γ(1/pt0)≤ k1+ k2 to
hold to avoid the case pt ≥ 1/ f 2 somewhere in I′.
We know from Claim 3.7 that k2 ≤ k0/2+
√
f . Hence,
k0 ≤ 2log1+γ f +
√
f + k1+ k0/2+
√
f
⇒ k0 ≤ 4log1+γ f +2k1+4
√
f
Suppose that 4 log1+γ f + 4
√
f ≤ ε f/4, which is true if f = Ω(1/ε2) is
sufficiently large (which is true for ε = Ω(1/ log3 N)). Since g ≥ ε f due to our
adversarial model, it follows that we must satisfy k0 ≤ 2k1+g/4.
Certainly, for any time step t with pt ≤ 1/ f 2,
P[≥ 1 message transmitted at t] ≤ 1/ f 2.
Suppose for the moment that no time step is jammed in I′. Then E[k1] ≤
(1/ f 2) f = 1/ f . In order to prove a bound on k1 that holds w.h.p., we can use the
general Chernoff bounds stated above. For any step t, let the binary random variable
Xt be 1 if and only if at least one message is transmitted at time t and pt ≤ 1/ f 2.
Then
P[Xt = 1] = P[pt ≤ 1/ f 2] ·P[≥ 1 msg sent | pt ≤ 1/ f 2]
≤ 1/ f 2.
and it particularly holds that for any set S of time steps prior to some time step t
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that, if there are multiple message transmissions and since pt ≤ 1/ f 2,
P[Xt = 1 |∏
s∈S
Xs = 1]≤ 1/ f 2.
Then, we have
P[∏
s∈S
Xs = 1] = P[X1 = 1] ·P[X2 = 1|X1 = 1]
· P[X3 = 1| ∏
s=1,2
Xs = 1]
·...·
· P[X|S| = 1| ∏
s=1,2,...,|S|−1
Xs = 1]
≤ (1/ f 2)|S|
and
E[∏
s∈S
Xs = 1] = P[∏
s∈S
Xs = 1]≤ (1/ f 2)|S|.
Thus, the Chernoff bounds and our choice of f imply that either ∑t∈I′ Xt <
ε f/4 and pt ≤ 1/ f 2 throughout I′ w.h.p., or there must be a time step t in I′ with
pt > 1/ f 2 which would finish the proof. Therefore, unless pt > 1/ f 2 at some point
in I′, k1 < ε f/4 and k0 > (1− ε/4) f w.h.p. As the reactive adversary can now
reduce k0 by at most f −g when leaving g non-jammed steps, it follows that for any
adversary, k0 > (1− ε/4) f − ( f − g) = g− (ε/4) f . That, however, would violate
our condition above that k0 ≤ 2k1+g/4 as that can only hold given the bounds on
g and k1 if k0 ≤ g− (ε/4) f .
Note that the choice of g is not oblivious as the adversary may adaptively
decide to set g based on the history of events. Thus, we cannot assume that g is
a fixed value, and the worst adaptive adversarial path is hard to assess. Therefore,
we apply a union bound argument and sum up over all adversarial choices for g,
showing that our claim holds for all g simultaneously. In order to show that none
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of them succeeds, observe that there are only f many possible values for g, and
for each the claimed property holds w.h.p. (for all possible distributions of the
g events); therefore, the claim holds simultaneously for the polynomially many
options of g as well.
Similarly, we can also prove that once the cumulative probability exceeds a
certain threshold, it cannot become too small again.
Claim 3.9 Suppose that for the first time step t0 in I′, pt0 ≥ 1/ f 2. Then there is no
time step t in I′ with pt < 1f 2(1+γ)√2 f , w.h.p.
Proof. Consider some fixed time step t in I′ and let I′′ = (t0, t]. Suppose that there
are g non-jammed time steps in I′′. If g≤ β logN for a (sufficiently large) constant
β , then it follows for the probability pt at the end of I′′ due to Claim 3.7 that
pt ≥ 1f 2 · (1+ γ)
−(2β logN+√ f ) ≥ 1
f 2(1+ γ)
√
2 f
given that ε =Ω(1/ log3 N), because in order to compute a pessimistic lower bound
on pt , assume that all g non-jammed steps are successful so at most β logN de-
creases of pt can happen, or similarly, assume that all g non-jammed steps are idle,
so at most β logN/2+
√
f decreases of pt can happen due to exceeding Tv; the total
number of decreases is smaller than β logN+β logN/2+
√
f < 2β logN+
√
f .
So suppose that g > β logN. Let k0 be the number of these steps with an
idle channel and k1 be the number of these steps with a successful message trans-
mission. Furthermore, let k2 be the maximum number of times a node v increases
Tv in I′′. If pt < 1f 2(1+γ)√2 f then it must hold (deterministically) that k0 ≤ k1 + k2
because of our assumption that pt0 ≥ 1/ f 2 (more idle rounds would yield
higher pt values).
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Since k2 ≤ k0/2+
√
f , this implies that k0 ≤ 2k1+2
√
f ≤ 2k1+g/4. Thus,
we are back to the case in the proof of Claim 3.8, which shows that k0 ≤ 2k1+g/4
does not hold w.h.p., given that g > β logN and we never have the case in I′′ that
pt > 1/ f 2.
If there is a step t ′ in I′′ with pt ′ > 1/ f 2, we prune I′′ to the interval (t ′, t]
and repeat the case distinction above. As there are at most f time steps in I′′, the
claim follows.
Combining Claims 3.8 and 3.9 completes the proof of Lemma 3.6.
Lemma 3.10 establishes an important relationship between cumulative send-
ing probability and throughput.
Lemma 3.10 Consider any subframe I′, and let δ > 1 be a sufficiently large con-
stant. Suppose that at the beginning of I′, pt0 ≥ 1/( f 2(1+ γ)
√
2 f ) and Tv ≤
√
F/2
for every node v. If pt ≤ δ/ε2 for at least half of the non-jammed time steps in I′,
then ANTIJAM is at least δ8ε2 e
−δ/(1−pˆ)ε2-competitive in I′.
Proof. A time step t in I is called useful if we either have an idle channel or a
successful transmission at time t (i.e., the time step is not jammed and there are no
collisions) and pt ≤ δ/ε2. Let k be the number of useful time steps in I′. Further-
more, let k0 be the number of useful time steps in I′ with an idle channel, k1 be
the number of useful time steps in I′ with a successful transmission and k2 be the
maximum number of times a node v reduces pv in I′ because of cv > Tv. Recall that
k = k0+ k1. Moreover, the following claim holds:
Claim 3.11 If n≥ (1+ γ)δ/(ε2 pˆ), then
k0− log1+γ(δ/(ε2 · pt0))≤ k′1+ k2
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where k′1 is the number of useful time steps with a successful transmission in which
the sender is different from the previously successful sender.
Proof. According to Corollary 3.4, if pt ≤ δ/ε2 and n ≥ (1+ γ)δ/(ε2 pˆ), then
pv(t)≤ pˆ/(1+ γ). This implies that whenever there is a useful time step t ∈ I with
an idle channel, then pt+1 = (1+ γ)pt . Thus, it takes at most log1+γ(δ/(ε2 · pt0))
many useful time steps with an idle channel to get from pt0 to a cumulative proba-
bility of at least δ/ε2. On the other hand, each of the k′1 successful transmissions
reduces the cumulative probability by a factor of (1+ γ). Therefore, once the cu-
mulative probability is at δ/ε2, we must have k0 ≤ k′1 + k2 since otherwise there
must be at least one useful time step where the cumulative probability is more than
δ/ε2, which contradicts the definition of a useful time step.
Since pt0 ≥ 1/( f 2(1+ γ)
√
2 f ) it holds that
log1+γ(δ/(ε
2 · pt0))≤ log1+γ(δ f 2/ε2)+
√
2 f .
From Lemma 3.7 we also know that k2 ≤ k0/2+
√
f . Hence,
k0 ≤ 2k′1+2 · log1+γ(δ f 2/ε2)+2 · (
√
f +
√
2 f )
≤ 2k′1+6
√
f
if f is sufficiently large. Also, k0 = k− k1 and k′1 ≤ k1. Therefore, k− k1 ≤
2k1+6
√
f or equivalently,
k1 ≥ k/3−2
√
f
Thus, we have a lower bound for k1 that depends on k, and it remains to find a lower
bound for k.
Claim 3.12 Let g be the number of non-jammed time steps t in I′ with pt ≤ δ/ε2.
If g≥ ε f/2 then
k ≥ δ
2ε2
e−δ/(1−pˆ)ε
2 ·g
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w.h.p.
Proof. Consider any (T,1− ε)-bounded jammer for I′. Suppose that of the non-
jammed time steps t with pt ≤ δ/ε2, s0 have an idle channel and s1 have a non-idle
channel. It holds that s0 + s1 = g ≥ ε f/2. For any one of the non-jammed time
steps with an idle channel, the probability that it is useful is one, and for any one of
the non-jammed time steps with a non-idle channel, the probability that it is useful
(in this case, that it has a successful transmission) is at least
∑
v
pv∏
w6=v
(1− pw) ≥ ∑
v
pv∏
w
(1− pw)
≥ ∑
v
pv∏
w
e−pw/(1−pˆ)
= ∑
v
pve−p/(1−pˆ)
= e−p/(1−pˆ)
where p is the cumulative probability at the step. Since pt ≤ δ/ε2, it follows that
the probability of a non-idle time step to be useful (note that we are considering
non-jammed time steps here) is at least
δ
ε2
e−δ/(1−pˆ)ε
2
.
Thus,
E[k]≥ s0+ δε2 e
−δ/(1−pˆ)ε2s1 ≥ δε2 e
−δ/(1−pˆ)ε2 ·g
since k is minimized for s0 = 0 and s1 = g.
Since our lower bound for the probability of a non-idle step to be useful
holds independently for all non-jammed non-idle steps t with pt ≤ δ/ε2 and E[k]≥
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α logN for our choice of g, it follows from the Chernoff bounds that k ≥ E[k]/2
w.h.p.
From Claim 3.12 it follows that
k1 ≥ ( δ2ε2 e
−δ/(1−pˆ)ε2 ·g)/3−2
√
f
w.h.p., which completes the proof of Lemma 3.10: if we divide the lower bound on
k1 by the number of non-jammed time steps ε f (as g≥ ε f/2, k1 ≥ k/3−2
√
f and
as −2√ f is negligible).
Finally, it remains to consider the case that for less than half of the non-
jammed time steps t in I′, pt ≤ δ/ε2. Fortunately, this does not happen w.h.p.
Lemma 3.13 Suppose that at the beginning of I′, Tv≤
√
F/2 for every node v. Then
at most half of the non-jammed time steps t can have the property that pt > δ/ε2
w.h.p.
Proof. Recall from Fact 3.5 that as long as the access probabilities of the nodes
do not hit pˆ, the cumulative probability only changes by a (1+ γ)-factor in both
directions. Suppose that δ is selected so that δ/ε2 represents one of these values.
Let H be the set of time steps t ∈ I′ with the property that either pt = δ/ε2 and the
channel is idle or pt ≥ (1+ γ)δ/ε2. Now, we define a step t to be useful if t ∈ H
and there is either an idle channel or a successful transmission at t. Let k be the
number of useful time steps in H. Furthermore, let k0 be the number of useful time
steps with an idle channel, k1 be the number of useful time steps with a successful
transmission and k2 be the maximum number of times a node v reduces pv in H
because of cv > Tv. It holds that k = k0+ k1.
Let us cut the time steps in H into passes where each pass (t, p,S) starting
at time t consists of a sequence of all (not necessarily consecutive) non-idle time
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steps t ′ > t with pt ′ = (1+ γ)p following t until a time step t ′′ is reached in which
pt ′′ = p, or the end of I′ is reached if there is no such step, where t ′′ is either due
to cv > Tv or a successful transmission. The time step t is such that either pt = p
and there is an idle channel at t, or t is the beginning of I′ if there is no such idle
channel to mark the beginning of S in I′. (Note that for two different passes (t, p,S)
and (t ′, p′,S′) and p 6= p′, S∩S′ = /0.)
Although passes defined like this could be nested, we additionally require
that for any pair of passes (t, p,S) and (t ′, p′,S′) with p′ = p and final time step
t ′′ in S, (t ′∪ S′)∩ [t, t ′′] = /0, but passes with p 6= p′ are allowed to violate this (by
one being nested into the other). It is not difficult to see that for any distribution
of cumulative probabilities over the time steps of I′ one can organize the time steps
in H into passes as demanded above. Based on that, the following claim can be
easily shown, where k′1 ≤ k1 is the number of useful time steps with a successful
transmission by a node different from the previously successful node.
Let P be any collection of passes in H, and ∆ be the number of distinct
possible values of the cumulative probability p in P. We have the following claim.
Claim 3.14 For any collection P of passes, w.h.p., k0≥ k1−∆−Θ(1) where k0 and
k1 are the number of idle time steps and the number of successful transmissions in
P.
Proof. We first show that k0 ≥ k′1−∆. Recall that k′1 is the number of success-
ful transmissions in which the sender is different from the previously successful
sender. Moreover, we define k2 as the number of times that the cumulative proba-
bility decreased due to cv > Tv; we define k3 as the number of times a pass started
at the initial step of I′ (i.e., the pass started at a non-idle time step). Clearly, we
have k2 ≥ 0, and k3 ≤ ∆. Since P is any collection of passes in H, it implies that
59
the cumulative probability p ≥ δ/ε2 throughout P. Hence, we have the following
inequality:
k0+ k3 ≥ k′1+ k2
Together with the fact that k2 ≥ 0, and k3 ≤ ∆, we have
k0 ≥ k′1−∆
Then, let Ei = 1 denote the event that the sender of the i-th successful trans-
mission is the same as the sender of the previous successful transmission. We show
that the probability that ∑i Ei ≥ c (c is a constant) given k1 is extremely small. Ac-
cording to Corollary 3.4, the nodes’ access probabilities do not differ by more than
a (1+ γ)-factor after the first successful transmission. Hence, each node has al-
most the same probability of transmitting a message at any given time step, which
implies that P[Ei = 1]≤ (1+ γ)/n.
P[∑
i
Ei ≥ c | k1]≤
(
k1
c
)
· (1+ γ
n
)c ≤
(
f
c
)
· (1+ γ
n
)c
Since f is polynomially smaller than n, P[∑i Ei ≥ c | k1] becomes very small
even for small c, which implies that Ei = 1 happens at most a constant number of
times during P w.h.p. Hence, the claim holds.
We have the following upper bound on the number of such steps in H.
Claim 3.15
|H| ≤ (k+ log1+γ max{p0/(δ/ε2),1})
√
F
where k is the number of useful steps in H.
Proof. If at the beginning of I′, Tv ≤
√
F/2 for every node v, then according to
Claim 3.7, Tv ≤
√
F for every node v at any time during I′. Hence, after at most
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2
√
F nonuseful steps we run into the situation that cv > Tv for every node v, which
reduces the cumulative probability by a factor of (1+ γ). Given that we only have
k useful steps and we may initially start with a probability p0 > δ/ε2, there can
be at most (k+ log1+γ max{p0/(δ/ε2),1})
√
F time steps in H; k are the useful
ones, and the nonuseful ones are the non-idle and non-successful steps in which the
cumulative probability is reduced: every
√
F nonuseful steps give one reduction of
p). This proves the claim.
For the calculations below recall the definition of f with the constants α
and β that are assumed to be sufficiently large. If k ≤ α logN, then it follows from
Claim 3.15 that, for large enough δ ,
|H| ≤ (α logN+ log1+γ N)
√
F ≤ ε f/β
where N = max{n,T}. Thus, the number of non-jammed time steps in H is also at
most ε f/β , and since β can be arbitrarily large, Lemma 3.13 follows, as the steps
in H fulfill this property (β ≥ 2 yields half of the steps).
It remains to consider the case that k > α logN. Let us assume that H con-
tains at least ε f/2 non-jammed time steps, otherwise the claim certainly holds. Our
goal is to contradict that statement in order to show that the lemma is true. For this
we will show that Claim 3.14 is violated w.h.p.
Let Tp be the number of all time steps covered by passes (t ′, p′,S′) with
p′ = p. Certainly, ∑p≥δ/ε2 Tp = |H|. Let φ = δ/ε2, and Φ= (1− pˆ) ln( f/ logN).
For a cumulative probability p ≥ Φ, P[idle | p] ≤ e−Φ = ( logNf )1−pˆ and
P[success | p]≤ Φ1−pˆ · e−Φ ≤ ln( f/ logN) · ( logNf )1−pˆ. Hence, by multiplying these
probabilities by the |H| ≤ f steps, we get that k ≤ f pˆ · ln f · log1−pˆ N on expecta-
tion, and from the Chernoff bounds it follows that k≤ 2 f pˆ · ln f · log1−pˆ N w.h.p., so
Claim 3.15 implies that the number of time steps in I′ with cumulative probability
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p≥Φ is at most
(2 f pˆ · ln f · log1−pˆ N+ log1+γ N)
√
F ≤ ε f/β ,w.h.p.
Since β can be arbitrarily large, we can only focus on the time steps when φ ≤ p<
Φ.
Let J¯p be the number of non-jammed time steps in Tp. We consider the case
where J¯p < 2P[idle|p] . Let k1,p be the number of successful time steps associated
with p-passes (i.e., at cumulative probability (1+ γ)p). Then, E[k1,p] = P[success |
p] · J¯p < 2. If we sum up over all possible probabilities p with φ ≤ p < Φ, the
number of non-jammed time steps covered by all J¯p such that J¯p < 2P[idle|p] is at
most
log1+γ Φ
∑
i=0
2/e−(1+γ)
i ≤ 4 · f/ logN = o( f )
many time steps, since the p values always differ by factors (1+ γ) (recall that
e−(1+γ)i is the corresponding probability of an idle step).
Hence, we can ignore all the passes where J¯p < 2P[idle|p] . We denote the
time steps that are ignored by H ′. Since we assumed |H| ≥ ε f/2, we have that f ≥
|H \H ′| ≥ ε f2η =Θ( f ), where η is a constant. Let Np be the number of time steps in
H \H ′ with cumulative probability p. Let Xt be a random variable, where Xt = 1 iff
there is a successful transmission at time step t. This implies that k1 = ∑t∈H\H ′ Xt ,
then:
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E[k1] =
Φ
∑
p=δ/ε2
Np ·P[success | p]
≥
Φ
∑
p=δ/ε2
Np · p · e−
p
1−pˆ ≥ ε f
2η
·Φ · e− Φ1−pˆ
= (1− pˆ) · ε f
2η
· (ln f − ln logN) · logN
f
= Ω(logN)
Applying Chernoff bounds, we have w.h.p., k1 ≥ (1− c1)E[k1] where 0 <
c1 ≤ 1.
Similarly, let Yt be a random variable, where Yt = 1 iff the channel is idle at
t. Then, k0 = ∑t∈H\H ′Yt .
E[k0] =
Φ
∑
p=δ/ε2
Np ·P[idle | p]≥
Φ
∑
p=δ/ε2
Np · e−
p
1−pˆ
≥ ε f
2η
· e− Φ1−pˆ = ε
2η
· logN =Ω(logN)
Applying Chernoff bounds, we have w.h.p., k0 ≤ c2 ·E[k0] where c2 ≥ 0 is
a large enough constant.
It implies that w.h.p.,
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k1− k0 ≥ (1− c1)E[k1]− c2 ·E[k0]
≥
Φ
∑
p=δ/ε2
Np((1− c1) · p · e−
p
1−pˆ − c2 · e−p)
≥ ε f
2η
· ((1− c1) ·Φ · logNf − c2 · e
−φ )
≥ ε f
2η
· ((1− c1) ·Φ · logNf − c2 · e
−δ/ε2)
=
ε
2η
· logN((1− c1) ·Φ− c3logN )
> log1+γΦ
> ∆+Ω(1)
Note that c3 = c2 · e−δ/ε2 is a constant, since both δ and ε are constants. More-
over, the number of different p values in [φ ,Φ) associated with a pass is at most
∆ = log1+γΦ− log1+γ φ . Hence, log1+γΦ > ∆+Ω(1). This inequality holds
w.h.p. when the constant c1 is small enough, and N is sufficiently large.
This is a contradiction to Claim 3.14, and hence completes the proof of
Lemma 3.13.
In order to proceed, we need the following claim.
Claim 3.16 For any collection P of passes it holds that
E[k′1]≥ (1− (1+ γ)/n)k1
where k1 and k′1 are defined w.r.t. P.
Proof. Because of Fact 3.5, the probability that a successful transmission is done
by a node different from the node of the last successful transmission is equal to
1− (1+ γ)p
(n+ γ)p
≥ 1− 1+ γ
n
.
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To see this, observe that among the cumulative probability p, if the last sender u has
a share pu(t) = x, all other nodes v have a share x/(1+ γ), and
pu(t)
∑v∈V pv(t)
=
x
(n−1) · x1+γ + x
=
1+ γ
n+ γ
.
Hence, E[k′1]≥ (1− (1+ γ)/n)k1.
Notice that by the choice of f and F , Tv never exceeds
√
F/2 for any v
when initially Tv = 1 for all v. Hence, the prerequisites of the lemmas are satisfied.
We can also show the following lemma, which shows that Tv remains bounded over
time.
Lemma 3.17 For any time frame I in which initially Tv ≤
√
F/2 for all v, also
Tv ≤
√
F/2 for all v at the end of I w.h.p.
Proof. We already know that in each subframe I′ in I, at least ε f/2 of the non-
jammed time steps t in I′ satisfy pt ≤ δ/ε2 w.h.p. Hence, for all (T,1−ε)-bounded
jamming strategies, there are at least
(δ/ε2) · e−δ/ε2 · ε f/2
useful time steps in I′ w.h.p. Due to the lower bound of pt ≥ 1/( f 2(1+ γ)
√
f ) for
all time steps in I w.h.p. we can also conclude that
k0 ≥ k′1+ k2− log1+γ((δ/ε2) · f 2(1+ γ)
√
f ).
Because of Claims 3.7 and 3.16 it follows that
k0 ≥ k1/3
w.h.p. Since k0 + k1 = k and k ≥ (δ/ε2) · e−δ/ε2 · ε f/2 it follows that k0 = Ω( f ).
Therefore, there must be at least one time point in I′ with Tv = 1 for all v ∈V . This
in turn ensures that Tv ≤
√
F/2 for all v at the end of I w.h.p.
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With Lemma 3.17, we show that Lemma 3.13 is true for a polynomial
number of subframes. Then, Lemma 3.13 and Lemma 3.17 together imply that
Lemma 3.10 holds for a polynomial number of subframes. Hence, our main The-
orem 3.2 follows. Along the same line as in [6], we can show that ANTIJAM is
self-stabilizing, so the throughput result can be extended to an arbitrary sequence
of time frames.
3.4 Simulation
We have implemented a simulator to study additional properties of our pro-
tocol and to complement our formal insights. Our focus here is on the qualitative
nature of the performance of ANTIJAM, and we did not optimize the parameters to
obtain the best constants. We consider three different jamming strategies for a re-
active jammer that is (T,1−ε)-bounded, for different ε values and where T = 100:
(1) one that jams non-idle steps with probability (1− ε); (2) one that jams non-idle
steps deterministically (as long the jamming budget is not used up); (3) one that
jams idle steps deterministically (as long as the jamming budget is not used up).
Intuitively, it seems that jamming non-idle steps is more harmful than jamming idle
steps. However, note that jamming idle steps may be an effective strategy to steer
the protocol into bad states; moreover, it may capture scenarios where nodes in
co-existent networks start sending in quiet times.
We define throughput as the number of successful transmissions over the
number of non-jammed time steps. Moreover, for networks larger than 100, we
choose (ˆp) = 1/24, whereas for smaller networks we choose (ˆp) = 1/2. As a gen-
eral guideline, it is always better to choose larger (ˆp) values, as this avoids capping
the throughput in small networks artificially. A smaller (ˆp) can make sense for
bootstrapping large networks, but due to the fast convergence times of the protocol
(see Section 3.4.2), this is unproblematic.
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Figure 3.1: Throughput under three different jamming strategies as a function of the
network size (large) and ε , where pˆ = 1/24 (averaged over 10 runs) (left: ε = 0.5,
right: ε = 0.3)
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Figure 3.2: Throughput under three different jamming strategies as a function of the
network size (small) and of ε , where pˆ= 1/2 (averaged over 10 runs) (left: ε = 0.5,
right: ε = 0.3)
3.4.1 Throughput
In a first set of experiments we study the throughput as a function of the network
size and ε . We evaluate the throughput performance for each type of adversary in-
troduced above, see Figure 3.1. For all three strategies, the throughput is basically
constant, independently of the network size; this is in accordance with our theoret-
ical insight of Theorem 3.2. We can see that given our conditions on ε and T , the
strategy that jams non-idle channels deterministically results in the lowest through-
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put. Hence, in the remaining experiments described in this section, we will focus
on this particular strategy. As expected, jamming idle channels does not affect the
protocol behavior much. In our simulations, ANTIJAM makes effective use of the
non-jammed time periods, yielding 20%−40% successful transmissions even with-
out optimizing the protocol parameters. Having shown the protocol scales well for
large network size, we also study the throughput results when the network size is
small, see Figure 3.2. We observe that the results for small and large scale networks
are comparable, but the throughput in the small scale networks can be slightly lower
under an adversary that jams non-idle channels deterministically or with probability
(1− ε).
Figure 3.3: Throughput as a function of γ under three different jamming strategies,
when n = 1000, and results are averaged over 10 runs
(left: ε = 0.5, right: ε = 0.3).
In additional experiments we also studied the throughput as a function of γ ,
see Figure 3.3. As expected, the throughput declines slightly for large γ , but this
effect is small. (Note that for very small γ , the convergence time becomes large
and the experiments need run for a long time in order not to underestimate the real
throughput.)
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3.4.2 Convergence Time
Besides a high throughput, fast convergence is the most important performance cri-
terion of a MAC protocol. The traces in Figure 3.4 (top left) show the evolution
of the cumulative probability over time. It can be seen that the protocol converges
quickly to constant access probabilities. (Note the logarithmic scale.) If the initial
probability for each node is high, the protocol needs more time to bring down the
low-constant cumulative probability. Moreover, the ratio of the time period the cu-
mulative probability is in the range of [ 12ε ,
2
ε ] to the time period the protocol being
executed is 92.98% when pˆ = 1/24, and 89.52% when pˆ = 1/2. This implies that
for a sufficiently large time period, the cumulative probability is well bounded most
of the time, which corresponds to our theoretical insights (cf Lemma 3.6 and 3.13).
Figure 3.4 (top right) studies the convergence time for different network sizes.
We ran the protocol 50 times, and assume that the execution has converged when
the cumulative probability p satisfies p ∈ [1,5], for at least 5 consecutive rounds.
The simulation result also qualitatively confirms our theoretical analysis in The-
orem 3.2, as the number of rounds needed to converge the execution is bounded
by Θ(1ε logN max{T, 1εγ2 log3 N}). (Of course, the concrete convergence time can
depend on the scenario, and may be faster than expected in the general case.)
Figure 3.4 (bottom left) indicates that independently of the initial values pˆ
and Tv, the throughput rises quickly (up above 20%) and stays there afterwards.
3.4.3 Fairness
As ANTIJAM synchronizes cv, Tv, and pv values upon message reception, the nodes
are expected to transmit roughly the same amount of messages; in other words, our
protocol is fair. Figure 3.4 (bottom right) presents a histogram showing how the
successful transmissions are distributed among the nodes. More specifically, we
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Figure 3.4: Top left: Evolution of cumulative probability over time (network size is
1000 nodes, and ε = 0.5). Note that the plot has logarithmic scale. Top right:
Boxplot of ANTIJAM runtime as a function of network size for pˆ = 1/24, and
ε = 0.5. Bottom left: Convergence in a network of 1000 nodes where ε = 0.5.
Bottom right: Fairness in a network of 1000 nodes, where ε = 0.5, and pˆ = 1/24
(averaged over 10 runs).
partition the number of successful transmissions into intervals of size 4. Then, all
the transmissions are grouped according to those intervals in the histogram.
3.4.4 Comparison
Finally, to put ANTIJAM into perspective, as a comparison, we implemented the
MAC protocol proposed in [6], as well as a simplified version of the widely used
802.11 MAC protocol (with a focus on 802.11a).
The configurations for the simulation are the following: (1) the jammer is
reactive and (T,1− ε)-bounded; (2) the unit slot time for 802.11 is set to 50µs;
for simplicity, we define one time step for ANTIJAM to be 50µs also; (3) we run
70
ANTIJAM, the MAC protocol in [6], and 802.11 for 4 min, which is equal to 4.8 ·106
time steps in our simulation; (4) the backoff timer of the 802.11 MAC protocol
implemented here uses units of 50µs; (5) we omit SIFS, DIFS, and RTS/CTS/ACK.
A comparison is summarized in Figure 3.5. The throughput achieved by
ANTIJAM and the MAC protocol in [6] are significantly higher than the one by
the 802.11 MAC protocol, specially for lower values of ε , when the 802.11 MAC
protocol basically fails to deliver any successful message. Note that the throughput
results between ANTIJAM and the MAC protocol in [6] are similar in the simula-
tions, but ANTIJAM is slightly better for the most ε .
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Figure 3.5: Throughput as a function of ε ∈ [0.05,0.95], compared to the MAC
protocol in [6] and
802.11, averaged over 10 runs, where pˆ = 1/24.
3.5 Conclusion
ANTIJAM is a simple, fair and self-stabilizing distributed MAC protocol that
is able to make efficient use of a shared communication medium whose availability
is changing quickly and in a hard to predict manner over time. In particular, we
proved that our protocol achieves a constant competitive throughput if ε is constant.
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Chapter 4
THE SELECT PROTOCOL
In this chapter, we consider the problem of designing a self-stabilizing distributed
protocol to elect a leader among a set V of n simple wireless nodes (e.g., nodes of
a sensor network) that are within each other’s transmission range and communicate
over a single channel. For our formal analysis, we assume that the time proceeds
in synchronous rounds (or steps).1 The general communication model specified
earlier (in 1.2.2) applies to SELECT also.
In addition to these nodes there is an adversary. We allow the adversary to
know the protocol and its entire history and to use this knowledge in order to jam
the wireless channel at will at any round. Such an adversary is called adaptive.
If in addition to that the adversary also knows (through physical carrier sensing)
the current channel state, we call it reactive. That is, a reactive adversary can
distinguish between the channel being currently idle (no node transmits) or busy
(either because of a successful transmission, a collision of transmissions, or too
much background noise) and can instantly make a jamming decision based on that
information. Whenever the adversary jams the channel, all nodes will notice a
busy channel. The nodes cannot distinguish between the adversarial jamming and
a collision of two or more messages that are sent at the same time.
In order to study the degree of jamming activity needed by the adversary
to prevent successful message transmissions, we use the notion of a (T,1− ε)-
bounded adversary. An adversary is called (T,1− ε)-bounded for some T ∈ N
and 0 < ε < 1 if for any time window of size w ≥ T the adversary can jam at
most (1− ε)w of the time steps in that window. Moreover we assume that the n
1A round may represent the time needed to send a message, e.g., a multiple of the 50µs unit in
802.11, depending on the message size.
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nodes use an encryption mechanism that prevents the adversary from inspecting
their messages.
As mentioned earlier, our goal is to design a leader election protocol that
is self-stabilizing despite adversarial jamming. Following the usual notation in the
self-stabilization literature, the system state is determined by the state of all vari-
ables in the system. That is, the protocol and any constants used by the protocol
are assumed to be immutable and not part of the system state. A system is called
self-stabilizing if and only if (1) when starting from any state, it is guaranteed to
eventually reach a legal state (convergence) and (2) given that the system is in a
legal state, it is guaranteed to stay in a legal state (closure), provided that there are
no faults or membership changes in the system. In our case, roughly speaking, the
legal state is the state in which we have exactly one leader. We will define the set of
legal states more formally when we introduce our protocol. While our protocol is
randomized and the leader election has to be performed under adversarial jamming,
our protocol is still guaranteed to eventually elect exactly one leader from any initial
state.
4.1 Contribution
This chapter presents SELECT (“SElf-stabilizing Leader EleCTion”), a pro-
tocol that solves the leader election problem in harsh environments—namely in
wireless networks under adversarial reactive jamming—and in a self-stabilizing
manner, independently of the initial network state. We believe that self-stabilization
is a crucial feature in real networks where membership is often dynamic. Although
our algorithm is randomized, we will present a formal proof that its correctness
holds deterministically. Moreover, while our analysis is rather involved, the SE-
LECT protocol itself is simple and hence easy to implement.
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Concretely, in this chapter we will derive the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 Given an arbitrary initial configuration and in the absence of state
faults, our leader election protocol reaches a state where there is exactly one leader
and n− 1 followers, despite a reactive (T,1− ε)-bounded jammer, for any T and
any constant ε > 0.
In SELECT, the nodes do not have to know anything about the system for
the protocol to work. The only assumption that we need is that some fixed common
parameter γ used by the nodes satisfies γ = O(1/(logT + log logn)). As logT and
loglogn are small for all reasonable values of T and n, this is scalable and not
a critical constraint, as it leaves room for a super-polynomial change in n and a
polynomial change in T over time.2 Thus, in practice we expect that choosing γ to
be a sufficiently small constant yields a good performance for any practical network,
which is confirmed by our simulations.
4.2 The SELECT Protocol
4.2.1 Intuition:
SELECT is based on the following idea. Each node v maintains a parameter pv
which describes v’s probability of accessing the medium at a given moment of time.
That is, in each round, each node v decides to transmit a message with probability pv
(e.g., in an attempt to become a leader). (This is similar to classic random backoff
mechanisms where the next transmission time t is chosen uniformly at random from
an interval of size 1/pv.) The nodes adapt and synchronize their pv values over time
in a multiplicative increase multiplicative decrease manner, i.e., the value is lowered
in times of high interference or increased during times where the channel is idling.
However, pv will never exceed pˆ, for some constant 0< pˆ< 1.
2On the other hand, note that the assumption that the nodes know constant factor approximations
of n or T directly would render the problem trivial. Moreover, such an assumption is unrealistic and
non-scalable.
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Algorithm 1 Leader Election: Follower
1: mc := cv mod b
2: ifmc = 0 then
3: ls1 := ls′0, ls2 := ls
′
1, ls3 := ls
′
2, ls4 := ls
′
3
4: sv := s′v
5: end if
6: if (ls3 = undefined) or (mc 6= ls1 and mc 6= ls2 and
mc 6= ls3 andmc 6= ls4) then
7: v decides with pv to send a follower message
8: if v sends a follower message then
9: the message contains:
10: cc1 := ls′0, cc2 := ls
′
1, cc3 := ls
′
2, cc4 := ls
′
3,
cnew := cv , Tnew := Tv , pnew := pv
11: end if
12: end if
13: if v does not send a follower message then
14: v senses the channel
15: if channel is idle then
16: ifmc = ls3 then
17: s′v := 1
18: pv := pˆ
19: else
20: pv := min {(1 + γ)pv, pˆ}
21: end if
22: else if v receives ‘LEADER’ then
23: s′v := 0
24: ls3 := undefined
25: ls′2 := undefined
26: else if v receives a tuple of {cc1, cc2, cc3, cc4, cnew,
Tnew, pnew} then
27: Tv := Tnew
28: pv := (1 + γ)−1pnew
29: cv := cnew
30: ls′0 := random(0, b− 1)
31: ls′1 := cc1, ls
′
2 := cc2, ls
′
3 := cc3, ls
′
4 := cc4
32: end if
33: end if
34: cv := cv + 1
35: if cv ≥ b · Tv then
36: cv := 0
37: if (not CONDITION) then
38: pv := (1 + γ)−1pv , Tv := Tv + 1
39: ls′0 := undefined, ls
′
1 := undefined,
ls′2 := undefined, ls
′
3 := undefined,
ls′4 := undefined
40: else
41: Tv := max{Tv − 1, 4}
42: end if
43: end if
Algorithm 2 Leader Election: Leader
1: mc := cv mod b
2: ifmc = 0 then
3: ls1 := ls′1, ls2 := ls
′
2, ls3 := ls
′
3, ls4 := ls
′
4
4: end if
5: if mc = ls1 or mc = ls2 or mc = ls3 or mc = ls4
then
6: v sends the leader message ‘LEADER’
7: else
8: v decides with pv to send ‘LEADER’
9: if v does not send ‘LEADER’ then
10: v senses the channel
11: if channel is idle then
12: pv := min {(1 + γ)2pv, pˆ}
13: else if v receives a message then
14: pv := (1 + γ)−1pv
15: if message is ‘LEADER’ then
16: sv := 0, s′v := 0
17: ls3 := undefined, ls′2 :=
undefined
18: else if message is a follower message,
i.e., a tuple of {cc1, cc2, cc3, cc4, cnew,
Tnew, pnew} then
19: cv := cnew, Tv := Tnew
20: ls′1 := cc1, ls
′
2 := cc2, ls
′
3 := cc3,
ls′4 := cc4
21: end if
22: end if
23: end if
24: end if
25: cv := cv + 1
26: if cv ≥ b · Tv then
27: cv := 0
28: if (not CONDITION) then
29: pv := (1 + γ)−1pv , Tv := Tv + 1
30: ls′0 := undefined, ls
′
1 := undefined,
ls′2 := undefined, ls
′
3 := undefined,
ls′4 := undefined
31: else
32: Tv := max{Tv − 1, 4}
33: end if
34: end if
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′
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24: ls3 := undefined
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30: ls′0 := random(0, b− 1)
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′
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Algorithm 2 Leader Election: Leader
1: mc := cv mod b
2: ifmc = 0 then
3: ls1 := ls′1, ls2 := ls
′
2, ls3 := ls
′
3, ls4 := ls
′
4
4: end if
5: if mc = ls1 or mc = ls2 or mc = ls3 or mc = ls4
then
6: v sends the leader message ‘LEADER’
7: else
8: v decides with pv to send ‘LEADER’
9: if v does not send ‘LEADER’ then
10: v senses the channel
11: if channel is idle then
12: pv := min {(1 + γ)2pv, pˆ}
13: else if v receives a message then
14: pv := (1 + γ)−1pv
15: if message is ‘LEADER’ then
16: sv := 0, s′v := 0
17: ls3 := undefined, ls′2 :=
undefined
18: else if message is a follower message,
i.e., a tuple of {cc1, cc2, cc3, cc4, cnew,
Tnew, pnew} then
19: cv := cnew, Tv := Tnew
20: ls′1 := cc1, ls
′
2 := cc2, ls
′
3 := cc3,
ls′4 := cc4
21: end if
22: end if
23: end if
24: end if
25: cv := cv + 1
26: if cv ≥ b · Tv then
27: cv := 0
28: if (not CONDITION) then
29: pv := (1 + γ)−1pv , Tv := Tv + 1
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′
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Figure 4.1: Algorithm for followers (left) and leaders (right).
In addition, each node maintains two variables, a threshold variable Tv and
a counter variable cv. Tv is used to estimate the adversary’s time window T : a good
estimation of T can help the nodes recover from a situation where they experience
high interference in the network. In times of high interference, Tv will be increased
and the sending probability pv will be decreased.
Initially, every node v sets cv := 1 and pv := pˆ. Note however that while
we provide some initial values for the variables in our description, our protocol is
self-stabilizing and works for any initial variable values, as we will show in our
proofs.
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SELECT distinguishes between two node roles: follower and leader. We use
sv to indicate the role of the node: sv = 1 means that node v is a leader, whereas
sv = 0 means v is a follower. The basic idea of our protocol is to divide time into
intervals of a small number of rounds specified by the constant parameter b > 5
(we use the variable mc as a modulo counter); in the following, we will refer to a
sequence of rounds between two consecutive mc = 0 events as a b-interval. (Of
course, it can happen that all b slots of an interval are jammed.)
Our protocol is based on the concept of so-called leader slots, special rounds—
in each b-interval through which SELECT cycles—in which leaders are obliged to
send an alive message (a so-called leader message) and in which followers keep
silent. The idea is that the followers learn that the leader has left in case of an idling
medium during a leader slot (of course, the leader slots may be jammed!) and a
new election is triggered automatically.
SELECT uses four leader slots:3 ls1, ls2, ls3 and ls4. Of course, in the
beginning, all nodes may have different ls values and may disagree on which slots
during the b-interval are leader slots. However, over time, the nodes synchronize
their states and a consistent view emerges. For the synchronization, five temporary
variables ls′0, ls
′
1, ls
′
2, ls
′
3, and ls
′
4 are used, which store future ls values.
Depending on whether the node is of type follower or leader, the leader
slots are updated differently: At the beginning of a new b-interval, a leader copies
its ls′i values to the lsi values. A follower on the other hand copies the ls′ values
“diagonally” in the sense that ls′i is copied to ls′i+1 for i ∈ {0,1,2,3}. As we will
see, this mechanism ensures that an elected leader covers the leader slot ls3 of each
follower. (SELECT guarantees that the reactive adversary has no knowledge about
the ls3 slots at all until it is already too late to prevent a successful election.) An-
3It is an open question whether a protocol with less leader slots can be devised.
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other special slot besides ls3 is ls′0 which is a random seed to mix the execution for
increased robustness.
4.2.2 Description of SELECT
In Figure 4.1 we give the detailed formal description of the follower and the leader
protocol, respectively. Recall that our algorithms can tolerate any initial values of
mc, pv, Tv, cv, sv, s′v, ls1, ls2, ls3, ls4, ls′0, ls
′
1, ls
′
2, ls
′
3, ls
′
4. For instance, in the
beginning, all nodes v may be leaders and for all v, sv = 1. However, the fixed
parameters used by the algorithms, namely pˆ,γ , or b, are assumed to be immutable.
Both the follower and the leader algorithm consist of three main parts. The
b-interval wise update (Lines 2− 4) makes sure that ls values are refreshed fre-
quently. Lines 6−33 (in case of a follower) and Lines 5−24 (in case of a leader)
are used for medium access in order to synchronize the nodes’ states (by a message
that includes cv, Tv, and pv values) and give nodes the chance to become or remain
leader (by a ‘LEADER’ message). The last sections of the algorithms are used to
react to high interference (by reducing pv) and to reset leader slots. The reason for
checking whether ls3 is undefined in Line 6 of the follower protocol is to keep the
leader slots hidden from the reactive adversary until it is already too late to prevent
a successful leader election.4
Both the follower and the leader protocol depend on the following crucial
CONDITION.
Definition 4.2 (CONDITION) We define CONDITION (Line 37 for followers, and
Line 28 for leaders) as the event that at least one ‘LEADER’ message was received
during the past b ·Tv steps.
4This check would not be necessary against a non-reactive adversary.
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The idea is that if CONDITION is fulfilled, we know that the protocol is already in
a good state. Moreover, we will see that the adversary cannot prevent CONDITION
to become true for a long time as the Tv values would continue to increase.
Finally, also note that leaders increase pv faster (i.e., by larger multiplicative
factors) during idle rounds than followers. With this mechanism, SELECT improves
the likelihood that a ‘LEADER’ message gets through and hence that a unique
leader is elected.
4.3 Analysis
This section shows that the randomized SELECT protocol is guaranteed to
eventually reach a situation where there is exactly one leader and n− 1 followers.
We make use of the following definitions. First, we define the system state.
Definition 4.3 (State and System State) The state of node v is determined by the
state of the variables pv, Tv, cv, sv, s′v, mc, ls′0, ls1, ls
′
1, ls2, ls
′
2, ls3, ls
′
3, ls4 and ls
′
4.
The state of the system is the set of the states of all nodes.
We use the following LSL set to describe the union of all possible leader slot
values present in the system.
Definition 4.4 (The LSL State Set) For any given system state, let LSL = {ls1(v),
ls2(v), ls3(v), ls4(v) |v is leader} \{unde f ined}.
The system can be in several special states which are formalized next: fol-
lower states, pre-leader states, and leader states. Let [b] = {0, . . . ,b−1}.
Definition 4.5 (Follower State) A state S is called a follower state, denoted by S ∈
FOLLOWER, if all the following conditions hold. (i) All nodes are followers (∀v ∈
V : sv = 0); (ii) for every node v: ls1(v), ls2(v), ls3(v), ls4(v) ∈ [b] ∪{unde f ined},
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ls′1(v), ls
′
2(v), ls
′
3(v), ls
′
4(v) ∈ [b]∪ {unde f ined}, ls′0(v) ∈ [b]; (iii) the follower
nodes can be partitioned into two sets {v} and V \{v}, according to their ls′ values
(v is the node that successfully sent the last follower message); for each w∈V \{v}:
ls′1(w) = ls
′
0(v), ls
′
2(w) = ls
′
1(v), ls
′
3(w) = ls
′
2(v), ls
′
4(w) = ls
′
3(v), and ls2(w) =
ls1(v), ls3(w) = ls2(v), and ls4(w) = ls3(v); (iv) for any pair of follower nodes
v,w ∈V with ls′2(v) ∈ [b] and ls3(v) ∈ [b], cv = cw and Tv = Tw.
We use the concept of so-called pre-leader states, i.e., states that result from
follower states before some nodes become leaders.
Definition 4.6 (Pre-leader State) A state S is called a pre- leader state, denoted by
S ∈ PRE−LEADER, if it is a follower state, and at least one follower node v has
s′v = 1.
While in the beginning, the leader sets may be large as each node regards
different slots during the b-interval as the “leader slots”, over time the values syn-
chronize and the LS sets become smaller. This facilitates a fast leader (re-) election.
Definition 4.7 (Leader State) A state S is called a leader state, denoted by S ∈
LEADER, if all the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) There is at least one leader, i.e., |{v|v ∈ V : sv = 1}| ≥ 1; (ii) for every
node v, ls1(v), ls2(v), ls3(v), ls4(v)∈ [b]∪{unde f ined}, ls′1(v), ls′2(v), ls′3(v), ls′4(v)∈
[b]∪{unde f ined}, ls′0(v) ∈ [b]; (iii) let v be any follower and let w be any follower
or leader, then ls3(v) ∈ {ls1(w), ls2(w), ls3(w), ls4(w)} ∪ {unde f ined}, ls′2(v) ∈
{ls′0(w), ls′1(w), ls′2(w), ls′3(w)} ∪ {unde f ined}; (iv) |LSL| ≤ 5; (v) for every fol-
lower w with ls3(w) ∈ [b] or ls′2(w) ∈ [b], cw = cv and Tw = Tv for any leader v.
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So in a leader state, it holds that any follower’s ls3 and ls′2 slots are covered by either
another follower’s ls and ls′ slots, or a leader’s ls and ls slots (cf Condition (iii)).
Finally, it is useful to define safe and legal states.
Definition 4.8 (Safe and Legal State) A system state S is called safe (denoted by
S∈ SAFE) if S∈FOLLOWER or S∈ LEADER, and legal (denoted by S∈ LEGAL)
if S is safe and there is exactly one node v with sv = 1.
Thus, according to our definitions, any legal state is also a safe state. In the follow-
ing, let S be the set of all possible system states, SAFE ⊂ S be the set of all safe
system states and LEGAL⊂ SAFE be the set of all legal system states.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 unfolds in a number of lemmas. An interest-
ing property of our randomized algorithm is that it is guaranteed to be correct, in
the sense that deterministically exactly one leader is elected; only the runtime is
probabilistic (i.e., depends on the random choices made by SELECT).
First, we study leader messages.
Lemma 4.9 For any network state it holds that if a leader successfully transmits a
‘LEADER’ message, the system will immediately enter a legal state.
Proof. When a node (either follower or leader) receives a ‘LEADER’ message, it
sets ls3 and ls′2 to unde f ined (Lines 22−25 in Figure 4.1 left; after Lines 15−17
of Figure 4.1 right), and considers itself a follower. Thus, in the new state, there is
exactly one leader (the sender of the ‘LEADER’ message) and n−1 followers. The
state is also a safe state, namely a leader state: Conditions (i) and (ii) are fulfilled
trivially. Condition (iv) also holds as there is only one leader that has four slots.
Condition (iii) is fulfilled because nodes receiving a ‘LEADER’ message reset their
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slots ls3 and ls′2; since ls3 and ls
′
2 are undefined for a follower, also Condition (v)
holds.
We next consider what happens if nodes hear a message sent by a follower.
Lemma 4.10 For any network state it holds that when a follower successfully trans-
mits a message, the system is guaranteed to enter a safe state at the beginning of
the next b-interval.
Proof. First note that if a leader message gets through before the next b-interval,
the claim holds trivially due to Lemma 4.9.
Otherwise we distinguish two cases: (A) For every node v, s′v = 0 (not pre-
leader) and sv = 0 (not leader) by the end of current b-interval. (B) There is at least
one node v with either s′v = 1 (pre-leader) or sv = 1 (leader) by the end of current
b-interval.
In Case (A), after the follower message has been successfully sent, there
are still n followers and no leaders or pre-leaders. We will show that the system
enters the follower state at the beginning of the next b-interval. Let us refer to the
follower node that sent the message by v and to any remaining node by w. When
w receives the message from v (Lines 26− 32 in Figure 4.1 left), it sets ls′1(w) :=
ls′0(v), ls
′
2(w) := ls
′
1(v), ls
′
3(w) := ls
′
2(v), and ls
′
4(w) := ls
′
3(v). The c values become
the same (cw = cv), and Tw := Tv. The new state therefore fulfills the follower
state conditions: Clearly, Conditions (i),(ii), and (iv) are fulfilled immediately, and
Condition (iii) holds as well, as for all followers w that did not send a message and
follower v which sent a message, at the beginning of the next b-interval: ls3(w) =
ls′2(w) = ls
′
1(v) = ls2(v), ls3(v) = ls
′
2(v) = ls
′
3(w) = ls4(w), and ls1(v) = ls2(w) =
ls′0(v) = ls
′
1(w).
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For Case (B), observe that during the remainder of the b-interval the number
of pre-leader nodes with s′v = 1 cannot decrease, and hence there will be at least one
leader at the beginning of the next b-interval. We now show that the new state will
indeed be a leader state as nodes “synchronize” with the follower node that sent the
message. Without loss of generality, assume that node u is the last follower that
successfully sent a follower message in the current b-interval. Let us refer to the
other follower nodes by v1 and to the leader nodes or the pre-leader nodes (i.e., the
followers v with s′v = 1) by v2. Again, Conditions (i) and (ii) are fulfilled trivially.
As for Condition (iii), we need to consider two sub-cases:
(Case 1) No node experienced an idle channel in its ls3 slot after the message
has been successfully sent. If this is the case and follower u is not a pre-leader, it
holds that for follower v1: ls′2(v1) = ls
′
2(v2) = ls
′
1(u) in the current b-interval, and
ls3(v1) = ls2(v2) = ls2(u) at the beginning of the next b-interval; on the other hand,
if follower u is a pre-leader, then in the current b-interval it holds that for follower
v1: ls′2(v1) = ls
′
2(v2) = ls
′
1(u), and ls3(v1) = ls2(v2) = ls1(u) at the beginning of
the next b-interval. Hence, Condition (iii) holds. Regarding the cardinality of the
leader set LSL, observe that at the beginning of the next b-interval, if u is not a pre-
leader, all leaders will have ls1 = ls′0(u), ls2 = ls
′
1(u), ls3 = ls
′
2(u), ls4 = ls
′
3(u), and
hence LSL = {ls′0(u), ls′1(u), ls′2(u), ls′3(u)}, therefore |LSL| ≤ 5; otherwise, if u is a
pre-leader, then LSL = {ls′0(u), ls′1(u), ls′2(u), ls′3(u), ls′4(u)}, therefore |LSL| ≤ 5.
(Case 2) One or more nodes experienced an idle channel in their ls3 slots
after the message has been successfully sent. In the following, we prove this case
correct assuming that u is a follower and not a pre-leader. If u is a pre-leader, the
proof is analogous.
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1. If v1 experienced the idle channel at its ls3 time slot, and became a pre-leader:
Note that a node v1 may experience an idle channel after receiving the mes-
sage from u and hence become a pre-leader, however Condition (iii) is still
satisfied, as it holds that for follower u: ls′2(u) = ls
′
3(v2) = ls
′
3(v1) in the
current b-interval and ls3(u) = ls3(v2) = ls3(v1) at the beginning of the next
b-interval. As for the cardinality of the leader set LSL, observe that at the
beginning of the next b-interval, all leaders will have ls1 = ls′0(u), ls2 =
ls′1(u), ls3 = ls
′
2(u), ls4 = ls
′
3(u), and hence LSL = {ls′0(u), ls′1(u), ls′2(u), ls′3(u)},
therefore |LSL| ≤ 5.
2. If u experienced the idle channel at its ls3 time slot, and became a pre-leader:
If node u experienced an idle channel after successfully sending the message,
u became a pre-leader, and we have for a follower v1, ls′2(v1) = ls
′
2(v2) =
ls′1(u) in the current b-interval and ls3(v1) = ls2(v2) = ls1(u) at the begin-
ning of the next b-interval. Hence, Condition (iii) is satisfied. As for |LSL|,
observe that at the beginning of the next b-interval, for a leader v2, ls1 =
ls′0(u), ls2 = ls
′
1(u), ls3 = ls
′
2(u), ls4 = ls
′
3(u), while for the remaining leader
u, it holds that ls1 = ls′1(u), ls2 = ls
′
2(u), ls3 = ls
′
3(u), ls4 = ls
′
4(u). Hence,
also in this case, we have that |LSL| ≤ 5.
Finally, Condition (v) is true for both of the sub-cases, because the cv and
Tv values are “synchronized” when the follower message is received (Lines 27 and
29 in Figure 4.1 left; Line 19 in Figure 4.1 right).
An important property of SELECT is that once it is in a safe state, it will
remain so in future (given that there are no external changes). Similar properties
can be derived for other states, as we will see.
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Lemma 4.11 Once the system is in a safe state, it will remain in a safe state in the
future.
Proof. We study what can happen in one round, and show that in each case, the
safety properties are maintained. In a round, (A) either a ‘LEADER’ message is
successfully sent, (B) a follower message is successfully sent, (C) there are colli-
sions or the channel is jammed, or (D) there is an idle channel.
In Case (A), the claim directly follows from Lemma 4.9 and from the fact
that safe states are a super set of the legal states (SAFE ⊃ LEGAL). In Case (B),
the claim follows from Lemma 4.10 and by the fact that the system is in the safe
state already.
In Case (C), if the channel is blocked, follower nodes (even those which
sent a message in this round) do not change their state except for the synchronized
rounds in Lines 35−43, and similarly for the leaders in Lines 26−34. Our proto-
cols guarantee that the leaders have the same cv and Tv values as the followers when
ls3 and ls′2 are valid, and since the leaders experience the same number of success-
ful transmissions and idle time steps as the followers do (single-hop network), the
claim follows.
If there is an idle channel (Case (D)), all nodes v for which ls3(v) = mc will
set s′v = 1 in the current b-interval, while other values remain the same. It is clear
that from this point on until the end of the current b-interval, the claim holds. More-
over, as we show next, the claim is still true at the beginning of next b-interval. If
ls3(v) is undefined, then the claim holds trivially, as no states will change in this
case. If ls3(v) = mc for any node v and the nodes experience an idle channel, there
is no leader since, if there was a leader, according to Condition (iii) of the leader
state definition (Definition 4.7), a follower’s ls3 slot would always be covered by a
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leader slot of a leader, which yields the contradiction. Hence, the current safe state
must be a pre-leader state. Let v denote the followers that have s′v = 0 (i.e., they are
not pre-leaders); let u denote the followers with s′u = 1 (pre-leaders). In the current
b-interval, we have ls′2(v) ∈ {ls′0(u), ls′1(u), ls′2(u), ls′3(u)}∪{unde f ined}, which is
true according to Condition (iii) of the follower state definition (Definition 4.5).
Then, at the beginning of next b-interval, u will become a leader, and hence we
have ls3(v) = ls′2(v), ls1(u) = ls
′
1(u), ls2(u) = ls
′
2(u), and ls3(u) = ls
′
3(u). This
implies that ls3(v) ∈ {ls′0(u), ls1(u), ls2(u), ls3(u)}, which satisfies Condition (iii)
of the leader state Definition 4.7. Conditions (i) and (ii) are clearly satisfied. Con-
dition (iv) holds simply because we have shown (in Lemma 4.10, Case (B)), when
there is an idle time step, |LSL| ≤ 5. Condition (v) is true because we always syn-
chronize the cv and Tv values.
Lemma 4.12 Once a system is in a leader state, it will remain in a leader state in
the future.
Proof. Lemma 4.11 tells us that the system will never leave a safe state. There-
fore, it remains to prove that there will always be at least one node v with sv = 1.
This clearly holds as the only way a leader can become a follower again is by receiv-
ing a ‘LEADER’ message (see Lines 15−17), which of course implies that another
leader is still active and remains to be a leader. Also, since we are in a leader state,
Condition (v) holds and it further implies that leaders will never invalidate their ls
slots before the followers. This guarantees that the protocol will never get out of a
leader state.
Lemma 4.13 Once a system is in a legal state, it will remain in a legal state in the
future.
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Proof. By Lemma 4.11, we know that our system will never leave a safe state
again, and hence, we only need to prove that there will always be exactly one
node v with sv = 1. This is true because in the safe state, a follower node w
can never become a leader, as its ls3(w) slot is covered by the leader v: ls3(w) ∈
{ls1(v), ls2(v), ls3(v), ls4(v)} and ls′2(w)∈{ls′0(v), ls′1(v), ls′2(v), ls′3(v)} (Condition (iii)
of leader state). Since a follower will never send a ‘LEADER’ message, v will re-
main a leader forever, which proves the claim.
Regarding convergence, note that the system quickly enters a safe state,
deterministically.
Lemma 4.14 For any initial system state with Tˆ = maxv Tv, it takes at most b · Tˆ
rounds until the system is in a safe state.
Proof. We distinguish three cases: if a leader message gets through sometimes
in these rounds, then the claim holds by Lemma 4.9; if a follower message gets
through, then the claim holds by Lemma 4.10. If within maxv Tvb rounds neither
a follower message nor a leader message gets through, all nodes will have to reset
their ls slots (since CONDITION in Line 37 (Figure 4.1 left) resp. Line 28 (Figure 4.1
right) is not met). This however constitutes the safe state (all conditions fulfilled
trivially), which is maintained according to Lemma 4.11.
Armed with these results, we can prove convergence.
Lemma 4.15 For any safe state, SELECT will eventually reach a legal state.
Proof. We divide the proof in two phases: the phase where the protocol transitions
to the leader state from the follower state, and the phase where it transitions to the
legal state from the leader state.
86
1. Follower state to leader state
If CONDITION is fulfilled, we know that a ‘LEADER’ message got through
and the system is in a legal state (and hence also in a leader state). As long as
CONDITION is not fulfilled, Tv is increasing for each node v. So eventually,
Tˆ = maxv Tv ≥ 2T/b. We can also provide a lower bound on the cumulative
probability p. W.l.o.g. suppose that T ≥ (3/ε) log1+γ n (a smaller T will only
make the jammer less flexible and weaker). Suppose that p is at most ε/4
throughout some T -interval I. Then it follows from the standard Chernoff
bounds that there are at most εT/3 busy steps in I with high probability.5
If this is true, then no matter how the adversary jams during I, at least (1−
ε/3)T − (1− ε)T = 2εT/3 non-jammed steps will be idle, which implies
that the cumulative probability at the end of I will be by a factor of at least
(1+ γ)εT/3 ≥ n3 higher than at the beginning of I. Using this insight, it
follows that eventually a T -interval is reached with p > ε/4. Once such a
T -interval has been reached, it is easy to show that p will not get below 1/n2
any more w.h.p. so that for every T -interval afterwards there is a time point
t with p > ε/4 w.h.p. So infinitely often the following event can take place
with some lower-bounded, positive probability:
Consider two consecutive T -intervals I1 and I2 starting at a time when cv = 0
for every node v. Suppose that I1 just consists of busy steps and I2 just con-
sists of idle time steps. Then the adversary has to leave εT busy time steps
in I1 non-jammed and εT idle time steps in I2 non-jammed. For I1, there is a
positive probability in this case that exactly 3 messages from different nodes
are successfully sent in 3 different b-intervals. In this case, all but one fol-
lower respect the leader slots (as their ls3-value is defined) while the follower
5“With high probability”, or short “w.h.p.”, means a probability of at least 1− 1/nc for any
constant c> 0.
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that sent the last successful message may still send out messages at all time
steps (as its ls3-value is still undefined, see Line 6 of the follower protocol).
Thus, it is indeed possible that all time steps in I1 are busy. Up to that point,
the adversary has not learned anything about the leader slots. In I2, there
is also a positive probability that none of the followers transmits a message
throughout I2 so that all time steps are idle. As the adversary does not know
which of them is a leader slot and has to leave εT non-jammed, there is a pos-
itive probability that ls3 is non-jammed, and some of the followers become
pre-leaders and then leaders.
Thus, the expected time to get from a follower to a leader state is finite.
2. Leader state to legal state
If there is only one leader in the leader state, the system is already in a le-
gal state by definition. If there is more than one leader, then we distinguish
between the following cases. If CONDITION is fulfilled, we know that a
‘LEADER’ message got through and the system is in a legal state. Other-
wise, the leaders will invalidate all of their ls slots once their cv values are
reset to 0. At this point there is a positive probability that for the next T steps
a ‘LEADER’ message is successfully sent. As the adversary has to leave εT
time steps non-jammed, at least one ‘LEADER’ message will be successfully
transmitted within these T steps so that the system reaches a legal state.
Analogous to the followers in the previous case, one can lower bound the cu-
mulative probability of the leaders (in fact, the leaders will eventually reach a
time point with a cumulative probability of Ω(ε) as they increase their prob-
abilities in case of an idle channel more aggressively than the followers) so
that the chance above of successfully transmitting a ‘LEADER’ message re-
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peats itself infinitely often with a lower-bounded positive probability. Thus,
the expected time to get from a leader to a legal state is finite as well.
From these cases, the lemma follows.
4.4 Experiments
We conducted several simulations to study the behavior of SELECT under
different types of jammers and interference.
4.4.1 Performance under Jamming
For our formal analysis, we introduced the notion of a (T,1−ε)-bounded adversary
for some T ∈ N and 0 < ε < 1 which denotes that for any time window of size
w ≥ T the adversary can jam at most (1− ε)w of the time steps in that window.
While our protocol is provably robust to any adversary meeting these constraints,
for our simulations, we will need to focus on specific instantiations. For example,
we will consider an adversary that reactively jams all non-idle time periods only
(as long as the budget is not used up), in order not to waste energy jamming idling
periods.
Figure 4.2: Left: Convergence time from safe state to legal state, where the ad-
versary ADVrand jams the channel. We ran our protocol until exactly one leader is
elected. Middle: Convergence time from safe state to legal state, where a reactive
adversary ADVbusy jams the channel when one or more nodes are transmitting. We
ran SELECT until only one leader is elected. Right: Convergence time from safe
state to legal state under the reactive ADVidle adversary.
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We consider jammers of different powers, one that can block the channel
90% of the entire time, one that blocks 70% of the time, and a “weak” one that
blocks 50% of the time (i.e., ε ∈ {0.1,0.3,0.5}, resp.). We set T = 100 and consider
a b-interval (see Figure 4.1) with parameter b= 15 (smaller b values are possible as
well). Experiments are repeated 50 times for each individual setting, and average
values are recorded correspondingly. We run each experiment until one and only
one leader is elected.
We conducted experiments with different types of reactive jammers: jam-
mers ADVrand which interrupt transmissions at random, jammers ADVbusy which
only jam busy periods where one or more nodes transmit, and jammers ADVidle
which jam the channel whenever it is idle. Concretely, for ADVbusy and ADVidle
we assume that the adversary will jam each busy resp. idle time period until the
“jamming budget” is used up for this T -period. For ADVrand we set the jamming
probability per round equal to (1− ε). ADVidle may appear less challenging to the
deal with. However, note that an adversary may be able to lead a protocol to sub-
optimal states by jamming idle time periods. Moreover, this scenario also describes
interference from co-existing networks where nodes are activated in quiet times.
Hence, this adversary constitutes an interesting case that should not be neglected in
the analysis.
Recall from Lemma 4.14 that from any initial state, the safe state is reached
quickly, and hence, we are mainly interested in the convergence time from the safe
state to the legal state. Figure 4.2 (left) plots the corresponding convergence times.
At first sight the runtime may appear to be rather high. For example, under an
adversary ADVrand that jams 90% of the entire time, it takes a few thousand time
steps. However, note that this result implies that during the merely a few hundred
non-jammed time steps, the five hundred nodes are able to successfully coordinate
90
the medium access among themselves—without being able to distinguish between
time periods with collisions and time periods that are jammed!— and use the com-
puted access probabilities to elect a leader. We believe that when taking this into
account, and although we do not have any lower bounds, the convergence time is
very good and probably cannot be improved much with alternative schemes.
Figure 4.2 (middle and right) presents the corresponding convergence times
for the reactive jammers ADVbusy and ADVidle. As expected, jamming the busy
channel yields higher convergence times, also when comparing these results to our
experiments with ADVrand. In contrast, interestingly, for ADVidle, the runtime is
fairly independent of the adversarial power: a reactive jammer blocking idle chan-
nels gives similar results as ADVrand. Clearly, among the scenarios we investigated,
the most effective strategy for the adversary is to reactively jam the busy time peri-
ods as long as the total number of jammed time steps does not exceed (1− ε) ·T .
Figure 4.3 complements Figure 4.2 by studying the execution times in smaller net-
works.
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Figure 4.3: Like Figure 4.2, but for smaller networks and using ε = 0.5 and pˆ =
1/24.
Our protocol aims to quickly reach a cumulative sending probability around
a small constant, such that on expectation, roughly one node will try to transmit a
message in a non-jammed step. Thus, given the constant probability of having a
successful transmission, a follower messages will get through soon, the nodes syn-
chronize, and the ls slots are defined as well. Since the leaders’ sending probabili-
ties reach higher values more quickly than the sending probabilities of the follow-
ers (according to Line 12 of Figure 4.1 right), a leader message gets through soon,
yielding a legal state. We consider two initial states, a “well-initialized one” where
all nodes have the maximum access probability pˆ (in simulation we set pˆ = 1/24),
where there is no leader in the network, and where the ls and ls′ slots are all inval-
idated (according to Definition 4.5, this implies that we are in the follower state);
and one with “arbitrary initialization” where the roles and variables are chosen at
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random (each node is either follower or leader, pv is chosen uniformly at random
between 0 and 1, and the ls values uniformly at random between 0 and b−1). Our
experiments show that both scenarios yield similar results, which indicates that the
convergence time of self-stabilization if fairly independent of the initial state.
Figure 4.4 (left) shows a typical trace of the cumulative probabilities over
time when the protocol is well initialized, i.e., the protocol starts from the follower
state. Initially, all nodes are followers, and we will denote the cumulative sending
probability of the followers by pF , and the cumulative sending probability of the
leaders by pL. At beginning, pF > 500 · pˆ> 10 while pL = 0. As time goes on, pF
decreases quickly until it falls in an interval of small constant range (i.e., pF < 10),
and multiple successful transmissions happen which synchronize the nodes’ ls and
ls′ values. Next, multiple leaders are elected because many followers sense an idle
time step in their ls3 slot. That is why pL emerges at the same point in time as pF
decreases dramatically to a value between 0 and 1. Then, the nodes continue to
adjust their transmission probabilities depending on the channel state, until the first
leader message gets through and all the other leaders become followers; this yields
the quick decrease of pL and increase of pF accordingly. One and only one leader
is elected after this point. Subsequently, both pF and pL remain within a small
constant range. Figure 4.4 (right) shows the cumulative probabilities when the pro-
tocol starts from an “arbitrary” state (pv, Tv, leaders and follower roles, etc. chosen
at random). In the beginning, there are both followers and leaders in the network. It
can be seen that SELECT converges fast, similarly to the well-initialized case. After
the legal state is reached, both pF and pL also remain in a small constant range.
4.4.2 Co-existing Networks
Our leader election protocol is robust to arbitrary (but bounded with respect to time)
interruptions of the availability of the medium, and it is convenient to regard these
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Figure 4.4: Left: Fast convergence of pF and pL (ε = 0.5, T = 100, network with
500 nodes) under ADVbusy when the protocol starts from a safe state. Right: Cor-
responding convergence of pF and pL when the protocol starts from an arbitrary
state.
Figure 4.5: Left: Convergence time of co-existing networks (as a function of their
individual sizes) performing the leader election algorithm. Right: Fair convergence
time among co-existing networks.
interruptions as caused by a malicious adversary. However, there are many other
forms of interference to which our protocol is resilient and under which the few
available time slots can be exploited effectively. In the following, we briefly report
on one more source of interference, namely co-existing protocol instances. Con-
cretely, we remove the jammer from the network and we compare the performance
of our leader election protocol when run alone to situations where additional net-
works (of the same size) are concurrently trying to elect a leader and interfere with
the other protocol instances accordingly.
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Figure 4.5 (left) plots the averaged runtime until successful leader election
for one, two, three and four co-existing networks, as a function of the correspond-
ing sub-network sizes (i.e., four co-existing networks imply a four times larger total
number of nodes). Our results indicate that each additional interfering network
increases the runtime by a factor corresponding to the additional nodes. The con-
vergence time among the co-existing networks exhibits a high fairness, as can be
seen in Figure 4.5 (right): in all networks, a leader is elected almost at the same
time.
4.5 Conclusion
We introduce the first self-stabilizing leader election protocol, SELECT, for
wireless networks operating in harsh environments, e.g., environments with hard-
to-predict interference from co-existing networks or environments subject to (both
adaptive and reactive) adversarial jamming. Although the nodes are not able to dis-
tinguish between collisions due to external interference or jamming and concurrent
transmissions of other nodes in the network, they are able to coordinate access to
the medium in the few and arbitrary time periods without external interference, and
subsequently elect a leader in a robust manner. Although our protocol is random-
ized, it yields deterministic guarantees.
There are several important open directions for future research. For exam-
ple, the formal study of convergence times under different adversaries is an open
problem. Another open problem is the generalization of our algorithms to multi-
hop networks where leaders need to be elected in different regions (e.g., in order to
construct a sparse backbone).
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Chapter 5
THE COMAC PROTOCOL
The decentralized allocation of a communication medium among a set of wireless
nodes does not only constitute one of the most fundamental theoretical problems
in distributed computing, but is also of direct practical relevance. Today, a chunk
of the wireless spectrum is often simultaneously used by many devices belonging
to different, so-called co-existing networks. It is expected that the popularity of
wireless mobile devices will further increase the resource sharing by such networks
in the future.
Interestingly, not much is known today on how a given spectrum can be
shared efficiently and fairly among co-existing networks, especially in environ-
ments with uncontrollable external interference. Existing distributed MAC pro-
tocols (typically based on random backoff schemes) are either not resistent to the
unpredictable unavailability of the medium at all, or are optimized towards a sin-
gle network only, in the sense that the nodes of a network collaboratively seek to
coordinate the access among themselves [50]. However, the state-of-the-art pro-
tocols fail if multiple networks are collocated (as illustrated, for example, in our
simulation study in Section 5.4).
This chapter presents (and rigorously prove the performance of) a robust
MAC protocol suited for co-existing networks exposed to a harsh environment with
unpredictable or even adversarial interference.
We attend to a simplified scenario where a set of n wireless nodes V are
located within transmission range of each other and need to communicate over a
single shared channel. The wireless nodes belong to K co-existing networks Ni with
node sets Vi, i.e., V =V1∪V2∪ . . .∪VK , for some constant K (which is of unknown
96
to the nodes). For simplicity we will assume that these networks are node disjoint.
However, by emulating multiple instances, a node may also participate in several
networks simultaneously; the performance guarantees derived in this chapter would
still hold.
We aim to design a distributed MAC protocol for these wireless nodes. Al-
though the protocol is used by all nodes v ∈V , it should not depend on any knowl-
edge of how many nodes n there are in total, on the number of co-existing networks
K, or on the size of the co-existing network v belongs to. Moreover, it should ensure
that the K networks are independent in the sense that no communication is required
between different networks.
Co-existing wireless networks appear in many scenarios where different
wireless networks share the same wireless medium. For example, consider a major
conference, e.g., organized by the United Nations, where participants from different
countries use their hand-held devices to communicate with the other representatives
of their country. We assume that the different networks only share the same medium
access protocol, but are otherwise different and inter-network communication may
not be desired or possible (except, e.g., for multi-national participants). Another
scenario where ensuring fairness among co-existing networks is crucial are emer-
gency response networks, where many emergency response services, such as fire
squads, police, and paramedics, all arrive simultaneously at some accident or disas-
ter scene and have to share the wireless medium in a fair and even manner in order
to establish their own separate communication networks.1
We present a robust and fair medium access (MAC) protocol COMAC that
makes effective use of the few and arbitrarily distributed time periods where a wire-
1Whereas in some scenarios it may be desirable that messages are broadcast across all emer-
gency unit networks, for better immediate response action to a disaster/accident, in the longer run,
it is still important to be able to differentiate among the different ad-hoc networks established.
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less medium is available. We model interference—due to simultaneous transmis-
sions, co-existing networks, changes in the environment that affect the wireless
medium, etc., and, when applicable, intentional jamming—generally as an adver-
sary, which we may sometimes simply refer to as the jammer (even when a mali-
cious jammer is not present in the environment and interference may be caused by
other factors). Our adversary may behave in an adaptive manner: we assume that
the adversary has full knowledge of the protocol and its history, and that it uses this
knowledge to decide on whether to jam at a certain moment in time.
Let us use the simplifying notation N(v) to denote the network node v ∈ V
belongs to. We assume that a node v can distinguish among the following events
at some time t: (1) idle channel (no node in V transmits and there is no outside
interference, including jamming activity, at time t); (2) successful transmission of
a packet in network N(v) (which occurs every time a single node in N(v) transmits,
and no other node in V nor the adversary transmits); and (3) medium busy (due
to a transmission by a node in some co-existing network different from network
N(v), or to simultaneous transmissions by two or more nodes in N(v), or to external
interference or jamming).
How to design such a distributed medium access protocol which shares the
bandwidth fairly among the K networks, without sacrificing performance? At first
sight this may seem impossible: as the total number of co-existing networks and
the number of devices is not known, a node cannot guess its fair share of the chan-
nel time. We show that this is indeed possible, even in the presence of a powerful
adaptive adversarial jammer, referred to as a (T,1− ε)-bounded (adaptive) adver-
sary, which can jam the medium an arbitrary (1− ε) fraction of the time for an
arbitrarily small constant ε > 0 and which hence models a wide range of exter-
nal interference scenarios or jammers. For the ease of presentation, we assume a
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synchronous environment where time proceeds in rounds (also called steps). For-
mally, the (T,1− ε)-bounded adversary is defined as follows: for some T ∈ N and
a constant 0 < ε < 1, the adversary may jam at most (1− ε)w of the time steps,
for any time window of size w ≥ T . In the following, we will use the notation
N = max{T,n} to denote the maximum over the adversarial window size and n.
Assuming backlogged traffic at the wireless devices, we require that our
MAC protocol fulfill the following properties: (1) c-competitiveness: Given a time
interval I, we define g(I) as the number of time steps in I that are non-jammed,
and s(I) as the total number of time steps in I in which a successful transmission
happens in any network. A MAC protocol is called c-competitive against some
(T,1− ε)-bounded adversary if, for any sufficiently large time interval I, s(I) ≥
c ·g(I). (2) Fairness: The probabilities of having a successful transmission in any
two networks Ni and N j, where i, j ∈ [1,K], do not differ by much; moreover, the
nodes inside a network share the bandwidth fairly as well.
Note that the nodes have no knowledge of how many nodes are there in
the same network as itself, nor do the nodes know how many other networks are
co-existing and how many nodes are there in each of these co-existing networks,
respectively. However, we assume that the nodes have a common parameter γ ∈
O(1/(logT + log logn)). The assumption that nodes know γ is not critical for the
scalability of our protocol, as it requires only a polynomial estimate of T and an
even rougher estimate of n.
Although the presented COMAC protocol converges fast and is therefore
expected to work well under continuously entering and leaving nodes, in this chap-
ter we will just focus on a synchronous setting where nodes do not join or leave.
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5.1 Contribution
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to present a robust medium
access protocol which provably performs well in an environment with co-existing
networks. The COMAC protocol features a guaranteed competitive throughput in
the presence of co-existing networks as well as a wide range of external interfer-
ence patterns that can be subsumed and modeled as a (T,1− ε)-bounded adaptive
adversary blocking the medium a (1− ε) fraction of all time. Moreover, it features
fairness among co-existing networks and within an individual network. Finally, the
protocol is attractive for its simple design. Our main theoretical result is summa-
rized in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1 The COMAC medium access protocol guarantees that in a back-
logged scenario, if executed for Ω(1ε logN max{T, 1εγ2 log3 N}) many time steps,
COMAC achieves a competitive throughput of Ω(ε2 min{ε,1/poly(K)}) w.h.p.,
despite the arbitrarily distributed non-jammed time periods left by the (T,1− ε)-
bounded adaptive adversary that arbitrarily jams the medium up to an (1−ε) frac-
tion of the time, and which has complete knowledge of the protocol history. More-
over, the cumulative probabilities among different networks, as well as the access
probabilities of individual nodes within the same network, differ only by a small
factor.
To complement our theoretical asymptotic bounds, we also report on a comparative
simulation study.
5.2 Description of COMAC
Before presenting the formal MAC algorithm, we explain its variables and
provide some intuition.
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5.2.1 Intuition
In the COMAC protocol, each node v maintains a medium access probability pv
which determines the probability that v transmits a message in a communication
round. The nodes adapt and synchronize (inside a co-existing network) their pv
values over time (which as a side-effect also improves fairness) in a multiplicative-
increase multiplicative-decrease manner in order to ensure a throughput that is as
good as possible. More precisely, the sending probabilities are changed by a factor
of (1+ γ). Moreover, we impose an upper bound of pˆ on pv, for some constant 0<
pˆ < 1. As we will see, unlike in most classic backoff protocols, our adaption rules
for pv ensure that the adversary cannot influence pv much by adaptive jamming.
In addition, each node maintains two variables, a threshold variable Tv and
a counter variable cv. Tv is used to estimate the adversary’s time window T . A good
estimation of T can help the nodes recover from a situation where they experience
high interference in the network. In times of high interference, Tv will be increased
and the sending probability pv will be decreased.
While these concepts have already been used in our other protocols in [6, 49,
50], they are not sufficient to ensure a jamming-resistant protocol that also works
well in case of co-existing networks. The basic problem lies in the fact that all of
these protocols aim at reaching a constant cumulative probability, irrespective of
the adversarial jamming, so that a good throughput can be obtained in those steps
that are not jammed. In co-existing networks, however, this is not a good idea:
Suppose that we have K co-existing networks that each have a constant cumulative
probability. Then the overall cumulative probability would be Θ(K) and therefore,
the probability of having a successful transmission in any network would be as low
as Θ(K)e−Θ(K), which is exponentially low in K.
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Hence, a less aggressive approach than the one pursued in [6, 49, 50] is
needed. Ideally, this approach should also make sure that the available bandwidth
is shared in a fair way among the networks. Surprisingly, a relatively simple change
in the protocol in [50] can achieve jamming-resistance, a good throughput in co-
existing networks, and also fairness. The basic idea behind this change is to re-
member the latest idle time step, and whenever there is a new idle time step, then
with a probability qv that is inversely proportional to the time difference to the pre-
vious idle time step, pv and Tv are adapted. (The protocol in [50] would always
adapt pv and Tv in case of an idle channel.) Since this probabilistic rule turned out
to be very hard to analyze, we transformed it into a deterministic rule that shows
the same performance in the experiments.
5.2.2 Protocol Description
Now we are ready to provide the detailed and formal description of the COMAC
see Algorithm 3. Initially, each node v sets pv = pˆ ( pˆ ≤ 1/24), cv = Tv = 1, and
qv = 0. In the following, Lv ≥ 1 is the time that went by from v’s viewpoint since
the last idle time step. (If there has not yet been an idle time step, Lv = ∞.)
5.3 Analysis
For the analysis of our protocol we will use the following notation. We
are given K ≥ 2 co-existing networks denoted by N1, . . . ,NK . Each network Ni
consists of a node set Vi where ni = |Vi| ≥ 2 (otherwise, the network would be
irrelevant). The cumulative probability due to nodes in Ni is given by Pi =∑v∈Vi pv,
and the cumulative probability over all co-existing networks is given by P=∑Ki=1 Pi.
Whenever we consider some specific time step t, Pi(t) is the value of Pi at time t
and P(t) is the value of P at time t.
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Algorithm 3 COMAC: for each node v
1: roundcounter = 0
2: pv := pˆ
3: cv := 1
4: Tv := 1
5: Lv := ∞ {COMAC works in synchronized rounds}
6: while True do
7: v decides with probability pv to send a message
8: if v decides to send a message then
9: v sends a message along with a triple: (pv,cv,Tv).
10: else
11: v senses the channel
12: if v senses an idle channel then
13: qv := qv+1/Lv
14: if qv ≥ 1 then
15: pv := min{(1+ γ)pv, pˆ}
16: Tv := Tv−1
17: qv := qv−1
18: update Lv
19: end if
20: else if v successfully receives a message along with the triple of
(pnew,cnew,Tnew) then
21: pv := (1+ γ)−1 pnew
22: cv := cnew
23: Tv := Tnew
24: end if
25: end if
26: cv := cv+1
27: if cv > Tv then
28: cv := 1
29: if there was no idle step among the past Tv time steps then
30: pv := (1+ γ)−1 pv
31: Tv := Tv+2
32: end if
33: end if
34: roundcounter := roundcounter+1
35: end while
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5.3.1 Basic Observations
Given that we have a single-hop network, any idle time period is observed by all
nodes in all co-existing networks. Hence, the qv and Lv values of all nodes are
identical if all start at the same time (otherwise, two idle time steps suffice to syn-
chronize the Lv values so that the increase of the qv’s is synchronized from that point
on, which would also be sufficient for our analysis to go through). Henceforth, we
will drop the subscript v from qv and Lv. Since after the first successful transmission
in Ni, the Tv and cv values are synchronized among the nodes in Ni, we arrive at the
following fact, which establishes fairness within a network.
Fact 5.2 After the first successful transmission in network Ni, the access probabil-
ities pv of the nodes v ∈Vi differ by a factor of at most (1+ γ).
Throughout our analysis, we will make use of Lemma 1.3 and Chernoff
bounds from Lemma 1.2 repeatedly.
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Based on Lemma 1.3, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3 For any non-jammed time step,
e−
P
1−pˆ ≤ P[channel is idle]≤ e−P and
Pi · e−
P
1−pˆ ≤ P[successful msg transmission in Ni]≤ Pi1− pˆ · e
−P
Proof. For P[idle] it holds that
P[idle] = ∏
v∈V
(1− pv)≥∏
v∈V
e−
pv
1−pv ≥∏
v∈V
e−
pv
1−pˆ = e−
P
1−pˆ
and
P[idle] = ∏
v∈V
(1− pv)≤∏
v∈V
e−pv = e−P
Next we show a lower bound on the probability of a successful transmission in some
given co-existing network Ni:
P[successful in Ni] = ∑
v∈Vi
pv · ∏
w∈V\{v}
(1− pw)≥ ∑
v∈Vi
pv ·∏
w∈V
(1− pw)
≥ ∑
v∈Vi
pv ·∏
w∈V
e−
pw
1−pw ≥ ∑
v∈Vi
pv ·∏
w∈V
e−
pw
1−pˆ
= ∑
v∈Vi
pv · e−
P
1−pˆ = pi · e−
P
1−pˆ
Finally, we derive an upper bound on P[successful at network i]:
P[successful in Ni] = ∑
v∈Vi
pv · ∏
w∈V\{v}
(1− pw)≤ 11− pˆ · ∑v∈Vi
pv ·∏
w∈V
(1− pw)
≤ 1
1− pˆ · ∑v∈Vi
pv ·∏
w∈V
e−pw = pi · e
−P
1− pˆ
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5.3.2 Cumulative Probability
In the following, we will derive the first fundamental property of our protocol:
we show that the overall cumulative probability P = ∑Ki=1 Pi converges to some
range of values so that the contention on the wireless medium is moderate. This
is a necessary condition for a good performance. Our proof framework basically
follows the framework of [6] but the proof arguments significantly differ in various
places when it comes to analyzing the specifics of our new protocol. We refer to
Section 2 of [6] for a comparison.
The proof works by induction over sufficiently large time frames. Let I be
a time frame consisting of αε logN subframes I
′ of size f = max{T, αβ 2εγ2 log3 N}
rounds, where α and β are sufficiently large constants and N = max{T,n}. Let
F = αε logN · f denote the size of I.
First, we show that for any subframe I′ in which initially the overall cu-
mulative probability is at least 1/( f 2(1+ γ)2
√
f ), also afterwards this cumulative
probability is at least 1/( f 2(1+ γ)2
√
f ), w.h.p.
Lemma 5.4 For any subframe I′ = [t0, t1) in which P(t0)≥ 1/( f 2(1+ γ)2
√
f ), also
P(t1)≥ 1/( f 2(1+ γ)2
√
f ) w.h.p.
Proof. We start with the following claim about the maximum number of times
nodes decrease their probabilities in I′ due to cv > Tv.
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Claim 5.5 If in subframe I′, Tv is decreased at most k times, then node v increases
Tv by 2 at most k/2+
√
f many times.
Proof. Only an idle time step can potentially reduce Tv by 1. If there is no idle
time step during the last Tv many steps, Tv is increased by 2. Suppose that k = 0.
Then the number of times a node v increases Tv by 2 is upper bounded by the
largest possible ` so that ∑`i=0 T 0v + 2i ≤ f , where T 0v is the initial value of Tv. For
any T 0v ≥ 1, ` ≤
√
f , so the claim is true for k = 0. For each decrease of Tv, the
current Tv as well as all subsequent values of Tv (until a Tv is reached with Tv = 1)
get reduced by one. Hence, for an arbitrary value of k ≥ 0 we are searching for
the maximum ` so that ∑`i=0 max{T 0v +2i− k,1} ≤ f . This ` is at most k/2+
√
f ,
which proves our claim.
This claim allows us to prove that the overall cumulative probability P will
exceed a certain threshold in a subframe w.h.p.
Claim 5.6 Suppose that in I′= [t0, t1), P(t0)∈ [1/( f 2(1+γ)
√
2 f ),1/ f 2]. Then there
is a time step t in I′ with P(t)≥ 1/ f 2, w.h.p.
Proof. Suppose that there are g non-jammed time steps in I′. Let k0 be the number
of these steps with an idle channel and k1 be the number of these steps with a
successful message transmission in any of the co-existing networks. Let the binary
random variable Xi be 1 if and only if the nodes increase their access probabilities in
the i-th idle time step in I′, and let X =∑k0i=1 Xi. Furthermore, let k2 be the maximum
number of times a node v increases Tv by 2 in I′.
Suppose for the moment that P(t0) = 1/ f 2. If all time steps t in I′ satisfy
P(t)≤ 1/ f 2, then it must hold that the total decrease of P(t) in I′ (due to successful
transmissions and cases in which access probabilities are decreased when cv > Tv),
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which is at most (1+ γ)k1+k2 , has to be at least as large as the total increase of
P(t) (due to idle time steps), which is equal to (1+ γ)X . Hence, we must have that
X ≤ k1 + k2. For an arbitrary initial probability P(t0) ≤ 1/ f 2, we must therefore
have
X− log1+γ((1/ f 2)/P(t0))≤ k1+ k2 (5.1)
to avoid a time step t in I′ with P(t)> 1/ f 2. Our goal is to show that this inequality
is violated w.h.p., which implies that I′ has a time step t with P(t)> 1/ f 2 w.h.p.
Next, we focus on k2. Consider some fixed k0 ≥ 2 (as we will see later,
k0 ≥ 2 w.h.p.). Let Li be the L-value of the nodes at the i-th idle time step (note that
they are all the same) and let qi = 1/Li denote the increase of the q-values of the
nodes in the i-th idle time step. Also, let q¯ = 1k0−1 ∑
k0
i=2 qi. Certainly, the number of
times any node v decreases Tv in I′ is bounded by the number of times q is at least
1, which is at most d∑k0i=1 qie ≤ d1+(k0− 1)q¯e. Hence, it follows from Claim 5.5
that
k2 ≤ dq¯(k0−1)+1e/2+
√
f (5.2)
On the other hand, the number of times any node v increases pv in I′ is at least
b∑k0i=2 qic = b(k0− 1)q¯c (because due to Fact 5.2 it follows from P(t) ≤ 1/ f 2 that
pv(t) < pˆ for all v). Plugging this together with (5.2) into (5.1) and using the fact
that P(t0)≥ 1/( f 2(1+ γ)
√
2 f ), we obtain
b(k0−1)q¯c−d(k0−1)q¯+1e/2 ≤
√
2 f + k1+
√
f
⇒ (k0−1)q¯/2 ≤ k1+4
√
f (5.3)
given that f is large enough. It remains to lower bound q¯ and k0 and to upper bound
k1 in order to arrive at a contradiction.
We start with q¯. Let L¯ = 1k0−1 ∑
k0
i=2 Li. Since ∑
k0
i=2 Li < f , it holds that
L¯< fk0−1 . Moreover, we make use of the following well-known fact.
108
Fact 5.7 For any sequence of positive numbers x1, . . . ,xn it holds for its arithmetic
mean A=(1/n)∑ni=1 xi and its harmonic mean H =((1/n)∑
n
i=1 1/xi)
−1 that A≥H.
Hence, it follows that L¯≥ 1/( 1k0−1 ∑
k0
i=2 1/Li) and therefore,
1
k0−1 ∑
k0
i=2 1/Li≥
1/L¯. This in turn implies that
q¯≥ 1/L¯≥ k0−1
f
Next we provide an upper bound for k1 that holds w.h.p. Certainly, for any time
step t with P(t)≤ 1/ f 2,
P[≥ 1 message transmitted at step t] ≤ 1/ f 2.
Hence, E[k1] ≤ g · (1/ f 2) ≤ 1/ f . In order to prove an upper bound on k1 that
holds w.h.p., we can use the general Chernoff bounds stated in Lemma 1.2. For any
step t let the binary random variable Yt be 1 if and only if at least one message is
transmitted successfully at time t and P(t)≤ 1/ f 2. Then
P[Yt = 1] = P[P(t)≤ 1/ f 2] ·
P[successful msg transmission | P(t)≤ 1/ f 2]
≤ 1/ f 2.
Moreover, it certainly holds for any set S of time steps prior to some time step t that
P[Yt = 1 |∏
s∈S
Ys = 1]≤ 1/ f 2.
Therefore, we have
P[∏
s∈S
Ys = 1]
= P[Y1 = 1] ·P[Y2 = 1|Y1 = 1] ·P[Y3 = 1| ∏
s=1,2
Ys = 1] · . . .
· P[Y|S| = 1| ∏
s=1,2,...,|S|−1
Ys = 1]
≤ (1/ f 2)|S|
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and
E[∏
s∈S
Ys = 1] = P[∏
s∈S
Ys = 1]≤ (1/ f 2)|S|.
Thus, the Chernoff bounds and our choice of f imply that w.h.p. either ∑t∈I′Yt <
ε2 f/8 and P(t) ≤ 1/ f 2 throughout I′, or there must be a time step t in I′ with
P(t)> 1/ f 2, which would finish the proof. Therefore, unless P(t)> 1/ f 2 at some
point in I′, k1 < ε2 f/8 w.h.p.
Next we prove a lower bound on k0 that holds w.h.p. For any time step t
with P(t)≤ 1/ f 2 it holds that
P[channel is idle]≥ e−P(t)/(1−pˆ) ≥ 1− P(t)
1− pˆ ≥ 1−1/ f
Hence, E[k0] ≥ g · (1− 1/ f ) ≥ ε f (1− 1/ f ). Using similar arguments as for k1, it
follows that k0 > (7/8)ε f w.h.p. unless P(t) > 1/ f 2 at some point in I′. When
combining the bounds for q¯ and k0, we obtain
(k0−1)q¯/2 ≥ (k0−1)
2
2 f
≥ (7/8)2ε2 f/2
> ε2 f/8+4
√
f > k1+4
√
f
w.h.p., if f is large enough, which violates Inequality (5.3) and therefore completes
the proof of Claim 5.6.
Similarly, we can also prove that once the cumulative probability exceeds a
certain threshold, it cannot become too small again.
Claim 5.8 Suppose that for the first time step t0 in I′, P(t0) ≥ 1/ f 2. Then there is
no time step t in I′ with P(t)< 1
f 2(1+γ)
√
2 f , w.h.p.
Proof. Consider some fixed subinterval I′′ = [t1, t2) in I′ with the property that
P(t1)≥ 1/ f 2 and P(t)≤ 1/ f 2 for all other t in I′′ (i.e., we will use conditional prob-
abilities based on P(t) ≤ 1/ f 2 like in the bound for k1 in the proof of Claim 5.6).
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Suppose that there are g non-jammed time steps in I′′. If g ≤ β logN for a (suffi-
ciently large) constant β , then it follows for the probability P(t2) at the end of I′′
that
P(t2)≥ 1f 2 · (1+ γ)
−((3/2)β logN+√ f ) ≥ 1
f 2(1+ γ)
√
2 f
given that f is large enough (i.e., ε = Ω(1/ log3 N)). This is because in the worst
case for the decrease of P(t) all non-jammed time steps are successful. In this
case, P(t) is decreased at most β logN times due to these steps. Moreover, from
Claim 5.5 it follows that P(t) can be decreased another at most β logN/2+
√
f
times due to cv > Tv.
So suppose that g > β logN. Let X be the number of time steps in I′′ in
which P(t) increases and k1 be the maximum number of time steps in I′′ (over
all networks) with a successful message transmission. Furthermore, let k2 be the
maximum number of times a node v increases Tv in I′′. If P(t2)< 1f 2(1+γ)√2 f then it
must hold that the total increase in P(t) (which is equal to (1+ γ)X ) is at most the
total decrease in P(t) (which is at most (1+ γ)k1+k2), or in other words,
X ≤ k1+ k2.
From the previous claim we know that this is not true w.h.p. given that P(t)≤ 1/ f 2
for all t > t1 in I′′ and the constant β is sufficiently large to achieve polynomially
small probability bounds. Since there are at most f 2 possible values for t1 and t2,
there is no time step t2 in I′ with P(t2) < 1f 2(1+γ)√2 f w.h.p., which completes the
proof.
Combining Claims 5.6 and 5.8 completes the proof of Lemma 5.4.
Next we show an upper bound for P(t). In the following, K′ = O(K) is a
sufficiently large constant ≥ K.
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Lemma 5.9 For any subframe I′ = [t0, t1) with Tv ≤ (3/4)
√
F for all nodes v at the
beginning of I′, P(t1)≤ 12lnK′ w.m.p.
Proof. First, we will show that if P(t) ≥ 4lnK′ throughout I′, then for each Ni,
there must be a step t ′ with Pi(t ′) ≤ (2lnK′)/K′ w.h.p., and once such a step is
reached, we show that Pi(t ′′)< (4lnK′)/K′ w.m.p. for all time steps t ′′ following t ′.
Hence, there must be a time step t ′′ in I′ with Pi(t ′′)< (4lnK′)/K′ for all i, w.m.p.,
contradicting the assumption that P(t) ≥ 4lnK′ throughout I′. Once we have that,
we will show that at the end of I′, P(t1)≤ 12lnK′ w.m.p.
Consider some fixed network i. Let k0 be the number of idle steps in I′ and
k1 be the number of successful time steps for network i. Moreover, let X be the
total number of times Pi(t) is increased by (1+ γ) due to an idle channel in I′. For
Ni to avoid a time step t ′ in I′ with Pi(t ′)≤ (2lnK′)/K′, we must have that the total
increase of Pi(t) (which is equal to (1+ γ)X ) is at least the total decrease of Pi(t)
once we have reached a point t with Pi(t) = (2lnK′)/K′, which is the case after at
most log1+γ(ni · pˆ) reductions of Pi(t). Hence, we must have
X ≥ k′1− log1+γ(ni · pˆ) (5.4)
where k′1 is the total decrease (in the exponent) of Pi(t) due to successful transmis-
sions to avoid a time step t ′ in I′ with Pi(t ′) ≤ (2lnK′)/K′. Notice that k′1 is not
equal to k1 because if, for example, a node successfully transmits twice in a row,
Pi(t) does not get decreased the second time.
In order to contradict this bound, we first need to have a closer look at what
happens when there is a successful transmission in Ni.
Claim 5.10 If the node v successfully transmitting a message in Ni at time t is
different from the node that previously successfully transmitted a message in Ni,
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then Pi(t+1) ∈ [ 11+γPi(t), 1√1+γPi(t)] for any ni ≥ 2.
Proof. The lower bound is obvious. Moreover, it follows from the protocol that
Pi(t+1) = pv,t + ∑
w∈Vi\{v}
1
1+ γ
· pv,t
=
1
1+ γ
·Pi(t)+ γ1+ γ · pv,t
≤ 1
1+ γ
·Pi(t)+ γ1+ γ ·
Pi(t)
ni
=
1
1+ γ
(
1+
γ
ni
)
Pi(t)
≤ 1
1+ γ
(1+ γ)1/ni Pi(t)≤ 1√1+ γPi(t)
given that ni ≥ 2.
If the same node v successfully transmits again at time t, then Pi(t + 1) =
Pi(t), which only happens with probability at most (1+ γ)/ni because in this case
the transmitting node has an access probability that is by a (1+γ) factor larger than
the other access probabilities in Ni. Hence, on expectation, at least 1/3 of the time
steps with successful transmission, Pi(t) is reduced by at least (1+ γ)1/2, which
implies that E[k′1]≥ k1/6.
Based on this insight, the next claim shows that under certain conditions,
Inequality (5.4) is not true w.h.p. Let gi be the number of useful time steps for Ni,
which are time steps that are either idle or successful for Ni in I′.
Claim 5.11 If all time steps t ∈ I′ satisfy P(t) ≥ 4lnK′ and gi ≥ δ log1+γ N for a
sufficiently large constant δ , then X + log1+γ ni < k′1 w.h.p.
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Proof. It is easy to see that for any useful time step t,
P[t successful for Ni] ≥ Pi(t) ·P[t idle] (5.5)
and thereforeE[k1]≥ 2lnK′K′ E[k0] unless there is a time step t with Pi(t)< (2lnK′)/K′.
For a given number of useful time steps gi, since k0 + k1 = gi and therefore also
E[k0]+E[k1] = gi, E[k1]≥ 2lnK′K′ (gi−E[k1]), which implies that E[k1]≥ lnK
′
K′ ·gi if
K′ = O(K) is a sufficiently large constant. Since E[k′1] ≥ k1/6, gi = Ω(log1+γ N),
and for each useful time step there is an independent probability whether this time
step is idle or successful, it follows from the Chernoff bounds that k′1≥ lnK
′
8K′ gi w.h.p.
Next we bound X . Let the binary random variable X j denote the increase of
Pi(t) by (1+ γ)X j in the j-th idle time step. Then X = ∑k0j=1 X j. Moreover, let L j be
the number of time steps between the ( j− 1)-th and j-th idle time steps. It holds
that
P[t idle]≤ e−P(t) ≤ 1/(K′)4
for every t ∈ I′ given that P(t)≥ 4lnK′. Hence,
E[X j] = ∑`
≥1
P[L j = `] ·1/`≤ ∑`
≥1
1
(K′)4
(
1− 1
(K′)4
)`−1
· 1
`
≤ 1
(K′)4−1 ∑`≥1
e−`/(K
′)4/`≤ 1
(K′)4−1 ·2ln(K
′)4
=
4lnK′
(K′)4−1
and therefore, E[X ] ≤ 4lnK′
(K′)4−1 · k0 ≤ 4lnK
′
(K′)4−1 · gi. Since the upper bound on E[X j]
holds independently for each j, it follows from the Chernoff bounds that X ≤ 6lnK′
(K′)4 ·
gi w.h.p.
Since gi = Ω(log1+γ N), X + log1+γ ni < k′1 w.h.p. if K
′ = O(K) is suffi-
ciently large, which completes the proof of the claim.
Otherwise, suppose that gi < δ log1+γ N. For every node v it follows from
the COMAC protocol and the choice of f and F that if initially Tv≤ (3/4)
√
F , then
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Tv can be at most
√
F during I′. Let us cut I′ into m intervals of size 2
√
F each. It
is easy to check that if β in the definition of f is sufficiently large compared to δ ,
then m ≥ 3δ log1+γ N. Since there are less than δ log1+γ N useful steps in Ni in I′,
at least 2δ log1+γ N of these intervals do not contain any useful step, which implies
that pv is reduced by (1+ γ) by each v ∈Vi in each of these intervals.
Hence, altogether, every pv gets reduced by a factor of at least (1+γ)−2δ log1+γ N
during I′ in Ni. The useful time steps can only raise that by at most (1+ γ)δ log1+γ N ,
so altogether we must have Pi(t ′)≤ (2lnK′)/K′ at some time point t ′ in I′, w.h.p.
Next we prove the following claim, which implies that for all t ′′ > t ′ in I′,
Pi(t ′′)< (4lnK′)/K′ w.m.p.
Claim 5.12 If all time steps t ∈ I′ satisfy P(t)≥ 4lnK′ and initially Pi(t)≤ (2lnK′)/K′,
then for all steps t ∈ I′, Pi(t)≤ (4lnK′)/K′ w.m.p.
Proof. Consider some fixed subinterval I′′ = [t1, t2) in I′ with the property that
Pi(t1)≤ (2lnK′)/K′ and Pi(t)≥ (2lnK′)/K′ for all other t in I′′. Suppose that there
are gi useful time steps in I′′. If gi ≤ ln1+γ 2, then it follows for the probability
Pi(t2) at the end of I′′ that Pi(t2)≤ 2lnK′K′ · (1+ γ)ln1+γ 2 ≤ 4lnK
′
K′ . Otherwise, suppose
that gi > ln1+γ 2, which is at least 1/(2γ) = Ω(ln f ). Let X be the number of time
steps in I′′ in which Pi(t) increases and k1 be the number of time steps in I′′ with
a successful transmission in Ni. Furthermore, let k2 be the maximum number of
times a node v ∈Vi increases Tv in I′′. If P(t2)> (4lnK′)/K′ then it must hold that
the total increase in Pi(t) (which is equal to (1+γ)X ) is at least the total decrease in
P(t) (which is at most (1+ γ)k1+k2) plus ln1+γ 2, or formally,
X ≥ k′1+ ln1+γ 2 (5.6)
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where k′1 is the total decrease (in the exponent) of Pi(t) due to successful transmis-
sions. We know that E[k′1] ≥ k1/6. Also, from the proof of the previous claim it
follows that E[k1]≥ lnK′K′ gi if K′ =O(K) is a sufficiently large constant, unless there
is a time step t in I′ with Pi(t) < (2lnK′)/K′. Since gi = Ω(ln f ), it follows from
the Chernoff bounds that k′1 ≥ lnK
′
8K′ gi w.m.p. On the other hand, it follows from
the proof of the previous claim that X ≤ 6lnK′
(K′)4 ·gi w.m.p. Hence, inequality (5.6) is
violated w.m.p., which implies that Pi(t2)≤ 4lnK′K′ w.m.p. Since there are at most f 2
different values of t1 and t2, there is no time step t2 in I′ with Pi(t2)> 4lnK
′
K′ w.m.p.,
which completes the proof.
Combining the insights above, it follows that there must be a time step t in
I′ with P(t)< 4lnK′ w.m.p. To finish the proof, we need the following claim.
Claim 5.13 If for the first time step t0 in I′, P(t0)≤ 4lnK′, then P(t)≤ 12lnK′ for
all time steps t in I′ w.m.p.
Proof. Consider some subinterval I′′ = [t1, t2) in I′ with the property that P(t1)≤
4lnK′ and P(t) ≥ 4lnK′ for all t > t1 in I′′. Suppose that there are g useful time
steps in I′′, where a time step is useful if there was either a successful transmission
in some network or the channel is idle. If g≤ log1+γ 2, then certainly P(t)≤ 12lnK′
for all t in I′. So suppose that g> log1+γ 2. Consider some fixed network Ni. Let X
be the number of time steps in I′′ in which Pi(t) increases and k1 be the number of
time steps in I′′ with a successful message transmission in Ni. Furthermore, let k2 be
the maximum number of times a node v ∈ Vi increases Tv in I′′. If P(t2) > 12lnK′
then there must be a network Ni with Pi(t2) > max{(8lnK′)/K′,2Pi(t1)}. To see
this, let I1 be the set of all i with Pi(t1) < (4lnK′)/K′ and I2 be the set of all other
i. As long as for all i, Pi(t2)≤max{(8lnK′)/K′,2Pi(t1)}, it must hold that P(t2)≤
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∑i∈I1(8lnK
′)/K′+∑i∈I2 2Pi(t1)≤ (8lnK′)/K′ ·K+2P(t1)≤ 12lnK′ if K′ = O(K)
is sufficiently large.
First, consider the case that for some i with Pi(t1) ≥ (4lnK′)/K′, Pi(t2) >
2Pi(t1). Then the total increase of Pi(t) in I′′ (which is equal to (1+ γ)X is at least
the total decrease in Pi(t) plus log1+γ 2. Hence,
X ≥ k′1+ log1+γ 2 (5.7)
where k′1 is the total decrease (in the exponent) of P(t) due to successful transmis-
sions in Ni. From Inequality (5.5) we know that E[k1]≥ 4lnK′K′ ·E[k0] and therefore
E[k1]≥ 2lnK′K′ ·g if K′ = O(K) is large enough. Since E[k′1]≥ k1/6 and g =Ω(ln f )
it follows from the Chernoff bounds that k′1 ≥ lnK
′
4K′ ·g w.m.p. On the other hand, we
also know that X ≤ 6lnK′
(K′)4 ·g w.m.p., which implies that Inequality (5.7) is violated
w.m.p. Hence, Pi(t2)≤ 2Pi(t1) w.m.p.
For the case that Pi(t1)< (4lnK′)/K′ let t ′1 be the first step in I
′′ with Pi(t ′1)≥
(4lnK′)/K′. If t ′1 does not exist, we are done, and otherwise we prove in the same
way as above that w.m.p. Pi(t2)≤ (12lnK′)/K′.
Since there are at most f 2 ways of choosing t1 and t2, there is no time step t
in I′ with P(t)≤ 12lnK′ w.m.p., which completes the proof.
All claims combined imply Lemma 5.9.
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A proof similar to Lemma 5.9 also implies the following result.
Corollary 5.14 For any subframe I′ that satisfies P(t) ≤ 12lnK′ at the beginning
of I′, all time steps t of I′ satisfy P(t)≤ 36lnK′ w.m.p.
We also need to show that for a constant fraction of the non-jammed time
steps in a subframe where initially P(t)≤ 12lnK′, P(t) is also lower bounded by a
constant for a sufficiently large fraction of time steps t.
Lemma 5.15 For any subframe I′ in which initially P(t0) ≥ 1/( f 2(1+ γ)2
√
f ), at
least ε/8 of the non-jammed steps t satisfy P(t)≥ ε pˆ/4, w.h.p.
Proof. Let G be the set of all non-jammed time steps in I′ and S be the set of all
steps t in G with P(t) < ε pˆ/4. Let g = |G| and s = |S|. If s ≤ (1− ε/8)g, we are
done. Hence, consider the case that s≥ (1− ε/8)g.
Suppose that P(t) must be increased ` many times to get from its initial
value up to a value of ε pˆ/4. (If P(t0)≥ ε pˆ/4 then `= 0.) Let k0 be the number of
time steps in S with an idle channel and k1 be the number of time steps in S with a
successful message transmission in any of the co-existing networks. Let the binary
random variable Xi be 1 if and only if the nodes increase their access probabilities in
the i-th idle time step in S, and let X =∑`i=1 Xi. Furthermore, let k2 be the maximum
number of times a node v decreases pv due to cv > Tv in I′. For S to be feasible (i.e.,
probabilities can be assigned to each t ∈ S so that P(t)< ε pˆ/4), we must have
X ≤ `+ k1+ k2 (5.8)
For the special case that ` = k2 = 0 this follows from the fact that whenever there
is a successful message transmission, P(t) is reduced by (1+ γ)−1, at most. On
118
the other hand, whenever the nodes decide to increase P(t) for some t ∈ S, P(t)
can indeed increase because of P(t) < ε pˆ/4 and therefore pv < pˆ for all v. Thus,
if X > k1, then one of the steps in S would have to have a probability of at least
ε pˆ/4, violating the definition of S. ` comes into the formula due to the startup cost
of getting to a value of ε pˆ/4, and k2 comes into the formula since the reductions of
the pv(t) values due to cv > Tv allow up to k2 additional decreases of P(t) for S to
stay feasible.
Certainly, ` ≤ 2log1+γ f + 2
√
f . Moreover, for k1 it holds that E[k1] ≤
ε pˆ/4 · s and therefore, k1 ≤ ε pˆ/2 · s w.h.p. For k2 it holds that k2 ≤ (X +εg/8)/2+
√
f . Hence, Inequality (5.8) implies that
X ≤ 2log1+γ f +2
√
f + ε pˆs/2+(X + εg/8)/2+
√
f
⇒ X ≤ (pˆ+1/16)εg+8
√
f (5.9)
if f is sufficiently large. It remains to compute a lower bound for X .
Let X ′ be the total number of times P(t) is increased over all time steps in
G, k′0 be the number of idle time steps in G, and q¯ be the average increase of the
qv-values in I′. From the proof of Claim 5.6 we know that q¯ ≥ (k′0− 1)/ f and
that X ′ ≥ b(k′0− 1)q¯c. Moreover, X ≥ X ′− εg/8. Hence, X ≥ b(k0− 1)2/ f c−
εg/8. We know that E[k0] ≥ (1− ε pˆ/4)s and therefore, k0 ≥ 3g/4 w.h.p. Hence,
X ≥ g2/(4 f )− εg/8≥ εg/8 w.h.p. Since this violates Inequality (5.9), the lemma
follows.
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In the following, let us call a subframe I′ good if its initial step t0 satisfies
P(t0)≤ 12lnK′. Combining the results above, we get:
Lemma 5.16 For any good subframe I′, there are at least ε2 f/8 non-jammed time
steps t in I′ with P(t) ∈ [ε pˆ/4,36lnK′] w.m.p.
Consider now the first eighth of frame I, called J. The following lemma
follows directly from Lemma 2.14 in [6].
Lemma 5.17 If at the beginning of J, pv ≥ 1/( f 2(1+ γ)2
√
f ) and Tv ≤
√
F/2 for
all nodes v, then we also have pv ≥ 1/( f 2(1+γ)2
√
f ) at the end of J for every v and
the number of non-jammed time steps t in I′ with P(t) ∈ [ε pˆ/4,36lnK′] is at least
ε2 f/16 w.h.p.
We finally need the following lemma, which follows from Lemma 2.15 in
[6].
Lemma 5.18 If at the beginning of J, Tv ≤
√
F/2 for all v, then it holds that also
Tv ≤
√
F/2 at the end of J w.h.p.
Inductively using Lemmas 5.17 and 5.18 on the eighths of frame I implies
that COMAC satisfies the property of Lemmas 5.17 for the entire I and at the end of
I, pv≥ 1/( f 2(1+γ)2
√
f ) and Tv≤
√
F/2 for all v w.h.p. Since our results hold with
high probability, we can also extend them to any polynomial number of frames.
5.3.3 Throughput
Summarizing the results above, we obtain the following result for the throughput.
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Theorem 5.19 For any polynomial sequence of time steps of length at least F,
COMAC achieves a competitive throughput of Ω(ε2 min{ε,1/poly(K)}) for any
constants ε and K.
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Figure 5.1: Left: Throughput of COMAC and ANTIJAM [50] as a function of the
number of co-existing networks and for two different adversaries (ε = {0.5,0.3}).
The total number of nodes for each K = 1, . . . ,10 is 500, and each co-existing net-
work has the same size (up to an additive node due to rounding). The protocol is
executed for 7000 rounds, and the result is averaged over 10 runs. The adversary
is modeled in a simplified manner and simply jams each round with independent
probability 1− ε . Right: Fairness as the min/max competitive throughput ratio for
ε = 0.3.
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Figure 5.2: Left: Throughput and fairness of COMAC and ANTIJAM [50] for a
setting like in Figure 5.1 but where the size of the co-existing networks is heteroge-
nous, i.e., the i-th largest network is roughly 1.5 times the size of (i+ 1)-largest
network. Right: Fairness as the min/max competitive throughput ratio for ε = 0.3.
5.3.4 Fairness
Finally, we show that COMAC also ensures a limited degree of fairness. Note
that by Lemma 5.3, we can directly bound the probabilities of having a successful
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transmission within networks Ni and N j by their respective cumulative probabilities,
which we bound on the following theorem.
Theorem 5.20 If all nodes v initially start with access probability pˆ, then it takes
at most F time steps until a time step is reached in which the difference between
minimum and maximum cumulative probability of a network is at most O(K2).
Proof. Consider the potential function Φ= ∑i |xi− xmin| where xi = ln1+γ Pi and
xmin = mini xi. We focus on the events with a successful transmission, since only
successful transmissions can change the difference among individual network prob-
abilities. Assume a successful transmission occurred in network Ni, if xi > xmin,
then the change inΦ, denoted by ∆Φ, satisfies ∆Φ=−1. If xi = xmin, then ∆Φ≤K.
Hence, E[∆Φ] ≤ −P[xi > xmin & successful] +KP[xi = xmin & successful]. Sup-
pose that xmax ≥ xmin+ log1+γ(2K2). Then, P[xi > xmin & successful]≥ 2K ·P[xi =
xmin & successful] as there can be up to K− 1 many Ni with xi = xmin. Certainly,
P[xi > xmin & successful]+P[xi = xmin & successful] = 1 given that there is a suc-
cessful transmission. Hence in this case, P[xi > xmin & successful] ≥ 2K2K+1 , which
implies that E[∆Φ] ≤ − 2K2K+1 + K2K+1 = − K2K+1 ≤ −1/3, whenever there is a suc-
cessful transmission.
Now, let us define the random variable Xt as follows for the t-th successful
transmission:
• Xt = 1 if either xmax < xmin+ log1+γ(2K
2) (i.e., we reached our goal) or the
successful transmission is from a network Ni with xi > xmin, and
• Xt =−K otherwise.
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Suppose that there are s successful transmissions across all networks. Let
X = ∑st=1 Xt . Then it holds that E[X ] ≥ s/3. In order to apply Chernoff bounds,
let us define Yt = (Xt +K)/(K + 1) and Y = ∑st=1Yt . Then Yt is a binary random
variable with E[Yt ]≥ (K+1/3)/(K+1) and therefore E[Y ]≥ s(K+1/3)/(K+1).
Since the upper bound on E[Yt ] holds irrespective of previous Yj’s, it follows from
the Chernoff bounds that P[Y ≤ (1− δ )s(K + 1/3)/(K + 1)] ≤ e−δ 2s/3, for any
0 < δ < 1. Since Y = (X + s ·K)/(K + 1), we get P[X ≤ (1− δ )s/3− δ sK] ≤
e−δ 2s/3. If we choose δ = 1/(6(K + 1/3)) then P[Y ≤ (1− δ )s(K + 1/3)/(K +
1)] = P[X ≤ s/6] and hence, P[X ≤ s/6] ≤ e−δ 2s/3. Now, from Theorem ?? we
know that s = Ω(ε2 min{ε,1/poly(K)}F) w.h.p., so s = ω(K logN). This implies
that when running the protocol for F time steps, X > K logN w.h.p. Thus, if the
initial value of the potential Φ0 is at most K logN, we must have reached a point
where xmax < xmin + log1+γ(2K
2) as otherwise we would end up with a negative
potential. It remains to bound Φ0.
Given that all nodes start with the same access probability pˆ, the maximum
initial difference between Pi and Pj for any i and j is N and therefore, xmax < xmin+
log1+γ N. Hence, Φ0 ≤ K log1+γ N, which implies the theorem.
Fact 5.2 ensures that the access probabilities of the nodes within a network
differs by at most a (1+ γ) factor, ensuring fairness within each network Ni.
5.4 Simulation
Although the focus of this chapter is on the formal, asymptotic and worst-
case performance guarantees achieved by COMAC, we also briefly report on some
of our quantitative insights from a simulation study. We are interested in: (i) how
the competitive throughput of all the networks changes when the number of net-
works varies, where the competitive throughput of all the networks is defined as the
fraction of non-jammed time steps that are used for successful transmissions among
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all K networks; (ii) the fairness of COMAC, i.e., whether the successful transmis-
sions are evenly distributed among all the networks. Also, we compare COMAC
to the state-of-the-art jamming resistent MAC protocol ANTIJAM in [50], and find
that COMAC indeed better suits co-existing networks.
There is a total of 500 nodes among all the co-existing networks, and the
number of networks K ranges from 1 to 10. All the results are averaged over 10 runs,
and the confidence intervals are provided as well. More specifically, we conduct
competitive throughput and fairness experiments in two different scenarios.
Scenario 1: The size of individual networks are the same, namely |Vi| ∈
{b500/Kc,d500/Ke}. In Figure 5.1 (left) we study the competitive throughput, i.e.,
the fraction of non-jammed time steps that are used for successful transmissions
among all K networks. We observe that for a single network (K = 1) the com-
petitive throughput of COMAC is relatively worse compared to ANTIJAM as pv is
raised more strictly when the channel is idle. However, COMAC is always better
than ANTIJAM when there is more than one network (K > 1) as the additional inter-
ference introduced by co-existing networks is bounded. For example, when K = 10,
the competitive throughput of COMAC is still above 20% even when adversary can
jam 70% of all time steps, while the competitive throughput of ANTIJAM is below
10%. Note that there is a trend towards smaller competitiveness for larger K, as ex-
pected from our formal worst-case analysis. Figure 5.1 (right) studies the fairness
of COMAC in terms of min/max competitive throughput ratio, where the mini-
mum and maximum competitive throughput are selected from the K co-existing
networks. The closer this ratio is to 1, the fairer the protocol. Obviously COMAC
is fair in a sense that even when K = 10, the min/max competitive throughput ratio
is above 0.78.
Scenario 2: The size of i-th largest network is roughly 1.5 times the size of
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(i+ 1)-th largest network. Figure 5.2 shows that even when the size of individual
networks vary a lot, COMAC still achieves a better competitive throughput (above
20% when K = 10) compared to ANTIJAM (below 10% when K = 10), and more
importantly, COMAC is still fair in a sense that the min/max competitive through-
put ratio when K = 10 is still above 0.73.
5.5 Conclusion
Motivated by our observation that MAC algorithms optimized for a sin-
gle network often yield a poor performance in scenarios with multiple co-existing
networks due to too high sending probabilities, we present the first protocol for
provably robust, efficient and fair medium allocation among a set of co-existing
networks (e.g., of a multi-nation conference or of an emergency network). Inter-
estingly, with simple adaption, our protocol could even be used in scenarios where
the throughput is required to be distributed according to some specific proportions
among the co-existing networks (not necessarily fair). For instance, a spectrum
owner may require the co-existing networks to use only a share of the medium that
corresponds to the negotiated or auctioned share.
We believe that our work raises a series of interesting questions for future
research. For example, we have assumed a rather naive interference model and it
would be interesting to generalize our results for the SINR physical interference
model.
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Chapter 6
THE SINRMAC PROTOCOL
The protocols proposed in the previous four chapters (i.e., JADE, ANTIJAM, SE-
LECT, and COMAC) work under the protocol interference model, i.e., the interfer-
ence is modeled by either single-hop or UDG networks. In the protocol interference
model, the impact of interference from neighboring nodes is binary and completely
depends on whether or not the node falls within the interference range of non-
intended transmitters. In particular, if the UDG is used, then the transmission range
and the interference range are the same, and equal to 1 (note that the distance is
normalized). Hence, under the UDG model, interference from the nodes outside
the receiver node’s interference range can be ignored completely, which greatly
simplifies the theoretical analysis of the protocols.
However, it seems difficult to go beyond these simplistic interference mod-
els. The next big step forward would certainly be a result on the widely used and
more realistic Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise-Ratio (SINR) model. A crucial dif-
ference from the previous models such as the UDG model is the fact that in the
SINR model, nodes cannot always objectively distinguish an idle medium from a
busy one. This however was a central assumption of the MAC protocols presented
so far as it was used to adjust the nodes’ backoff periods: in times of an idling
medium, the medium access probability was increased, and in times of a successful
transmission, the medium access probability was decreased.
We report on our endeavor to generalize our previous results to the SINR
model. Concretely, we describe a first algorithm where each node maintains a noise
threshold to determine whether the channel is idle or busy, and then adjust its access
probability and noise threshold accordingly in an adaptive fashion.
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We assume that the wireless nodes V (n = |V | many) are distributed ar-
bitrarily in the 2-dimensional Euclidean plane, and that they communicate over a
wireless network with a single channel. We also assume the nodes are backlogged
in the sense that they always have something to broadcast. The SINR model de-
fines a parameter called minimum signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at
which a data frame can still be received with a reasonably low frame error rate.1
In other words, these SINR values specify the transmission range of the data trans-
mission mechanism, i.e., the maximum range within which data frames can still
be received correctly. The SINR model is first introduced in [24], which accounts
for the SINR at the receiver end of a communication link to determine whether the
transmission is successful. More specifically, a message sent from node u to node v
is successfully received by node v if and only if
Pv(u)
N +∑w∈S Pv(w)
≥ β1
where Pv(u) is the received power at node v of the signal transmitted by
node u, N captures the background noise (e.g., thermal), S is the subset of nodes
in V \ {u,v} that are concurrently transmitting, and β1 is the SINR threshold that
depends on the desired rate, the modulation scheme, etc.
In wireless communications, the value of the received signal power at a
node r of a signal transmitted by node y, i.e., Px(y), is a decreasing function of the
distance d(x,y) between node x and node y. More specifically,
Px(y) =
Py
d(x,y)α
, (6.1)
where Py is the sending power of node y, and α ≥ 2 is the pass-loss exponent (in
[40]), which is a constant between 2 and 6, and depends on external conditions of
1For example, according to [55], the minimum SINR for 802.11b are 10dB for 11Mbps down
to 4dB for 1Mbps.
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the medium as well as the exact sender-receiver distance. Although, in practise
the received signal power may be different from 6.1, due to the reason that obsta-
cles in the transmission medium may have an impact on the signal power at the
receiver end. To better approximate the path loss, both [55] and [40] use the more
generalized signal propagation model. However, as an initial study of designing
jamming-resistant MAC protocols under SINR, we focus on the most basic signal
propagation model which is indicated by 6.1.
For our formal description and analysis, we assume a synchronized setting
where time proceeds in time steps called rounds. In each round, a node u may either
transmit a message (at a certain power level) or sense the channel, but it cannot do
both. A node which is sensing the channel may either (i) sense an idle channel, (ii)
sense a busy channel, or (iii) receive a packet.
In the UDG model, the three cases can easily be distinguished in the follow-
ing manner: idle means no other node in a node u’s transmission range is transmit-
ting at that round and the channel is not jammed, busy means two or more nodes
in u’s transmission range transmit at that round or the channel is jammed, and suc-
cessful reception occurs if exactly one node in u’s transmission range transmits at
that round and the channel is not jammed. In the SINR model, things are more
complicated. In order to distinguish between an idle and a busy channel, a node
may use a certain threshold β2: if the measured signal power exceeds β2, a channel
is considered busy, otherwise idle. Whether a message is successfully received is
determined by the SINR rule described above. (There is at most one successful
reception at any moment of time.)
We assume that in addition to the nodes there is an adversary: the idea
is that our conservative definition of adversary subsumes many different forms of
intentional and unintentional interference. Concretely, like in [6], we want to allow
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the adversary to know the protocol and its entire history and to use this knowledge in
order to jam the wireless channel at will at any round (i.e, the adversary is adaptive).
However, unlike in previous works [6], the adversary is not bounded over time in
the sense that it can only jam a subset of the time periods, but with respect to
energy: for each time period of length T , the adversary has a certain energy budget
to disrupt communications. Rather than assuming some jammer locations in the
Euclidean plane from which it can transmit at different energy levels, we propose
a model where the jammer has a certain budget Bv for each wireless node v ∈ V .
Henceforth, we assume that this budget is the same for every node and we will
simply refer to it by B. Such a jammer is called a (B,T )-bounded adversary: in
every time interval of size w ≥ T , the adversary can add B ·w/T to the noise level
N of each node.
Our goal is to design a symmetric local-control MAC protocol (i.e., there is
no central authority controlling the nodes, and all the nodes are executing the same
protocol) that has a “competitive” throughput against any (B,T )-bounded adversary
in any multi-hop network that can be modeled by SINR. Intuitively, we want to call
a MAC protocol competitive if the number of successful message receptions at the
nodes is a “large” fraction of the messages that would have been received if the
adversarial contributions to the noiseN are subtracted in the SINR formula for the
corresponding time steps.
6.1 Description of SINRMAC
Basically, the SINRMAC protocol we propose is a random backoff protocol,
but with a twist: the nodes do not only backoff once their messages collide, but
maintain a “backoff counter” which is adapted over time and reflects the current
channel state (see also [6]). Rather than storing the backoff counter itself, each
node v in SINRMAC stores a medium access probability pv (between 0 and some
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upper bound pˆ < 1). The idea is that in times of an idling channel, pv is increased
(message transmissions become more likely), whereas in times of a busy medium,
pv is decreased. Unfortunately, unlike in the UDG model, such a distinction is not
possible in the SINR model, because absolute silence on the channel no longer ex-
ists due to background noise and the jammer. Hence, it is hard to tell from a node’s
point of view that the noise it senses at a particular time step is due to background
noise, message collisions, adversarial jamming, or any combination of these.
In SINRMAC, each node v maintains pv (in some sense, the inverse of a
random backoff timer), a noise threshold estimate τv to distinguish between idle
and non-idle time periods, plus a time window threshold Tv, and a counter cv. (The
threshold Tv is necessary since an accurate estimation of T allows v to adjust its pv
correctly and in a timely manner.) Finally, the nodes share a common small factor γ
with which the cumulative sending probabilities are adjusted, and a constant value
c, which is used to additively adjust τv. In the following, let Nv be the noise level
(background noise plus concurrent transmissions plus jamming) at node v.
In order to find a good equilibrium and achieve a high throughput, the pv
and τv values need to converge to meaningful values quickly. This constitutes a
non-trivial challenge. If there are no successful message transmissions, a node v
cannot decide whether τv is too high or too low. Fortunately, however, in practice
one may determine some reasonable upper bound τˆ for τv, as, e.g., (1) the RSSI
register (i.e., Received Signal Strength Indicator which measures the power of a
received radio signal) is of limited size and constitutes a natural upper bound, or as
(2) according to [9], a constant density of transmitter nodes in the network implies
that interference from far-away nodes can be bounded by a constant. Given such an
upper bound, it seems feasible to come up with MAC protocols which find a good
equilibrium (in terms of pv and τv values in a certain region), even in the presence
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of adversaries.
Our solution, the SINRMACprotocol, is formally described in Algorithm 4.
The algorithm is essentially interpreting any noise floor smaller than τv as an idle
channel and increases the sending probabilities accordingly; if on the other hand
the noise is relatively high, the sending probabilities are reduced, but only after Tv
rounds where the channel was not idle.
In SINRMAC, each node adapts τv additively and pv multiplicatively, based
on the channel states. Concretely, we decrease τv by 2c if there is not much noise
(Nv < τv), but only increase it by c otherwise: thus, in an equilibrium, we strive for
a 2 : 1 ratio of busy to idle time periods.
Algorithm 4 SINRMAC
1: Initially, every node v sets Tv := 1, cv := 1, pv := pˆ, and τv := 0.1.
2: Afterwards, the protocol proceeds in synchronized rounds:
3: v decides with probability pv to send a message
4: if v decides not to send a message then
5: v senses the channel
6: if a message is successfully received then
7: pv = pv/(1+ γ)
8: else if Nv < τv then
9: τv := max{τv−2c,0}
10: pv := min{(1+ γ)pv, pˆ}
11: Tv := max{Tv−1,1}
12: else if Nv ≥ τv then
13: τv := min{τv+ c, τˆ}
14: if cv ≥ Tv then
15: cv := 1
16: if no idle channel in past Tv rounds then
17: pv := pv/(1+ γ)
18: Tv := Tv+2
19: end if
20: end if
21: end if
22: end if
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6.2 First Results
Although intuitively, adapting τv seems to be crucial to accurately react to
the channel states and converge to a good throughput, our first experiments indicate
that static τv values (fixed at the maximal possible reception power) are better, if
the fixed value for τv is chosen appropriately. In the following, we report on our
preliminary simulation study to evaluate the performance of our protocol in terms
of throughput and as a function of the network size. We define throughput as the
number of messages successfully received in the whole network per round per node.
In our network, nodes are distributed uniformly in a two-dimensional plane of size
7×7. The number of nodes n ∈ [10,200]. We implement a (B,T )-bounded adver-
sary which jams the channel using a random amount of energy from its remaining
budget. The transmission power for all nodes is set to 4, the SINR ratio is β1 = 6,
and T = 50. We set c = 0.1, and consider pˆ = 1/24.
We evaluate four different schemes for adapting τv: the first one initializes
τv = 1 and adapts τv based on “idle” and “busy” channel states afterwards (see
Algorithm 4); the other three schemes use a fixed τv (from {1,4,40}).
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Figure 6.1: Normalized throughput as a function of the network size and under
different τv adaption schemes. The result is averaged over 10 runs.
Figure 6.1 shows an exemplary dependency of the throughput on the differ-
132
ent τv schemes when pˆ := 1/24. We see that fixing τv at 1 produce the best through-
put result. More specifically, when the network density is low (i.e., n≤ 70), fixing
τv at {1,4,40} results better throughput than adapting τv. This is because when node
density is low, the network needs to have increase cumulative probability in order
to experience more successful transmissions, and in order to achieve this, there has
to be sufficient number of “idle” channels sensed by the nodes. Fixing τv at a rela-
tively high value (note that when τv is adaptive, it is initialized to 0.1), nodes would
sense “idle” channels more frequently. However, as the network size grows, adap-
tively adjusting τv produces better result than fixing τv at {4,40}, simply because
if the network density is high enough, the value of τv should be lower, so that by
having more “busy” channels, the cumulative probability of the network would be
deceased accordingly to maintain at an appropriate level. Although based on our
intuition, adapting τv should give us better throughput when node density is high,
fixing τv at 1 makes the throughput result remains around 30%, and is much better
than our adaptive strategy. The throughput produced by our adaptive strategy for
τv drops below 10% when n ≥ 130. Here, being able to identify the busy channels
and decrease access probabilities accordingly is crucial for the protocol to achieve a
good throughput. As we can see from the simulation result, our adaptive approach
for τv still needs improvement, because it cannot always reach to an appropriate
value so that the throughput is maximized.
6.3 Conclusion
We propose a preliminary MAC protocol for the SINR model under jam-
ming activities. We found that our adaptive idle/busy threshold adaption strategy
scales better than a static strategy.
In our future work, we plan to rigorously evaluate different adapting schemes
for τv, and study our algorithm under more sophisticated and worst-case adver-
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saries, not only empirically but hopefully also by deriving performance proofs. Ob-
viously, in this process, changes to the protocol presented here may be required.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this dissertation, we study the problem of designing and analyzing efficient MAC
protocols that are robust against strong adversarial jamming. How to efficiently ac-
cess the wireless medium, which is a limited resource, is one of the most important
problems in wireless computing.
Four jamming-resistant MAC protocols and a leader election protocol, which
work under different interference and network models, are presented. More specif-
ically, JADE can achieve constant competitive throughput against the adaptive but
non-reactive adversary in multi-hop wireless networks that can be modeled as UDG;
ANTIJAM can achieve constant competitive throughput against the adaptive and
reactive adversary in single-hop wireless networks; SELECT is a self-stabilizing
leader election protocol that is also robust against adaptive and reactive jamming;
COMAC can achieve constant competitive throughput as well as fairness for K co-
existing networks in a single-hop wireless network environment; SINRMAC is our
first attempt to explore the possibility of designing jamming-resistant MAC proto-
cols under SINR model.
The next natural step would be to design a jamming-resistant MAC proto-
col under SINR model that can achieve provably high throughput. Also, in all the
protocols presented in this dissertation, we assume the nodes have a common pa-
rameter γ = O( 1logT+log logn). Although such estimate on loglogn and logT still
allows for a superpolynomial increase in n and a polynomial increase in T without
violating the assumptions on γ , it would of course be more desirable if γ could be
set to a constant.
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